544 research outputs found

    False Consensus Voting and Welfare Reducing Polls

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    We consider a process of costly majority voting where people anticipate that others have similar preferences. This perceived consensus of opinion is the outcome of a fully rational Bayesian updating process where individuals consider their own tastes as draws from a population. We show that the correlation in preferences lowers expected turnout. The intuition is that votes have a positive externality on those who don’t participate, which reduces incentives to participate. We study the effects of the public release of information (“polls”) on participation levels. We find that polls raise expected turnout but reduce expected welfare because they stimulate the “wrong” group to participate. As a result, polls frequently predict the wrong outcome. While this lack of prediction power is usually attributed to an imperfect polling technology, we show it may result from the reaction of rational voters to the poll’s accurate information.Majority Voting; Correlated Preferences; False Consensus; Pre-election Polls

    The number of parties and decision-making in legislatures

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    This paper proposes a model of a legislature, formed by several parties, which has to vote for or against a certain bill in the presence of a lobbyist interested in a certain vote outcome. We show that the ease with which the lobbyist can manipulate a legislature decision increases with the number of elected parties, and, consequently, decreases with an electoral threshold. On the other hand, a lower electoral threshold increases the representativeness of a legislature. We combine these two effects in a notion of fairness. We show the existence of an electoral threshold that optimizes the fairness of a political system, which is close to 1–5%. Namely, the optimal threshold (in our sense) is close to thresholds that exist in most parliamentary democracies. © 2021 by the authors. Licensee MDPI, Basel, Switzerland

    A mixed-utility theory of vote choice regret

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    The paper builds upon an original pre- and post-election survey that we conducted before and after the 2015 Canadian election. Directly after Election Day, we asked Canadians for which party they voted, and whether they regret their choice. We find that 39% of them are not perfectly happy with their decision, and 4% even say that they made a bad decision. We show that the propensity to regret can be explained by a mixed-utility theory, whereby voters attempt to maximize a mixture of instrumental and expressive utilities. Our study contributes to the literatures on voting behavior and political economy, which usually considers that voters are either instrumental or expressive, but not both at the same time

    Approximate implementation of Relative Utilitarianism via Groves-Clarke pivotal voting with virtual money

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    `Relative Utilitarianism' (RU) is a version of classical utilitarianism, where each person's utility function is rescaled to range from zero to one. As a voting system, RU is vulnerable to preference exaggeration by strategic voters. The Groves-Clarke Pivotal Mechanism elicits truthful revelation of preferences by requiring each voter to `bid' a sum of real money to cast a pivotal vote. However, this neglects wealth effects and gives disproportionate power to rich voters. We propose a variant of the Pivotal Mechanism using fixed allotments of notional `voting money'; this `Voting Money Pivotal Mechanism' (VMPM) is politically egalitarian and immune to wealth effects. In the large-population limit, the only admissible (i.e. weakly undominated) voting strategies in the VMPM are approximately truthful revelations of preferences; thus the VMPM yields an arbitrarily close approximation of RU

    Dynamic Currency Hedging with Non-Gaussianity and Ambiguity

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    This paper introduces a non-Gaussian dynamic currency hedging strategy for globally diversified investors with ambiguity. Assuming that ambiguity of a typical investor can be measured from market data, we associate it to non-Gaussianity of financial asset returns and compute an optimal ambiguity-adjusted mean-variance (dynamic) currency allocation. Next, we extend the filtered historical simulation method to numerically optimize an arbitrary risk measure, such as the expected shortfall. The out-of-sample backtest results show that the derived non-Gaussian dynamic currency hedging strategy outperforms the benchmarks of constant hedging and dynamic hedging with Gaussianity for all base currencies and net of transaction costs

    Democracy and the Common Good: A Study of the Weighted Majority Rule

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    In this study I analyse the performance of a democratic decision-making rule: the weighted majority rule. It assigns to each voter a number of votes that is proportional to her stakes in the decision. It has been shown that, for collective decisions with two options, the weighted majority rule in combination with self-interested voters maximises the common good when the latter is understood in terms of either the sum-total or prioritarian sum of the voters’ well-being. The main result of my study is that this argument for the weighted majority rule — that it maximises the common good — can be improved along the following three main lines. (1) The argument can be adapted to other criteria of the common good, such as sufficientarian, maximin, leximin or non-welfarist criteria. I propose a generic argument for the collective optimality of the weighted majority rule that works for all of these criteria. (2) The assumption of self-interested voters can be relaxed. First, common-interest voters can be accommodated. Second, even if voters are less than fully competent in judging their self-interest or the common interest, the weighted majority rule is weakly collectively optimal, that is, it almost certainly maximises the common good given large numbers of voters. Third, even for smaller groups of voters, the weighted majority rule still has some attractive features. (3) The scope of the argument can be extended to decisions with more than two options. I state the conditions under which the weighted majority rule maximises the common good even in multi-option contexts. I also analyse the possibility and the detrimental effects of strategic voting. Furthermore, I argue that self-interested voters have reason to accept the weighted majority rule

    Talking About Uncertainty

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    In the first article we review existing theories of uncertainty. We devote particular attention to the relation between metacognition, uncertainty and probabilistic expectations. We also analyse the role of natural language and communication for the emergence and resolution of states of uncertainty. We hypothesize that agents feel uncertainty in relation to their levels of expected surprise, which depends on probabilistic expectations-gaps elicited during communication processes. Under this framework above tolerance levels of expected surprise can be considered informative signals. These signals can be used to coordinate, at the group and social level, processes of revision of probabilistic expectations. When above tolerance levels of uncertainty are explicated by agents through natural language, in communication networks and public information arenas, uncertainty acquires a systemic role of coordinating device for the revision of probabilistic expectations. The second article of this research seeks to empirically demonstrate that we can crowd source and aggregate decentralized signals of uncertainty, i.e. expected surprise, coming from market agents and civil society by using the web and more specifically Twitter as an information source that contains the wisdom of the crowds concerning the degree of uncertainty of targeted communities/groups of agents at a given moment in time. We extract and aggregate these signals to construct a set of civil society uncertainty proxies by country. We model the dependence among our civil society uncertainty indexes and existing policy and market uncertainty proxies, highlighting contagion channels and differences in their reactiveness to real-world events that occurred in the year 2016, like the EU-referendum vote and the US presidential elections. In the third article, we propose a new instrument, called Worldwide Uncertainty Network, to analyse the uncertainty contagion dynamics across time and areas of the world. Such an instrument can be used to identify the systemic importance of countries in terms of their civil society uncertainty social percolation role. Our results show that civil society uncertainty signals coming from the web may be fruitfully used to improve our understanding of uncertainty contagion and amplification mechanisms among countries and between markets, civil society and political systems

    Exploring the Effects on the Electoral College of National and Regional Popular Vote Interstate Compact: An Electoral Engineering Perspective

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    The main purpose of this paper is to explore the consequences of the formation of either a Regional Popular Vote Interstate compact or a National Popular Vote Interstate compact on the functioning of the Electoral College. The two versions of interstate Compact which are considered here differ in only one respect: in one case the interstate compact allocates its electoral votes to the regional popular winner while in the other case it allocates these votes to the national popular winner. They both differ from the ongoing National Popular Vote Interstate Compact as it is assumed that the agreement is effective as soon as the members sign it. The decisiveness and welfare analysis are conducted for a simplified symmetric theoretical version of the Electoral College where the malapportionment problems are absent. The three most popular probabilistic models are considered and the study is conducted either from the self-interest perspective of the initiators of the interstate compact or from a general interest perspective. The analysis combines analytical arguments and simulations
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