The logic of identity and copy for computational artefacts

Defining identity for entities is a longstanding logical problem in philosophy, and it has resurfaced in current investigations within the philosophy of technology. The problem has not yet been explored for the philosophy of information, and of Computer Science in particular. This paper provides a logical analysis of identity and copy for computational artefacts. Identity is here understood as the relation holding between an instance of a computational artefact and itself. By contrast, the copy relation holds between two distinct computational artefacts. We distinguish among exact, inexact and approximate copies. We use process algebra to provide suitable formal definitions of these relations, using in particular the notion of bisimulation to define identity and exact copies, and simulation for inexact and approximate copies. Equivalence is unproblematic for identical computational artefacts at each individual time and for inexact copies; we will examine to which extent the formal constraints on identity criteria discussed in the literature are satisfied by our approach. As for inexact and approximate copy, they are intended as a weakening of the identity relation in that equivalence and other constraints on identity are violated. The proposed approach also suggests a computable treatment of identity and copy checking

The logic of identity and copy for computational artefacts

Defining identity for entities is a longstanding logical problem in philosophy, and it has resurfaced in current investigations within the philosophy of technology. The problem has not yet been explored for the philosophy of information, and of Computer Science in particular. This paper provides a logical analysis of identity and copy for computational artefacts. Identity is here understood as the relation holding between an instance of a computational artefact and itself. By contrast, the copy relation holds between two distinct computational artefacts. We distinguish among exact, inexact and approximate copies. We use process algebra to provide suitable formal definitions of these relations, using in particular the notion of bisimulation to define identity and exact copies, and simulation for inexact and approximate copies. Equivalence is unproblematic for identical computational artefacts at each individual time and for inexact copies; we will examine to which extent the formal constraints on identity criteria discussed in the literature are satisfied by our approach. As for inexact and approximate copy, they are intended as a weakening of the identity relation in that equivalence and other constraints on identity are violated. The proposed approach also suggests a computable treatment of identity and copy checking

Infringing software property rights : ontological, methodological, and ethical questions

This paper contributes to the computer ethics debate on software ownership protection by examining the ontological, methodological, and ethical problems related to property right infringement that should come prior to any legal discussion. The ontological problem consists in determining precisely what it is for a computer program to be a copy of another one, a largely neglected problem in computer ethics. The methodological problem is defined as the difficulty of deciding whether a given software system is a copy of another system. And the ethical problem corresponds to establishing when a copy constitutes, or does not constitute, a property right infringement. The ontological problem is solved on the logical analysis of abstract machines, and the latter are argued to be the appropriate level of abstraction for software at which the methodological and the ethical problems can be successfully addressed

Computational Abstraction

Representation and abstraction are two of the fundamental concepts of computer science. Together they enable “high-level” programming: without abstraction programming would be tied to machine code; without a machine representation, it would be a pure mathematical exercise. Representation begins with an abstract structure and seeks to find a more concrete one. Abstraction does the reverse: it starts with concrete structures and abstracts away. While formal accounts of representation are easy to find, abstraction is a different matter. In this paper, we provide an analysis of data abstraction based upon some contemporary work in the philosophy of mathematics. The paper contains a mathematical account of how Frege’s approach to abstraction may be interpreted, modified, extended and imported into type theory. We argue that representation and abstraction, while mathematical siblings, are philosophically quite different. A case of special interest concerns the abstract/physical interface which houses both the physical representation of abstract structures and the abstraction of physical systems.</jats:p

The logic of identity and copy for computational artefacts

What does it mean for two programs to be identical to each other and in what sense can one computational artefact be said to be a copy of another one? This is the fundamental question tackled in the following paper that is now on-line: Nicola Angius and Giuseppe Primiero, The logic of identity and copy for computational artefacts, Journal of Logic and Computation, https://academic.oup.com/logcom/advance-article-abstract/doi/10.1093/logcom/exy012/4954042 The philosophical problem of identity h..