Motility at the origin of life: Its characterization and a model

Due to recent advances in synthetic biology and artificial life, the origin of life is currently a hot topic of research. We review the literature and argue that the two traditionally competing "replicator-first" and "metabolism-first" approaches are merging into one integrated theory of individuation and evolution. We contribute to the maturation of this more inclusive approach by highlighting some problematic assumptions that still lead to an impoverished conception of the phenomenon of life. In particular, we argue that the new consensus has so far failed to consider the relevance of intermediate timescales. We propose that an adequate theory of life must account for the fact that all living beings are situated in at least four distinct timescales, which are typically associated with metabolism, motility, development, and evolution. On this view, self-movement, adaptive behavior and morphological changes could have already been present at the origin of life. In order to illustrate this possibility we analyze a minimal model of life-like phenomena, namely of precarious, individuated, dissipative structures that can be found in simple reaction-diffusion systems. Based on our analysis we suggest that processes in intermediate timescales could have already been operative in prebiotic systems. They may have facilitated and constrained changes occurring in the faster- and slower-paced timescales of chemical self-individuation and evolution by natural selection, respectively.Comment: 29 pages, 5 figures, Artificial Lif

Hermeneutic resonance in animats and art

One major criticism of direct or active perception (and other forms of embodied action) from the perspective of cognitive psycology is that, according to common sense, there are some actions that require strictly symbolic information - for example, to stop a car in response to a red traffic light - which fall outside the realm of a perception-action cycle. Although such cognitive responses are not necessarily a goal of artificial life, they must necessarily be included within the embodied paradigm if it is to encompass the cognisant individual, the self-aware individual, or, potentially, the conscious individual. This paper will address the question, 'can an animat appreciate art?' Although this may seem very different to the example of a prosaic response to a traffic light, it will be argued that a common framework for establishing the meaning of an object is needed. It will also be argued that clarification to previous philosophical models of artistic engagement is required: in particular that the process of understanding is not a dialogue between an autopoietic artwork and animat, but that there is either a unity of object (artwork-animat) which becomes self-maintaining, or a more classical Gibsonian interpretation as a fixed set of affordances offered by an object to the subject, both of which lead to the conclusion that the process of understanding becomes a resonance in the unity or animat

Artificial life meets computational creativity?

I review the history of work in Artificial Life on the problem of the open-ended evolutionary growth of complexity in computational worlds. This is then put into the context of evolutionary epistemology and human creativity

Is defining life pointless? Operational definitions at the frontiers of Biology

Despite numerous and increasing attempts to define what life is, there is no consensus on necessary and sufficient conditions for life. Accordingly, some scholars have questioned the value of definitions of life and encouraged scientists and philosophers alike to discard the project. As an alternative to this pessimistic conclusion, we argue that critically rethinking the nature and uses of definitions can provide new insights into the epistemic roles of definitions of life for different research practices. This paper examines the possible contributions of definitions of life in scientific domains where such definitions are used most (e.g., Synthetic Biology, Origins of Life, Alife, and Astrobiology). Rather than as classificatory tools for demarcation of natural kinds, we highlight the pragmatic utility of what we call operational definitions that serve as theoretical and epistemic tools in scientific practice. In particular, we examine contexts where definitions integrate criteria for life into theoretical models that involve or enable observable operations. We show how these definitions of life play important roles in influencing research agendas and evaluating results, and we argue that to discard the project of defining life is neither sufficiently motivated, nor possible without dismissing important theoretical and practical research

Quantum Biology

A critical assessment of the recent developments of molecular biology is presented. The thesis that they do not lead to a conceptual understanding of life and biological systems is defended. Maturana and Varela's concept of autopoiesis is briefly sketched and its logical circularity avoided by postulating the existence of underlying {\it living processes}, entailing amplification from the microscopic to the macroscopic scale, with increasing complexity in the passage from one scale to the other. Following such a line of thought, the currently accepted model of condensed matter, which is based on electrostatics and short-ranged forces, is criticized. It is suggested that the correct interpretation of quantum dispersion forces (van der Waals, hydrogen bonding, and so on) as quantum coherence effects hints at the necessity of including long-ranged forces (or mechanisms for them) in condensed matter theories of biological processes. Some quantum effects in biology are reviewed and quantum mechanics is acknowledged as conceptually important to biology since without it most (if not all) of the biological structures and signalling processes would not even exist. Moreover, it is suggested that long-range quantum coherent dynamics, including electron polarization, may be invoked to explain signal amplification process in biological systems in general

COGNITIVE LINGUISTICS AS A METHODOLOGICAL PARADIGM

A general direction in which cognitive linguistics is heading at the turn of the century is outlined and a revised understanding of cognitive linguistics as a methodological paradigm is suggest. The goal of cognitive linguistics is defined as understanding what language is and what language does to ensure the predominance of homo sapiens as a biological species. This makes cognitive linguistics a biologically oriented empirical science

Adaptation from interactions between metabolism and behaviour: self-sensitive behaviour in protocells

This thesis considers the relationship between adaptive behaviour and metabolism, using theoretical arguments supported by computational models to demonstrate mechanisms of adaptation that are uniquely available to systems based upon the metabolic organisation of self-production. It is argued how, by being sensitive to their metabolic viability, an organism can respond to the quality of its environment with respect to its metabolic well-being. This makes possible simple but powerful ‘self-sensitive’ adaptive behaviours such as “If I am healthy now, keep doing the same as I have been doing – otherwise do something else.” This strategy provides several adaptive benefits, including the ability to respond appropriately to phenomena never previously experienced by the organism nor by any of its ancestors; the ability to integrate different environmental influences to produce an appropriate response; and sensitivity to the organism’s present context and history of experience. Computational models are used to demonstrate these capabilities, as well as the possibility that self-sensitive adaptive behaviour can facilitate the adaptive evolution of populations of self-sensitive organisms through (i) processes similar to the Baldwin effect, (ii) increasing the likelihood of speciation events, and (iii) automatic behavioural adaptation to changes in the organism itself (such as genetic changes). In addition to these theoretical contributions, a computational model of self-sensitive behaviour is presented that recreates chemotaxis patterns observed in bacteria such as Azospirillum brasilense and Campylobacter jejuni. The models also suggest new explanations for previously unexplained asymmetric distributions of bacteria performing aerotaxis. More broadly, the work advocates further research into the relationship between behaviour and the metabolic organisation of self-production, an organisational property shared by all life. It also acts as an example of how abstract models that target theoretical concepts rather than natural phenomena can play a valuable role in the scientific endeavour

Beyond the ‘other’ as constitutive outside: : The politics of immunity in Roberto Esposito and Niklas Luhmann

This article re-conceptualises the ‘constitutive outside’ through Roberto Esposito’s theory of immunity to detach it from Laclau and Mouffe’s political antagonism. It identifies Esposito’s thought as an innovative epistemological perspective to dissolve post-ontological political theories of community from the intertwinement with a foundational self/other dialectic. Esposito shows how a community can sustain its relations through introversive immunisation against a primarily undefined outside. But it is argued that his theory of immunity slips back to a vitalist depth ontology which ultimately de-politicises the construction of the communal outside. This article draws on Niklas Luhmann’s immunity theory to resituate immunisation in the political production of social connectivity. Following Luhmann, politics relies on immunisation through contradictions to reproduce its functional role as a decision-making institution, but is at the same time constantly exposed to potential rupture through the political openness immunity introduces. Through Esposito and Luhmann, this article identifies the relationship between a social inside and its outside as open-ended and secondary to an introversive process of socio-political self-differentiation. It can involve, but does epistemologically necessitate, the construction of an external otherPeer reviewedFinal Accepted Versio

From Simple to Complex and Ultra-complex Systems:\ud A Paradigm Shift Towards Non-Abelian Systems Dynamics

Atoms, molecules, organisms distinguish layers of reality because of the causal links that govern their behavior, both horizontally (atom-atom, molecule-molecule, organism-organism) and vertically (atom-molecule-organism). This is the first intuition of the theory of levels. Even if the further development of the theory will require imposing a number of qualifications to this initial intuition, the idea of a series of entities organized on different levels of complexity will prove correct. Living systems as well as social systems and the human mind present features remarkably different from those characterizing non-living, simple physical and chemical systems. We propose that super-complexity requires at least four different categorical frameworks, provided by the theories of levels of reality, chronotopoids, (generalized) interactions, and anticipation