Three Centuries of Category Errors in Studies of the Neural Basis of Consciousness and Intentionality

Recent interest in consciousness and the mind-brain problem has been fueled by technological advances in brain imaging and computer modeling in artificial intelligence: can machines be conscious? The machine metaphor originated in Cartesian "reflections" and culminated in 19th century reflexology modeled on Newtonian optics. It replaced the Aquinian view of mind, which was focused on the emergence of intentionality within the body, with control of output by input through brain dynamics. The state variables for neural activity were identified successively with animal spirits, élan vital, electricity, energy, information, and, most recently, Heisenbergian potentia. The source of dynamic structure in brains was conceived to lie outside brains in genetic and environmental determinism. An alternative view has grown in the 20th century from roots in American Pragmatists, particularly John Dewey, and European philosophers, particularly Heidegger and Piaget, by which brains are intrinsically unstable and continually create themselves. This view has new support from neurobiological studies in properties of self-organizing nonlinear dynamic systems. Intentional behavior can only be understood in relation to the chaotic patterns of neural activity that produce it. The machine metaphor remains, but the machine is seen as self-determining

High-Frequency Oscillations in Distributed Neural Networks Reveal the Dynamics of Human Decision Making

We examine the relative timing of numerous brain regions involved in human decisions that are based on external criteria, learned information, personal preferences, or unconstrained internal considerations. Using magnetoencephalography (MEG) and advanced signal analysis techniques, we were able to non-invasively reconstruct oscillations of distributed neural networks in the high-gamma frequency band (60–150 Hz). The time course of the observed neural activity suggested that two-alternative forced choice tasks are processed in four overlapping stages: processing of sensory input, option evaluation, intention formation, and action execution. Visual areas are activated first, and show recurring activations throughout the entire decision process. The temporo-occipital junction and the intraparietal sulcus are active during evaluation of external values of the options, 250–500 ms after stimulus presentation. Simultaneously, personal preference is mediated by cortical midline structures. Subsequently, the posterior parietal and superior occipital cortices appear to encode intention, with different subregions being responsible for different types of choice. The cerebellum and inferior parietal cortex are recruited for internal generation of decisions and actions, when all options have the same value. Action execution was accompanied by activation peaks in the contralateral motor cortex. These results suggest that high-gamma oscillations as recorded by MEG allow a reliable reconstruction of decision processes with excellent spatiotemporal resolution

"Consciousness". Selected Bibliography 1970 - 2001

This is a bibliography of books and articles on consciousness in philosophy, cognitive science, and neuroscience over the last 30 years. There are three main sections, devoted to monographs, edited collections of papers, and articles. The first two of these sections are each divided into three subsections containing books in each of the main areas of research. The third section is divided into 12 subsections, with 10 subject headings for philosophical articles along with two additional subsections for articles in cognitive science and neuroscience. Of course the division is somewhat arbitrary, but I hope that it makes the bibliography easier to use. This bibliography has first been compiled by Thomas Metzinger and David Chalmers to appear in print in two philosophical anthologies on conscious experience (Metzinger 1995a, b). From 1995 onwards it has been continuously updated by Thomas Metzinger, and now is freely available as a PDF-, RTF-, or HTML-file. This bibliography mainly attempts to cover the Anglo-Saxon and German debates, in a non-annotated, fully formatted way that makes it easy to "cut and paste" from the original file. To a certain degree this bibliography also contains items in other languages than English and German - all submissions in other languages are welcome. Last update of current version: July 13th, 2001

Three Centuries of Category Errors in Studies of the Neural Basis of Consciousness and Intentionality.

Recent interest in consciousness and the mind-brain problem has been fueled by technological advances in brain imaging and computer modeling in artificial intelligence: can machines be conscious? The machine metaphor originated in Cartesian "reflections" and culminated in 19th century reflexology modeled on Newtonian optics. It replaced the Aquinian view of mind, which was focused on the emergence of intentionality within the body, with control of output by input through brain dynamics. The state variables for neural activity were identified successively with animal spirits, élan vital, electricity, energy, information, and, most recently, Heisenbergian potentia. The source of dynamic structure in brains was conceived to lie outside brains in genetic and environmental determinism. An alternative view has grown in the 20th century from roots in American Pragmatists, particularly John Dewey, and European philosophers, particularly Heidegger and Piaget, by which brains are intrinsically unstable and continually create themselves. This view has new support from neurobiological studies in properties of self-organizing nonlinear dynamic systems. Intentional behavior can only be understood in relation to the chaotic patterns of neural activity that produce it. The machine metaphor remains, but the machine is seen as self-determining

Three Centuries of Category Errors in Studies of the Neural Basis of Consciousness and Intentionality.

Recent interest in consciousness and the mind-brain problem has been fueled by technological advances in brain imaging and computer modeling in artificial intelligence: can machines be conscious? The machine metaphor originated in Cartesian "reflections" and culminated in 19th century reflexology modeled on Newtonian optics. It replaced the Aquinian view of mind, which was focused on the emergence of intentionality within the body, with control of output by input through brain dynamics. The state variables for neural activity were identified successively with animal spirits, élan vital, electricity, energy, information, and, most recently, Heisenbergian potentia. The source of dynamic structure in brains was conceived to lie outside brains in genetic and environmental determinism. An alternative view has grown in the 20th century from roots in American Pragmatists, particularly John Dewey, and European philosophers, particularly Heidegger and Piaget, by which brains are intrinsically unstable and continually create themselves. This view has new support from neurobiological studies in properties of self-organizing nonlinear dynamic systems. Intentional behavior can only be understood in relation to the chaotic patterns of neural activity that produce it. The machine metaphor remains, but the machine is seen as self-determining

Three Centuries of Category Errors in Studies of the Neural Basis of Consciousness and Intentionality

Recent interest in consciousness and the mind-brain problem has been fueled by technological advances in brain imaging and computer modeling in artificial intelligence: Can machines be conscious? The machine metaphor originated in Cartesian "reflections" and culminated in 19th century reflexology modeled on Newtonian optics. It replaced the Aquinian view of mind, which was focused on the emergence of intentionality within the body, with control of output by input through brain dynamics. The state variables for neural activity were identified successively with animal spirits, lan vital, electricity, energy, information, and, most recently, Heisenbergian potentia. The source of dynamic structure in brains was conceived to lie outside brains in genetic and environmental determinism. An alternative view has grown in the 20th century from roots in American Pragmatists, particularly John Dewey, and European philosophers, particularly Heidegger and Piaget, by which brains are intrinsically unstable and continually create themselves. This view has new support from neurobiological studies in properties of self-organizing nonlinear dynamic systems. Intentional behavior can only be understood in relation to the chaotic patterns of neural activity that produce it. The machine metaphor remains, but the machine is seen as selfdetermining. 1

Intenzionalità e coscienza nella teoria neurodinamica di Walter J. Freeman

In my thesis I analyze Walter J. Freeman’s neurobiologic theory, focusing on the concept of intentionality, which is the conceptual tool that Freeman uses to explain how the brain works and how it interacts with the body, the environment and the other brains. According to Freeman, intentionality is the process of creation of meanings, developed in a cyclic dynamic of hypothesis, actions and tests that allows the adaptation of the subjects to the world. This interpretation, supported by specific theories about consciousness, causality, meanings and representations, clearly differs from the most common use of the term, that describes intentionality as the mind property of referring thoughts to objects. In this work I try to determine the consequences of this distinction, not only in the matter of neurodynamics but also about the mind-body problem and other topics of philosophy of mind