276 research outputs found

    Minimal Stable Sets in Tournaments

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    We propose a systematic methodology for defining tournament solutions as extensions of maximality. The central concepts of this methodology are maximal qualified subsets and minimal stable sets. We thus obtain an infinite hierarchy of tournament solutions, which encompasses the top cycle, the uncovered set, the Banks set, the minimal covering set, the tournament equilibrium set, the Copeland set, and the bipartisan set. Moreover, the hierarchy includes a new tournament solution, the minimal extending set, which is conjectured to refine both the minimal covering set and the Banks set.Comment: 29 pages, 4 figures, changed conten

    Consensus theories: an oriented survey

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    This article surveys seven directions of consensus theories: Arrowian results, federation consensus rules, metric consensus rules, tournament solutions, restricted domains, abstract consensus theories, algorithmic and complexity issues. This survey is oriented in the sense that it is mainly – but not exclusively – concentrated on the most significant results obtained, sometimes with other searchers, by a team of French searchers who are or were full or associate members of the Centre d'Analyse et de Mathématique Sociale (CAMS).Consensus theories ; Arrowian results ; aggregation rules ; metric consensus rules ; median ; tournament solutions ; restricted domains ; lower valuations ; median semilattice ; complexity

    Ordinally consistent tournament solutions

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    A set ranking method assigns to each tournament on a given set an ordering of the subsets of that set. Such a method is consistent if (i) the items in the set are ranked in the same order as the sets of items they beat and (ii) the ordering of the items fully determines the ordering of the sets of items. We describe two consistent set ranking methods

    Computing Tournament Solutions using Relation Algebra and REL VIEW

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    We describe a simple computing technique for the tournament choice problem. It rests upon a relational modeling and uses the BDD-based computer system RelView for the evaluation of the relation-algebraic expressions that specify the solutions and for the visualization of the computed results. The Copeland set can immediately be identified using RelView's labeling feature. Relation-algebraic specifications of the Condorcet non-losers, the Schwartz set, the top cycle, the uncovered set, the minimal covering set, the Banks set, and the tournament equilibrium set are delivered. We present an example of a tournament on a small set of alternatives, for which the above choice sets are computed and visualized via RelView. The technique described in this paper is very flexible and especially appropriate for prototyping and experimentation, and as such very instructive for educational purposes. It can easily be applied to other problems of social choice and game theory.Tournament, relational algebra, RelView, Copeland set, Condorcet non-losers, Schwartz set, top cycle, uncovered set, minimal covering set, Banks set, tournament equilibrium set.

    Robust Bounds on Choosing from Large Tournaments

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    Tournament solutions provide methods for selecting the "best" alternatives from a tournament and have found applications in a wide range of areas. Previous work has shown that several well-known tournament solutions almost never rule out any alternative in large random tournaments. Nevertheless, all analytical results thus far have assumed a rigid probabilistic model, in which either a tournament is chosen uniformly at random, or there is a linear order of alternatives and the orientation of all edges in the tournament is chosen with the same probabilities according to the linear order. In this work, we consider a significantly more general model where the orientation of different edges can be chosen with different probabilities. We show that a number of common tournament solutions, including the top cycle and the uncovered set, are still unlikely to rule out any alternative under this model. This corresponds to natural graph-theoretic conditions such as irreducibility of the tournament. In addition, we provide tight asymptotic bounds on the boundary of the probability range for which the tournament solutions select all alternatives with high probability.Comment: Appears in the 14th Conference on Web and Internet Economics (WINE), 201

    Recognizing Members of the Tournament Equilibrium Set is NP-hard

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    A recurring theme in the mathematical social sciences is how to select the "most desirable" elements given a binary dominance relation on a set of alternatives. Schwartz's tournament equilibrium set (TEQ) ranks among the most intriguing, but also among the most enigmatic, tournament solutions that have been proposed so far in this context. Due to its unwieldy recursive definition, little is known about TEQ. In particular, its monotonicity remains an open problem up to date. Yet, if TEQ were to satisfy monotonicity, it would be a very attractive tournament solution concept refining both the Banks set and Dutta's minimal covering set. We show that the problem of deciding whether a given alternative is contained in TEQ is NP-hard.Comment: 9 pages, 3 figure

    Refinements and Randomised Versions of Some Tournament Solutions

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    We consider voting rules that are based on the majority graph. Such rules typically output large sets of winners. Our goal is to investigate a general method which leads to refinements of such rules. In particular, we use the idea of parallel universes, where each universe is connected with a permutation over alternatives. The permutation allows us to construct resolute voting rules (i.e. rules that always choose unique winners). Such resolute rules can be constructed in a variety of ways: we consider using binary voting trees to select a single alternative. In turn this permits the construction of neutral rules that output the set the possible winners of every parallel universe. The question of which rules can be constructed in this way has already been partially studied under the heading of agenda implementability. We further propose a randomised version in which the probability of being the winner is the ratio of universes in which the alternative wins. We also investigate (typically novel) rules that elect the alternatives that have maximal winning probability. These rules typically output small sets of winners, thus provide refinements of known tournament solutions

    Who Can Win a Single-Elimination Tournament?

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    A single-elimination (SE) tournament is a popular way to select a winner in both sports competitions and in elections. A natural and well-studied question is the tournament fixing problem (TFP): given the set of all pairwise match outcomes, can a tournament organizer rig an SE tournament by adjusting the initial seeding so that their favorite player wins? We prove new sufficient conditions on the pairwise match outcome information and the favorite player, under which there is guaranteed to be a seeding where the player wins the tournament. Our results greatly generalize previous results. We also investigate the relationship between the set of players that can win an SE tournament under some seeding (so called SE winners) and other traditional tournament solutions. In addition, we generalize and strengthen prior work on probabilistic models for generating tournaments. For instance, we show that \emph{every} player in an nn player tournament generated by the Condorcet Random Model will be an SE winner even when the noise is as small as possible, p=Θ(lnn/n)p=\Theta(\ln n/n); prior work only had such results for pΩ(lnn/n)p\geq \Omega(\sqrt{\ln n/n}). We also establish new results for significantly more general generative models.Comment: A preliminary version appeared in Proceedings of the 30th AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI), 201
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