Gareth evans’s argument against vague identity

In the paper Evans’s argument concerning indeterminate identity statements is presented and discussed. Evans’s paper in which he formulated his argument is one of the most frequently discussed papers concerning identity. There are serious doubts concerning what Evans wanted to prove by his argument. Theorists have proposed two competing and incompatible interpretations. According to some, Evans purposefully constructed an invalid argument in order to demonstrate that the vague objects view cannot diagnose the fallacy and is therefore untenable. According to others, Evans wanted to formulate a (valid) argument to the effect that there cannot be vague identity statements whose vagueness is due solely to the existence of vague objects. As it has been argued, if it is the former interpretation which is correct, than the argument really is invalid, but it is doubtful whether it achieves its aim. It might be claimed that “the vague objects view” it refutes is not the view that most vague objects theorists hold. The main part of the paper is devoted to the second interpretation and the discussions concerning the validity of the argument on this interpretation. It appears that the vague objects theorist is in a position to object to the validity of every single step of the proof

Vindicating Vague Objects

Until recently, vagueness has been seen as a product of representation alone; a byproduct of the limitations of our language or our ability to know the truth. To endorse the contrasting idea that vagueness can come from the world – and to endorse the existence of vague objects – has often been a maligned enterprise. Indeed, proponents of the view have been charged with mistaking features of the world for features of our language or minds, mistaking a question of language and epistemology for a question of metaphysics. Further, even granting the plausibility of such a view, the thesis that vague objects can exist has been laden with commitment to problematic notions such as vague identity and vague existence. This thesis examines the prospects of defending the idea that vague objects exist, vindicating the cogency of such a view and decoupling it from these problematic notions. Chapter 1 begins by examining Gareth Evans’ seminal reductio against vague objects, in which the existence of vague objects is tied to the fate of vague identity. Engaging with the literature that Evans’ paper generated, we show that vague objects need not be committed to a contradictory notion of vague identity; rather, one can defend an account of vague objects without the need for revisionary logics or gerrymandered notions of identity. Chapter 2 extends the investigation of vague objects by considering the Problem of the Many, a powerful paradox which appears to undermine seemingly well-founded mereological principles and intuitions. After evaluating existing solutions to the problem, we show how vague objects can be used to develop a novel solution that is couched within the logical apparatus defended in Chapter 1. We then demonstrate how the novel solution offers a fruitful means of responding to the problem while retaining desired mereological principles. Chapter 3 draws on the discussion in the preceding chapters to defend the cogency of vague objects in the context of contemporary views of metaphysical vagueness. Specifically, we show that defending the existence of vague objects has genuine utility for supporting a defence of the intelligibility of metaphysical vagueness. We end with a brief examination of the prospects of extending the novel account of vague objects developed, and consider how this view may be applied to future investigations in metaphysics.Thesis (MPhil) -- University of Adelaide, School of Humanities, 201

Vague Objects within Classical Logic and Standard Mereology, and without Indeterminate Identity

Weatherson (The Philosophical Quarterly, 53, 481\u2013501 2003) argues that whoever accepts classical logic, standard mereology and the difference between vague objects and any others, should conclude that there are no vague objects. Barnes and Williams (Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 90, 176\u2013187 2009) claim that a supporter of vague objects who accepts classical logic and standard mereology should recognize that the existence of vague objects implies indeterminate identity. Even though it is not clearly stated, they all seem to be committed to the assumption that reality is ultimately constituted by mereological atoms. This assumption is not granted by standard mereology which instead remains silent on whether reality is atomic or gunky; therefore, I contend that whoever maintains classical logic, standard mereology and the difference between vague objects and any others, is not forced to conclude with Weatherson that there are no vague objects; nor is she compelled to revise her point of view according to Barnes and Williams\u2019s proposal and to accept that the existence of vague objects implies indeterminate identity

A Note on a Remark of Evans

In his seminal paper, ‘Can There Be Vague Objects?’ (1978), Gareth Evans advanced an argument purporting to prove that the idea of indeterminate identity is incoherent. Aware that his argument was incomplete as it stands, Evans added a remark at the end of his paper, in which he explained how the original argument needed to be modified to arrive at an explicit contradiction. This paper aims to develop a modified version of Evans’ original argument, which I argue is more promising than the modification that Evans proposed in his remark. Last, a structurally similar argument against the idea of indeterminate existence is presented

Music and Vague Existence

I explain a tension between musical creationism and the view that there is no vague existence. I then suggest ways to reconcile these views. My central conclusion is that, although some versions of musical creationism imply vague existence, others do not. I discuss versions of musical creationism held by Jerrold Levinson, Simon Evnine, and Kit Fine. I also present two new versions. I close by considering whether the tension is merely an instance of a general problem raised by artifacts, both abstract and concrete. I argue that on at least one defensible account of music the tension is especially problematic for abstracta. I focus on musical works, but much of the paper straightforwardly applies to other kinds of abstract artifacts

Multiple actualities and ontically vague identity

Gareth Evans's argument against ontically vague identity has been picked over on many occasions. But extant proposals for blocking the argument do not meet well-motivated general constraints on a successful solution. Moreover, the pivotal position that defending ontically vague identity occupies vis a vis ontic vagueness more generally has not yet been fully appreciated. This paper advocates a way of resisting the Evans argument meeting all the mentioned constraints: if we can find referential indeterminacy in virtue of ontic vagueness, we can get out of the Evans argument while still preserving genuinely ontically vague identity. To show how this approach can vindicate particular cases of ontically vague identity, I develop a framework for describing ontic vagueness in general in terms of multiple actualities. The effect, overall, is to provide a principled and attractive approach to ontically vague identity that is immune from Evansian worries

A Polar Concept Argument for the Existence of Abstracta

In this paper, I present a polar concept argument for the existence of abstract objects. After recalling the fundamentals concerning the debate about the existence of abstracta, I present in a detailed way the argument for the existence of abstracta. I offer two different variations of the argument: one, deductive and the other, inductive. The argument rests primarily on the fact that our universe is well-balanced. This well-balanced property results from the fact that all instantiable polar dualities are instantiated. Hence, the abstract pole of the abstract/concrete duality must also be exemplified. Lastly, I review several objections that can be raised against the present argument

A unified theory of granularity, vagueness and approximation

Abstract: We propose a view of vagueness as a semantic property of names and predicates. All entities are crisp, on this semantic view, but there are, for each vague name, multiple portions of reality that are equally good candidates for being its referent, and, for each vague predicate, multiple classes of objects that are equally good candidates for being its extension. We provide a new formulation of these ideas in terms of a theory of granular partitions. We show that this theory provides a general framework within which we can understand the relation between vague terms and concepts and the corresponding crisp portions of reality. We also sketch how it might be possible to formulate within this framework a theory of vagueness which dispenses with the notion of truth-value gaps and other artifacts of more familiar approaches. Central to our approach is the idea that judgments about reality involve in every case (1) a separation of reality into foreground and background of attention and (2) the feature of granularity. On this basis we attempt to show that even vague judgments made in naturally occurring contexts are not marked by truth-value indeterminacy. We distinguish, in addition to crisp granular partitions, also vague partitions, and reference partitions, and we explain the role of the latter in the context of judgments that involve vagueness. We conclude by showing how reference partitions provide an effective means by which judging subjects are able to temper the vagueness of their judgments by means of approximations