Alat Bantu Perwasitan pada Pertandingan Taekwondo

Scoring machine is a device to help the referees scoring in a Tae Kwon Do tournament and solve scoring problem (real time).Three corner referees score the match using the push button provided. The score will come out if two or more referees pushed the same buttons in 2 seconds. The result will be automatically shown in scoring board

Prizes and Lemons: Procurement of Innovation under Imperfect Commitment

The literature on R&D contests implicitly assumes that contestants submit their innovation regardless of its value. This ignores a potential adverse selection problem. The present paper analyzes the procurement of innovations when the procurer cannot commit to never bargain with innovators who bypass the contest. We compare ?xed-prize tournaments with and without entry fees, and optimal scoring auctions with and without minimum score requirement. Our main result is that the optimal ?xed-prize tournament is more pro?table than the optimal auction since preventing bypass is more costly in the optimal auction

Prizes and Lemons: Procurement of Innovation under Imperfect Commitment

The literature on R&D contests implicitly assumes that contestants submit their innovation regardless of its value. This ignores a potential adverse selection problem. The present paper analyzes the procurement of innovations when the procurer cannot commit to never bargain with innovators who bypass the contest. We compare ?xed-prize tournaments with and without entry fees, and optimal scoring auctions with and without minimum score requirement. Our main result is that the optimal ?xed-prize tournament is more pro?table than the optimal auction since preventing bypass is more costly in the optimal auction.innovation; contests; tournaments; auctions; bargaining; adverse

Manipulating Tournaments in Cup and Round Robin Competitions

In sports competitions, teams can manipulate the result by, for instance, throwing games. We show that we can decide how to manipulate round robin and cup competitions, two of the most popular types of sporting competitions in polynomial time. In addition, we show that finding the minimal number of games that need to be thrown to manipulate the result can also be determined in polynomial time. Finally, we show that there are several different variations of standard cup competitions where manipulation remains polynomial.Comment: Proceedings of Algorithmic Decision Theory, First International Conference, ADT 2009, Venice, Italy, October 20-23, 200

On the additivity of preference aggregation methods

The paper reviews some axioms of additivity concerning ranking methods used for generalized tournaments with possible missing values and multiple comparisons. It is shown that one of the most natural properties, called consistency, has strong links to independence of irrelevant comparisons, an axiom judged unfavourable when players have different opponents. Therefore some directions of weakening consistency are suggested, and several ranking methods, the score, generalized row sum and least squares as well as fair bets and its two variants (one of them entirely new) are analysed whether they satisfy the properties discussed. It turns out that least squares and generalized row sum with an appropriate parameter choice preserve the relative ranking of two objects if the ranking problems added have the same comparison structure.Comment: 24 pages, 9 figure

Ranking in Swiss system chess team tournaments

The paper uses paired comparison-based scoring procedures for ranking the participants of a Swiss system chess team tournament. We present the main challenges of ranking in Swiss system, the features of individual and team competitions as well as the failures of official lexicographical orders. The tournament is represented as a ranking problem, our model is discussed with respect to the properties of the score, generalized row sum and least squares methods. The proposed procedure is illustrated with a detailed analysis of the two recent chess team European championships. Final rankings are compared by their distances and visualized with multidimensional scaling (MDS). Differences to official ranking are revealed by the decomposition of least squares method. Rankings are evaluated by prediction accuracy, retrodictive performance, and stability. The paper argues for the use of least squares method with a results matrix favoring match points

Do Tournaments Have Incentive Effects?

Much attention has been devoted to studying models of tournaments or situations in which an individual\u27s payment depends only on his or her output or rank relative to that of other competitors. Academic interest derives from the fact that under certain sets of assumptions, tournaments have desirable normative properties because of the incentive structures they provide. Our paper uses nonexperimental data to test whether tournaments actually elicit effort responses. We focus on professional golf tournaments because information on the incentive structure (prize distribution) and measures of individual output (players\u27 scores) are both available. We find strong support for the proposition that the level and structure of prizes in PGA tournaments influence players\u27 performance

A graph interpretation of the least squares ranking method

The paper aims at analyzing the least squares ranking method for generalized tournaments with possible missing and multiple paired comparisons. The bilateral relationships may reflect the outcomes of a sport competition, product comparisons, or evaluation of political candidates and policies. It is shown that the rating vector can be obtained as a limit point of an iterative process based on the scores in almost all cases. The calculation is interpreted on an undirected graph with loops attached to some nodes, revealing that the procedure takes into account not only the given object's results but also the strength of objects compared with it. We explore the connection between this method and another procedure defined for ranking the nodes in a digraph, the positional power measure. The decomposition of the least squares solution offers a number of ways to modify the method