551 research outputs found
The Role of Monotonicity in the Epistemic Analysis of Strategic Games
It is well-known that in finite strategic games true common belief (or common
knowledge) of rationality implies that the players will choose only strategies
that survive the iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies. We
establish a general theorem that deals with monotonic rationality notions and
arbitrary strategic games and allows to strengthen the above result to
arbitrary games, other rationality notions, and transfinite iterations of the
elimination process. We also clarify what conclusions one can draw for the
customary dominance notions that are not monotonic. The main tool is Tarski's
Fixpoint Theorem.Comment: 20 page
Interactive and common knowledge in the state-space model
This paper deals with the prevailing formal model for knowledge in contemporary economics, namely the state-space model introduced by Robert Aumann in 1976. In particular, the paper addresses the following question arising in this formalism: in order to state that an event is interactively or commonly known among a group of agents, do we need to assume that each of them knows how the information is imparted to the others? Aumann answered in the negative, but his arguments apply only to canonical, i.e., completely specified state spaces, while in most applications the state space is not canonical. This paper addresses the same question along original lines, demonstrating that the answer is negative for both canonical and not-canonical state spaces. Further, it shows that this result ensues from two counterintuitive properties held by knowledge in the state-space model, namely Substitutivity and Monotonicity.
Knowledge and Blameworthiness
Blameworthiness of an agent or a coalition of agents is often defined in
terms of the principle of alternative possibilities: for the coalition to be
responsible for an outcome, the outcome must take place and the coalition
should have had a strategy to prevent it. In this article we argue that in the
settings with imperfect information, not only should the coalition have had a
strategy, but it also should have known that it had a strategy, and it should
have known what the strategy was. The main technical result of the article is a
sound and complete bimodal logic that describes the interplay between knowledge
and blameworthiness in strategic games with imperfect information
A New Game Equivalence and its Modal Logic
We revisit the crucial issue of natural game equivalences, and semantics of
game logics based on these. We present reasons for investigating finer concepts
of game equivalence than equality of standard powers, though staying short of
modal bisimulation. Concretely, we propose a more finegrained notion of
equality of "basic powers" which record what players can force plus what they
leave to others to do, a crucial feature of interaction. This notion is closer
to game-theoretic strategic form, as we explain in detail, while remaining
amenable to logical analysis. We determine the properties of basic powers via a
new representation theorem, find a matching "instantial neighborhood game
logic", and show how our analysis can be extended to a new game algebra and
dynamic game logic.Comment: In Proceedings TARK 2017, arXiv:1707.0825
Blameworthiness in Strategic Games
There are multiple notions of coalitional responsibility. The focus of this
paper is on the blameworthiness defined through the principle of alternative
possibilities: a coalition is blamable for a statement if the statement is
true, but the coalition had a strategy to prevent it. The main technical result
is a sound and complete bimodal logical system that describes properties of
blameworthiness in one-shot games
Epistemically stable strategy sets
This paper provides a definition of epistemic stability of sets of strategy profiles, and uses it to characterize variants of curb sets in finite games, including the set of rationalizable strategies and minimal curb sets.Epistemic game theory; epistemic stability; rationalizability; closedness under rational behavior; mutual p-belief.
Robust Virtual Implementation
In a general interdependent preference environment, we characterize when two payoff types can be distinguished by their rationalizable strategic choices without any prior knowledge of their beliefs and higher order beliefs. We show that two payoff types are strategically distinguishable if and only if they satisfy a separability condition. The separability condition for each agent essentially requires that there is not too much interdependence in preferences across agents. A social choice function -- mapping payoff type profiles to outcomes -- can be robustly virtually implemented if there exists a mechanism such that every equilibrium on every type space achieves an outcome arbitrarily close to the social choice function. This definition is equivalent to requiring virtual implementation in iterated deletion of strategies that are strictly dominated for all beliefs. The social choice function is robustly measurable if strategically indistinguishable payoff types receive the same allocation. We show that ex post incentive compatibility and robust measurability are necessary and sufficient for robust virtual implementation.Mechanism design, Virtual implementation, Robust implementation, Rationalizability, Ex-post incentive compatibility
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