256 research outputs found
Private Communication Detection via Side-Channel Attacks
Private communication detection (PCD) enables an ordinary network user to discover communication patterns (e.g., call time, length, frequency, and initiator) between two or more private parties. Analysis of communication patterns between private parties has historically been a powerful tool used by intelligence, military, law-enforcement and business organizations because it can reveal the strength of tie between these parties. Ordinary users are assumed to have neither eavesdropping capabilities (e.g., the network may employ strong anonymity measures) nor the legal authority (e.g. no ability to issue a warrant to network providers) to collect private-communication records. We show that PCD is possible by ordinary users merely by sending packets to various network end-nodes and analyzing the responses. Three approaches for PCD are proposed based on a new type of side channels caused by resource contention, and defenses are proposed. The Resource-Saturation PCD exploits the resource contention (e.g., a fixed-size buffer) by sending carefully designed packets and monitoring different responses. Its effectiveness has been demonstrated on three commercial closed-source VoIP phones. The Stochastic PCD shows that timing side channels in the form of probing responses, which are caused by distinct resource-contention responses when different applications run in end nodes, enable effective PCD despite network and proxy-generated noise (e.g., jitter, delays). It was applied to WiFi and Instant Messaging for resource contention in the radio channel and the keyboard, respectively. Similar analysis enables practical Sybil node detection. Finally, the Service-Priority PCD utilizes the fact that 3G/2G mobile communication systems give higher priority to voice service than data service. This allows detection of the busy status of smartphones, and then discovery of their call records by correlating the busy status. This approach was successfully applied to iPhone and Android phones in AT&T's network. An additional, unanticipated finding was that an Internet user could disable a 2G phone's voice service by probing it with short enough intervals (e.g., 1 second). PCD defenses can be traditional side-channel countermeasures or PCD-specific ones, e.g., monitoring and blocking suspicious periodic network traffic
Mitigating Distributed Denial of Service Attacks in an Anonymous Routing Environment: Client Puzzles and Tor
Online intelligence operations use the Internet to gather information on the activities of U.S. adversaries. The security of these operations is paramount, and one way to avoid being linked to the Department of Defense (DoD) is to use anonymous communication systems. One such system, Tor, makes interactive TCP services anonymous. Tor uses the Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol and is thus vulnerable to a distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attack that can significantly delay data traversing the Tor network. This research uses client puzzles to mitigate TLS DDoS attacks. A novel puzzle protocol, the Memoryless Puzzle Protocol (MPP), is conceived, implemented, and analyzed for anonymity and DDoS vulnerabilities. Consequently, four new secondary DDoS and anonymity attacks are identified and defenses are proposed. Furthermore, analysis of the MPP identified and resolved two important shortcomings of the generalized client puzzle technique. Attacks that normally induce victim CPU utilization rates of 80-100% are reduced to below 70%. Also, the puzzle implementation allows for user-data latency to be reduced by close to 50% during a large-scale attack .Finally, experimental results show successful mitigation can occur without sending a puzzle to every requesting client. By adjusting the maximum puzzle strength, CPU utilization can be capped at 70% even when an arbitrary client has only a 30% chance of receiving a puzzle
An Empirical Analysis of Privacy in Cryptocurrencies
Cryptocurrencies have emerged as an important technology over the past decade
and have, undoubtedly, become blockchainâs most popular application. Bitcoin has
been by far the most popular out of the thousands of cryptocurrencies that have been
created. Some of the features that made Bitcoin such a fascinating technology include
its transactions being made publicly available and permanently stored, and the
ability for anyone to have access. Despite this transparency, it was initially believed
that Bitcoin provides anonymity to its users, since it allowed them to transact using
a pseudonym instead of their real identity. However, a long line of research has
shown that this initial belief was false and that, given the appropriate tools, Bitcoin
transactions can indeed be traced back to the real-life entities performing them.
In this thesis, we perform a survey to examine the anonymity aspect of cryptocurrencies.
We start with early works that made first efforts on analysing how private
this new technology was. We analyse both from the perspective of a passive observer
with eyes only to the public immutable state of transactions, the blockchain,
as well as from an observer who has access to network layer information. We then
look into the projects that aimed to enhance the anonymity provided in cryptocurrencies
and also analyse the evidence of how much they succeeded in practice.
In the first part of our own contributions we present our own take on Bitcoinâs
anonymity, inspired by the research already in place. We manage to extend existing
heuristics and provide a novel methodology on measuring the confidence we have in
our anonymity metrics, instead of looking into the issue from a binary perspective,
as in previous research.
In the second part we provide the first full-scale empirical work on measuring anonymity in a cryptocurrency that was built with privacy guarantees, based on a
very well established cryptography, Zcash. We show that just building a tool which
provides anonymity in theory is very different than the privacy offered in practice
once users start to transact with it.
Finally, we look into a technology that is not a cryptocurrency itself but is built
on top of Bitcoin, thus providing a so-called layer 2 solution, the Lightning network.
Again, our measurements showed some serious privacy concerns of this technology,
some of which were novel and highly applicable
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Design and Implementation of Algorithms for Traffic Classification
Traffic analysis is the practice of using inherent characteristics of a network flow such as timings, sizes, and orderings of the packets to derive sensitive information about it. Traffic analysis techniques are used because of the extensive adoption of encryption and content-obfuscation mechanisms, making it impossible to infer any information about the flows by analyzing their content. In this thesis, we use traffic analysis to infer sensitive information for different objectives and different applications. Specifically, we investigate various applications: p2p cryptocurrencies, flow correlation, and messaging applications. Our goal is to tailor specific traffic analysis algorithms that best capture network trafficâs intrinsic characteristics in those applications for each of these applications. Also, the objective of traffic analysis is different for each of these applications. Specifically, in Bitcoin, our goal is to evaluate Bitcoin trafficâs resilience to blocking by powerful entities such as governments and ISPs. Bitcoin and similar cryptocurrencies play an important role in electronic commerce and other trust-based distributed systems because of their significant advantage over traditional currencies, including open access to global e-commerce. Therefore, it is essential to
the consumers and the industry to have reliable access to their Bitcoin assets. We also examine stepping stone attacks for flow correlation. A stepping stone is a host that an attacker uses to relay her traffic to hide her identity. We introduce two fingerprinting systems, TagIt and FINN. TagIt embeds a secret fingerprint into the flows by moving the packets to specific time intervals. However, FINN utilizes DNNs to embed the fingerprint by changing the inter-packet delays (IPDs) in the flow. In messaging applications, we analyze the WhatsApp messaging service to determine if traffic leaks any sensitive information such as membersâ identity in a particular conversation to the adversaries who watch their encrypted traffic. These messaging applicationsâ privacy is essential because these services provide an environment to dis- cuss politically sensitive subjects, making them a target to government surveillance and censorship in totalitarian countries. We take two technical approaches to design our traffic analysis techniques. The increasing use of DNN-based classifiers inspires our first direction: we train DNN classifiers to perform some specific traffic analysis task. Our second approach is to inspect and model the shape of traffic in the target application and design a statistical classifier for the expected shape of traffic. DNN- based methods are useful when the network is complex, and the trafficâs underlying noise is not linear. Also, these models do not need a meticulous analysis to extract the features. However, deep learning techniques need a vast amount of training data to work well. Therefore, they are not beneficial when there is insufficient data avail- able to train a generalized model. On the other hand, statistical methods have the advantage that they do not have training overhead
On traffic analysis attacks and countermeasures
Security and privacy have gained more and more attention with the rapid growth and
public acceptance of the Internet as a means of communication and information
dissemination. Security and privacy of a computing or network system may be
compromised by a variety of well-crafted attacks.
In this dissertation, we address issues related to security and privacy in computer
network systems. Specifically, we model and analyze a special group of network attacks,
known as traffic analysis attacks, and develop and evaluate their countermeasures.
Traffic analysis attacks aim to derive critical information by analyzing traffic over a
network. We focus our study on two classes of traffic analysis attacks: link-load analysis
attacks and flow-connectivity analysis attacks.
Our research has made the following conclusions:
1. We have found that an adversary may effectively discover link load by passively
analyzing selected statistics of packet inter-arrival times of traffic flows on a
network link. This is true even if some commonly used countermeasures (e.g.,
link padding) have been deployed. We proposed an alternative effective countermeasure to counter this passive traffic analysis attack. Our extensive
experimental results indicated this to be an effective approach.
2. Our newly proposed countermeasure may not be effective against active traffic
analysis attacks, which an adversary may also use to discover the link load. We
developed methodologies in countering these kinds of active attacks.
3. To detect the connectivity of a flow, an adversary may embed a recognizable
pattern of marks into traffic flows by interference. We have proposed new
countermeasures based on the digital filtering technology. Experimental results
have demonstrated the effectiveness of our method.
From our research, it is obvious that traffic analysis attacks present a serious
challenge to the design of a secured computer network system. It is the objective of this
study to develop robust but cost-effective solutions to counter link-load analysis attacks
and flow-connectivity analysis attacks. It is our belief that our methodology can provide
a solid foundation for studying the entire spectrum of traffic analysis attacks and their
countermeasures
Hardening Tor Hidden Services
Tor is an overlay anonymization network that provides anonymity for clients surfing the web but also allows hosting anonymous services called hidden services. These enable whistleblowers and political activists to express their opinion and resist censorship. Administrating a hidden service is not trivial and requires extensive knowledge because Tor uses a comprehensive protocol and relies on volunteers. Meanwhile, attackers can spend significant resources to decloak them. This thesis aims to improve the security of hidden services by providing practical guidelines and a theoretical architecture. First, vulnerabilities specific to hidden services are analyzed by conducting an academic literature review. To model realistic real-world attackers, court documents are analyzed to determine their procedures. Both literature reviews classify the identified vulnerabilities into general categories.
Afterward, a risk assessment process is introduced, and existing risks for hidden services and their operators are determined. The main contributions of this thesis are practical guidelines for hidden service operators and a theoretical architecture. The former provides operators with a good overview of practices to mitigate attacks. The latter is a comprehensive infrastructure that significantly increases the security of hidden services and alleviates problems in the Tor protocol. Afterward, limitations and the transfer into practice are analyzed. Finally, future research possibilities are determined
Privacy-preserving deanonymization of Dark Web Tor Onion services for criminal investigations
Tese de Mestrado, Engenharia InformĂĄtica, 2022, Universidade de Lisboa, Faculdade de CiĂȘnciasTor is one of the most popular anonymity networks in the world. Users of this platform range from
dissidents to cybercriminals or even ordinary citizens concerned with their privacy. It is based on advanced security mechanisms that provide strong guarantees against traffic correlation attacks that can
deanonymize its users and services.
Torpedo is the first known traffic correlation attack on Tor that aims at deanonymizing onion servicesâ
(OS) sessions. In a federated way, servers belonging to ISPs around the globe can process deanonymization queries of specific IPs. With the abstraction of an interface, these queries can be submitted by an
operator to deanonymize OSes and clients. Initial results showed that this attack was able to identify the
IP addresses of OS sessions with high confidence (no false positives).
However, Torpedo required ISPs to share sensitive network traffic of their clients between each other.
Thus, in this work, we seek to complement the previously developed research with the introduction
and study of privacy-preserving machine learning techniques, aiming to develop and assess a new attack
vector on Tor that can preserve the privacy of the inputs of each party involved in a computation, allowing
ISPs to encrypt their network traffic before correlation.
In more detail, we leverage, test and assess a ML-oriented multi-party computation framework on top
of Torpedo (TF Encrypted) and we also develop a preliminary extension for training the model with
differential privacy using TF Privacy.
Our evaluation concludes that the performance and precision of the system were not significantly affected by the execution of multi-party computation between ISPs, but the same was not true when we
additionally introduced a pre-defined amount of random noise to the gradients by training the model with
differential privac
On privacy in home automation systems
Home Automation Systems (HASs) are becoming increasingly popular in newly built as well as existing properties. While offering increased living comfort, resource saving features and other commodities, most current commercial systems do not protect sufficiently against passive attacks. In this thesis we investigate privacy aspects of Home Automation Systems. We analyse the threats of eavesdropping and traffic analysis attacks, demonstrating the risks of virtually undetectable privacy violations. By taking aspects of criminal and data protection law into account, we give an interdisciplinary overview of privacy risks and challenges in the context of HASs. We present the first framework to formally model privacy guarantees of Home Automation Systems and apply it to two different dummy traffic generation schemes. In a qualitative and quantitative study of these two algorithms, we show how provable privacy protection can be achieved and how privacy and energy efficiency are interdependent. This allows manufacturers to design and build secure Home Automation Systems which protect the users' privacy and which can be arbitrarily tuned to strike a compromise between privacy protection and energy efficiency.Hausautomationssysteme (HAS) gewinnen sowohl im Bereich der Neubauten als auch bei Bestandsimmobilien stetig an Beliebtheit. WĂ€hrend sie den Wohnkomfort erhöhen, Einsparpotential fĂŒr Strom und Wasser sowie weitere VorzĂŒge bieten, schĂŒtzen aktuelle Systeme nicht ausreichend vor passiven Angriffen. In dieser Arbeit untersuchen wir Aspekte des Datenschutzes von Hausautomationssystemen. Wir betrachten die Gefahr des Abfangens von Daten sowie der Verkehrsanalyse und zeigen die Risiken auf, welche sich durch praktisch unsichtbare Angriffe fĂŒr Nutzende ergeben. Die Betrachtung straf- und datenschutzrechtlicher Aspekte ermöglicht einen interdisziplinĂ€ren Ăberblick ĂŒber Datenschutzrisiken im Kontext von HAS. Wir stellen das erste Rahmenwerk zur formellen Modellierung von Datenschutzgarantien in Hausautomationssystemen vor und demonstrieren die Anwendung an zwei konkreten Verfahren zur Generierung von Dummy-Verkehr. In einer qualitativen und quantitativen Studie der zwei Algorithmen zeigen wir, wie Datenschutzgarantien erreicht werden können und wie sie mit der Energieeffizienz von HAS zusammenhĂ€ngen. Dies erlaubt Herstellern die Konzeption und Umsetzung von Hausautomationssystemen, welche die PrivatsphĂ€re der Nutzenden schĂŒtzen und die eine freie Parametrisierung ermöglichen, um einen Kompromiss zwischen Datenschutz und Energieeffizienz zu erreichen
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