Translation, Quotation, Iterability

Translation, Quotation, Iterability (Walter Benjamin) — Translatability can be considered a special case of the general property of language Derrida called "iterability." By focusing on this property I seek both to clarify the place of translation in Benjamin's thought with respect to other modes of iteration, such as critical commentary and quotation, and to suggest a different way of thinking about translation.Like quotation, translation does not "use" the original text, but rather "mentions" or "names" it. Thus we can understand Benjamin's defense of word-for-word translation (Wörtlichkeit); if translation, like quotation, denotes the text of the original, then what it translates is not the sense of the original, but its word. Similarly, what translation connotes is translation itself considered as a possible act, or to put the point in Benjamin's and Rodolphe Gasché's terms, it communicates translatability.Iterability, translatability, and quotability are that part of the structure of a linguistic entity that differs from the entity itself, and points toward something beyond it. For Benjamin, that beyond is pure language.Traduction, citation, itérabilité — Dans la « traductibilité » on peut voir un cas particulier de la propriété linguistique générale à laquelle Derrida a donné le nom d'« itérabilité ». En me penchant sur l'itérabilité je cherche à mieux définir la place de la traduction dans la pensée de Benjamin et en même temps à suggérer une nouvelle perspective sur la traduction elle-même.Comme la citation, la traduction n'emploie pas le texte original, mais plutôt le mentionne ou le nomme. Ainsi on peut comprendre la défense benjaminienne de la traduction mot-à-mot (Wörtlichkeit); si comme la citation la traduction dénote le texte de l'original, elle traduit non pas le sens mais le mot de l'original. De même, la traduction connote la traduction elle-même en tant qu'acte possible, ou pour le dire comme Benjamin et Rodolphe Gasché, elle communique la traductibilité. L'itérabilité, la traductibilité, la citabilité constituent cette part de la structure d'une entité linguistique qui diffère de l'entité en soi et se réfère à quelque chose au-delà. Pour Benjamin, cet au-delà, c'est le langage pur

TYPE AND EXPERIENCE. AN INQUIRY INTO THE ROLE AND FUNCTION OF TYPE AND TYPIFYING-APPERCEPTION IN EXPERIENCE AND COGNITION

The work concentrates on the early works and production of Edmund Husserl, and especially, on the time we consider fundamental for the development of Husserl's later phenomenology. That will also cover a period normally less taken into consideration by the critic. Ideality is in our understanding linked as label-term to the Husserlian \uabeidetics\ubb, which is for its part explicitly derived in the first Book of Ideas from eidos, a term introduced in reality years earlier by Husserl, in connection with essence [Wesen]. It is in fact only around the time of the works belonging to this fundamental introduction to phenomenology that the concept of eidos is assumed as an equivalent for \uabpure essence\ubb and phenomenology is established for its part as \u201ceidetics\u201d or \u201ceidetic science\u201d. Around the time of the Logical Investigations indeed, the term essence comprehends a large variety of concepts less distinguished in comparison with to later Husserlian works, for example, for what concern the concept of eidos. Among the different definitions and functions showed by essence and idea in the 1900 work and in the course on logic and epistemology before the Ideas, we will try to stress one peculiar aspect of such overly complex thematic, which is the partial definition of essence in terms of conceptual universality. With respect to this characterization, we will therefore try to indicate the kind of definition given to it by Husserl, which partially recalls the traditional interpretation of the Universal in the sense of an ideal terms, or a common element, over against the multiplicity. This latter is therefore interpreted in the sense of a universal object. Our aim will be consequently, to analyze a series of manuscripts on the period prior to the Logical Investigations, where, according to our interpretation, all the features assigned to the same concept are present. That will be basically, show the \u201corigin\u201d of one important aspect of the future doctrine of essence, even besides the later interpretation via Lotze and Bolzano of Ideality

On the foundations of legal reasoning in international law

Issues pertaining to the "foundations" of legal reasoning in international law break down into several discrete questions: what do statements about law mean; how do they get their meaning: to what do legal terms refer; in what does knowledge of law consist; how do we reason with legal concepts; what constitutes a criterion for argumentative success; how do bodies of legal concepts combine to form systems; is the conceptual organisation of different types of legal system, such as municipal law and international law, necessarily (or even factually) the same at some fundamental level?... This thesis is concerned with some measure with all of these questions, but the focus throughout is on those of the meaning of what we say about law, of legal knowledge, and of topological issues regarding legal systems (that is, how various types of legal system stand, conceptually, to one another). The thesis falls into two parts. The first, which is critical in nature, looks at some of the ways in which modern positivism has attempted to supply answers to these questions. It shall be argued that underlying those attempts is a particular view about the foundations of legal reasoning which has remained fairly constant in modern legal theory, not only among the positivists but also commonly among their sceptic rivals. Several difficulties with this view are raised and explored, all of which have contributed to the notion that international law is, when viewed through the spectacles of a municipal lawyer, at best a primitive system of law. The heart of Part I is a discussion of the character of legal knowledge. This takes place in the context of an account of the "Institutional Theory of Law" (ITL), as propounded by Neil MacCormick and Ota Weinberger. The argument that emerges is one broadly in favour of ITL, though critical of the methodological and philosophical assumptions on the basis of which the main edifice of the theory rests. It is submitted that such assumptions are the result of misplaced views about semantics and the nature of reference. Part I ends with the suggestion of an alternative, and hopefully more stable, strategy for generating the account of legal knowledge for which ITL strove. Part II comprises a positive thesis about the foundations of legal reasoning in international law, developed on the back of the strategy in Part I

FRANZ BRENTANO ET LE PRINCIPE DE RÉFÉRENCE INTENTIONELLE

In this thesis, I show in what way Brentano’s notion of intentionality is tied to a form of Platonising Aristotelianism. For both his mereological theory and his theory of knowledge depend on this Platonic element. In the first part, I show that the notion of intentionality is present as early as the dissertation On the Several Senses of Being in Aristotle (1862) in which Brentano takes up the ontological distinction between ‘in itself’ and ‘in the other’ which is of Platonic rather than Aristotelian stamp, in order to deduce from it, according to a single principle, the Aristotelian categories

Interlitteraria : Tartu Ülikooli maailmakirjanduse õppetooli ja Eesti Võrdleva Kirjandusteaduse Assotsiatsiooni rahvusvaheline ajakiri = international refereed edition of the Chair of Comparative Literature of Tartu University and the Estonian Association of Comparative Literature

http://www.ester.ee/record=b1226153*es

A theory of reference for product design: the semantics of product ideation

The present research focuses on the way designers make sense of things while developing their design concepts. The idea was to investigate whether the use of an appropriate segmentation of the meaningful aspects comprising products could help designers to work more consciously and more effectively in their exploration of ideas for design concepts. To this aim a methodology based on the inclusion of different forms of knowledge to understand design situations (Cross, 2002) and design themes (Margolin, 2005) was developed, with semiotics as its modelling paradigm and cognitive psychology as its experimental counterpart. Such an inclusive methodology allowed: (1) the identification of key issues and notions about concept formation (in general and within design), (2) a quite comprehensive review of the contributions of semiotic and non-semiotic theories to the understanding of meaning in products, (3) the formulation of a theoretical model about the meaningful aspects of products, and (4) the development of an experimental method to test the feasibility of this model. The last three points aforementioned are indeed the contributions of the present research to knowledge. This dissertation is organised in five chapters. The first chapter introduces the reader to the subject of this research, the relevance of researching about this subject in design and the methodological aspects involved. The second chapter presents the literature review of design concepts and the theoretical positions about the construction of meaning in products. The third chapter outlines the theoretical notions and considerations that are needed to formulate a theory of concept ideation as a preamble to chapter four, in which the theoretical model is developed. This model is mainly inspired by the work of Roman Jakobson, and it suggests the existence of six meaningful dimensions for the ideation of design concepts. The last chapter presents the results and discussion of eight experimental carried out with 20 industrial design students and three studies developed to test the practical feasibility of the theoretical model formulated as part of this research. The conclusions show that the proposed division of meaning for concept ideation into six dimensions is quite feasible

Phenomenon and Abstraction: Coordinating Concepts in Music Theory and Analysis

This dissertation explores the habits of thought that inform how music analysts conceptualize the music they study and how this conceptualization affects the kinds of claims they make and the discursive practices adopted to express them. I aim to clarify these issues in music-theoretical conceptualization with an eye toward mediating analytical disagreements by tracing the influence of two types of concepts used in contemporary music analysis. I differentiate what I call theoretical concepts, which refer to abstract, theoretical objects, from phenomenal concepts, which refer to elements of felt, musical experience. Drawing on theories of concepts from philosophy of mind, I argue that these concepts have a complex structure, featuring both a reference and mode of presentation. The musical concept Dominant, for instance, might be used as a phenomenal concept, referring to the conscious experience of hearing a dominant, or it might be used as a theoretical concept, referring to a kind of abstract object, presented as either the triad the leads to the tonic or the triad built on scale degree five. In analysis, the kinds of concepts that analysts use will determine the scope of their analyses as well as define what sorts of critiques are best deployed against them. I explore four different ways that these conceptual types are used. These case studies include conceptually simple theories that attempt to foreground one type of concept or another (from the formalized model proffered by Eugene Narmour, to the drawing-analyses of Elaine Barkin) as well as more common analytical strategies that rely on both kinds of concept in concert, such as Schenkerian analysis and transformational and neo-Riemannian theory. I enrich my study of analytical approaches with insights drawn from my own analytical practice, including a wide range of styles and composers (though foregrounding the complexity of tonal analysis especially) and close readings of various authors in different analytical traditions. In general, I am concerned less with testing the soundness of any given approach than with understanding what ways of conceptualizing music underlie them and how analysts coordinate these concepts in practice. I find that while most approaches rely on both types of concept in some combination, their differences come in the roles these concepts play in analytical methodology and the degree to which each type of engagement is foregrounded in practice