Intertemporal Choice of Fuzzy Soft Sets

This paper first merges two noteworthy aspects of choice. On the one hand, soft sets and fuzzy soft sets are popular models that have been largely applied to decision making problems, such as real estate valuation, medical diagnosis (glaucoma, prostate cancer, etc.), data mining, or international trade. They provide crisp or fuzzy parameterized descriptions of the universe of alternatives. On the other hand, in many decisions, costs and benefits occur at different points in time. This brings about intertemporal choices, which may involve an indefinitely large number of periods. However, the literature does not provide a model, let alone a solution, to the intertemporal problem when the alternatives are described by (fuzzy) parameterizations. In this paper, we propose a novel soft set inspired model that applies to the intertemporal framework, hence it fills an important gap in the development of fuzzy soft set theory. An algorithm allows the selection of the optimal option in intertemporal choice problems with an infinite time horizon. We illustrate its application with a numerical example involving alternative portfolios of projects that a public administration may undertake. This allows us to establish a pioneering intertemporal model of choice in the framework of extended fuzzy set theorie

The New Basel Accord and the Nature of Risk: A Game Theoretic Perspective

Basel II changes risk management in banks strongly. Internal rating procedures would lead one to expect that banks are changing over to active risk control. But, if risk management is no longer a simple "game against nature", if all agents involved are active players then a shift from a non-strategic model setting (measuring event risk stochastically) to a more general strategic model setting (measuring behavioral risk adequately) comes true. Knowing that a game is any situation in which the players make strategic decisions – i.e., decisions that take into account each other's actions and responses – game theory is a useful set of tools for better understanding different risk settings. Embedded in a short history of the Basel Accord in this article we introduce some basic ideas of game theory in the context of rating procedures in accordance with Basel II. As well, some insight is given how game theory works. Here, the primary value of game theory stems from its focus on behavioral risk: risk when all agents are presumed rational, each attempting to anticipate likely actions and reactions by its rivals --New Basel Accord,event risk,behavioral risk,rating,simple game,Nash-equilibrium,game theory

The Penalty-Duel and Institutional Design: Is there a Neeskens-Effect?

nonesoccer, game theory, sports

Options for transporting Russian gas to Western Europe: A game-theoretic simulation analysis

This paper examines the perspectives of Russian gas exports to Western Europe and the strategic options of the CIS gas transiting countries, namely Ukraine and Belarus. The development of a new transit corridor through Belarus (the Yamal-Europe pipeline), depriving Ukraine of its former monopoly, has modified the situation profoundly. The thrust of the paper is an analysis of nthe strategies that Ukraine and Belarus may pursue in transiting Russian gas: non-cooperative duopoly, cooperative duopoly, and individual or collective cooperation with Russia. Using a demand function for Western European gas imports from Russia, we estimate prices and quantities for gas transit, the expected profits for Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus, and the resulting import prices for Western Europe. The results indicate that Ukraine suffers a loss of several hundred million USD annually from the market entry of Belarus, Belarus has an incentive to increase its gas transit capacity to at least 56 billion cubic meters, and Russia's profits increase, in particular when it unites its gas sector with Belarus and Ukraine. For Western Europe, all scenarios indicate an increase in welfare through the new pipeline, but also an increasing importance of gas imports from Russia. -- Der Beitrag untersucht die Perspektiven russischer Gasexporte nach Westeuropa und die strategischen Optionen der Gastransitländer Ukraine und Belarus. Durch den Neu- und Ausbau eines Gastransitkorridors durch Belarus (die Jamal-Europa-Pipeline) geht die bisherige Monopolstellung der Ukraine als Transitland verloren. Ziel der Arbeit ist die Modellierung und Quantifizierung unterschiedlicher Wettbewerbsstrategien, wie das nichtkooperative Duopol, das kooperative Duopol, oder die individuelle bzw. kollektive Kooperation der Transitländer mit Russland. Hierfür werden Exportpreise und mengen sowie die resultierenden Gewinne der Spieler geschätzt. Durch den Markteintritt von Belarus ergeben sich erhebliche Verluste für die Ukraine, während sich Belarus mit einem Ausbau seiner Kapazitäten auf 56 Mrd. m3 noch besser stellt. Russlands Gewinne steigen insbesondere durch die vertikale Integration der belarussischen und ukrainischen Gassektoren. Für Westeuropa legen die Ergebnisse erhebliche Wohlfahrtsgewinne durch den Pipelineausbau nahe, gleichzeitig aber auch eine gestiegene Abhängigkeit von Gasimporten aus Russland.Gas,pipelines,strategic behavior,CIS,Russia