This paper provides a definition of epistemic stability of sets of strategy profiles, and uses it to characterize variants of curb sets in finite games, including the set of rationalizable strategies and minimal curb sets.Epistemic game theory; epistemic stability; rationalizability; closedness under rational behavior; mutual p-belief.

Geir B. Asheim

Jörgen Weibull

Mark Voorneveld

English

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Epistemically stable strategy sets

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Epistemically stable strategy sets

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Research Papers in Economics