Valuing Anger

It is widely acknowledged that susceptibility to suitable emotional responses is part of what it is to value something. Indeed, the value of at least some things calls for such emotional responses – if we lack them, we don’t respond appropriately to their value. In this paper, I argue that susceptibility to anger is an essential component of valuing other people, ourselves, and our relationships. The main reason is that various modes of valuing, such as respect, self-respect, and love, ground normative expectations towards others and ourselves. And holding someone accountable for violating legitimate normative expectations involves emotions from the anger family, such as resentment and indignation. I hold that such forms of anger, which aim at getting the target to conform to expectations or lower their unduly elevated status, are neither inherently problematic or dispensable parts of the package of attitudes involved in valuing. Finally, thinking about anger’s role in valuing also helps see when it is out of place or immature – roughly, it is often excessive, because we easily exaggerate the magnitude of the value involved, the harm or threat to it, or the degree of the target’s moral responsibility

Exploring the nature of counterfactual thinking and their perceived consequences in an elite sporting context: an interpretative phenomenological analysis

This study explored the characteristics, contextual factors and consequences of counterfactual thoughts in seven elite athletes using Interpretative Phenomenological Analysis (IPA). Counterfactuals were experienced regularly with self-directed and upward counterfactuals (cognitions about how things could be better) being most frequent. These upward counterfactuals typically occurred following performance that was below participants’ goals and expectations These thoughts were perceived by participants to have a negative affect initially, and that they then led to facilitative behavioral consequences around learning and development. Some elements of counterfactual thinking could be used as a useful reflective tool to encourage elite athletes to problem solve and motivate cognitive, emotional and behavioral change to enhance future performance

Luck Feelings, Luck Beliefs, and Decision Making

Luck feelings have long been thought to influence decision making involving risk. Previous research has established the importance of prior outcomes, luck beliefs, and counterfactual thinking in the generation of luck feelings, but there has been no comprehensive demonstration of this system of variables that impinge on luck feelings. Moreover, the actual relationship of luck feelings and risky choice has not been directly tested. Addressing these gaps, results from five studies are presented in this thesis. Empirical work begins with an extensive validation exercise of an existing 22-item luck beliefs scale. Those 22 items are refined to a 16-item scale, comprising four luck belief dimensions that inter-relate in a compelling structural arrangement. Insights from this exercise, and a subset of the items are used throughout the remainder of the thesis. Results from two studies contradicted the counterfactual closeness hypothesis, the most prominent theory in the psychology of luck, which holds that counterfactual thinking is essential for generating lucky feelings. However, one study found that affect and luck feelings are not unitary, as evidenced by a weak form of double dissociation of affect and lucky feelings from overestimation and overplacement. Another study found lucky and unlucky feelings to be distinct. The effects of lucky feelings and unlucky feelings on risky choice differ by the nature of a prior outcome. For negative outcomes, unlucky feelings are likely to influence risky choices. For positive outcomes, lucky feelings are likely to influence risky choices. The type of risky choice most affected by lucky feelings—for positive experiences—is ambiguity tolerance in the probability distributions of prospective outcomes. The Activation Theory of Luck Feelings (ActLF) is proposed, which reconciles previous findings to those reported herein

Cognitions and emotions - testing the tenets of Fairness Theory

In this study, we test the tenets put forth by Fairness Theory (Folger & Cropanzano, 2001). Fairness Theory argues that perceptions of unfairness are formulated through a cognitive process that evaluates an event in terms of the presence or absence of injury or harm, the commission or omission of discretionary conduct on the part of the entity responsible for the injury or harm, and whether or not an ethical or moral standard was violated by such conduct (termed “Would,” “Could,” and “Should,” respectively). In this paper, we examine the role each of these elements plays in the assessment of fairness. Across two laboratory studies we show that a combination of harm and moral infraction shows the strongest effects on both first- and third-party justice perceptions, anger, and subsequent behaviors, whereas perceived discretion (“Could”) has little effect. Results are interpreted in light of recent research in moral psychology

Descartes and the Possibility of Enlightened Freedom

This paper offers a novel interpretation of Descartes's conception of freedom that resolves an important tension at the heart of his view. It does so by appealing to the important but overlooked distinction between possessing a power, exercising a power, and being in a position to exercise a power

What is a Relational Virtue?

In this paper, I introduce what I call relational virtue and defend it as an important subcategory of virtue. In particular, I argue that it offers a valuable resource for answering questions concerning the value of intimate relationships such as parent-child relationship or friendship. After briefly sketching what I mean by relational virtue, I show why it is a virtue and in what sense we can meaningfully distinguish it from other sorts of virtue. I then describe some distinctive features of relational virtue in more detail and discuss their implications. Next, I present filial piety as the paradigmatic example of relational virtue. I argue that a child s being filial should be understood as an appropriate response to her parent s being virtuous as a parent. I conclude by showing how my relational virtue theory of filial piety can avoid the difficulties faced by previous theories of filial piety such as gratitude theory and friendship theory

Wouldn\u27t Future People Like to Know? A Compensation-Based Approach to Global Climate Change

Anthropogenic global climate change (GCC), understood as changes to the Earth’s climate system resulting from greenhouse gas emissions caused by human beings, has emerged as one of the most pressing environmental problems in human history. Proposed responses to climate change typically focus on either mitigation or adaptation. Mitigation refers to the process of lessening the effects of GCC, most often by reducing our emissions of greenhouse gases. Adaptation refers to the process of helping those who will be adversely affected by GCC adapt to the environmental changes to avoid being harmed. There is, however, a third approach to the issue that has been unduly neglected in the literature: compensation. This approach focuses on what we can give to the victims of climate change to rectify the wrongful harms they have endured (or will endure). Since it is no longer possible to prevent all the adverse effects of climate change, compensation will be a vital part of any satisfactory global response to it, even one that pursued mitigation and adaptation to the fullest extent possible and began immediately. Beyond addressing general questions about the compensatory duties generated by climate change, I consider whether knowledge transmission between generations can serve as a suitable form of intergenerational compensation and how it relates to other possible forms of intergenerational compensation. Ultimately, I defend five main claims. First, we have duties to compensate future people for the harms caused by GCC. Second, the transmission of knowledge from the current generation to future generations is a suitable means of compensating future people for the rights violations caused by GCC. Third, we cannot provide sufficient compensation to nullify the harms caused by GCC. Fourth, despite initial appearances to the contrary, striving to meet compensatory duties through intergenerational transfer of knowledge would not be irrelevant from the standpoint of public policy; pursuing these duties would carry great practical significance. Fifth, duties of compensation should be undertaken primarily by the richer, developed nations, especially those that have historically contributed the most to GCC