53 research outputs found
Practical free-start collision attacks on 76-step SHA-1
In this paper we analyze the security of the compression function
of SHA-1 against collision attacks, or equivalently free-start collisions
on the hash function. While a lot of work has been dedicated to the analysis
of SHA-1 in the past decade, this is the first time that free-start collisions
have been considered for this function. We exploit the additional
freedom provided by this model by using a new start-from-the-middle
approach in combination with improvements on the cryptanalysis tools
that have been developed for SHA-1 in the recent years. This results in
particular in better differential paths than the ones used for hash function
collisions so far. Overall, our attack requires about evaluations
of the compression function in order to compute a one-block free-start
collision for a 76-step reduced version, which is so far the highest number
of steps reached for a collision on the SHA-1 compression function.
We have developed an efficient GPU framework for the highly branching
code typical of a cryptanalytic collision attack and used it in an optimized
implementation of our attack on recent GTX 970 GPUs. We report
that a single cheap US\$ 350 GTX 970 is sufficient to find the collision in
less than 5 days. This showcases how recent mainstream GPUs seem to
be a good platform for expensive and even highly-branching cryptanalysis
computations. Finally, our work should be taken as a reminder that
cryptanalysis on SHA-1 continues to improve. This is yet another proof
that the industry should quickly move away from using this function
D.STVL.9 - Ongoing Research Areas in Symmetric Cryptography
This report gives a brief summary of some of the research trends in symmetric cryptography at the time of writing (2008). The following aspects of symmetric cryptography are investigated in this report: • the status of work with regards to different types of symmetric algorithms, including block ciphers, stream ciphers, hash functions and MAC algorithms (Section 1); • the algebraic attacks on symmetric primitives (Section 2); • the design criteria for symmetric ciphers (Section 3); • the provable properties of symmetric primitives (Section 4); • the major industrial needs in the area of symmetric cryptography (Section 5)
An Overview of Cryptography (Updated Version, 3 March 2016)
There are many aspects to security and many applications, ranging from secure commerce and payments to private communications and protecting passwords. One essential aspect for secure communications is that of cryptography...While cryptography is necessary for secure communications, it is not by itself sufficient. This paper describes the first of many steps necessary for better security in any number of situations.
A much shorter, edited version of this paper appears in the 1999 edition of Handbook on Local Area Networks published by Auerbach in September 1998
Analysis and Design Security Primitives Based on Chaotic Systems for eCommerce
Security is considered the most important requirement for the success of electronic commerce, which is built based on the security of hash functions, encryption algorithms and pseudorandom number generators. Chaotic systems and security algorithms have similar properties including sensitivity to any change or changes in the initial parameters, unpredictability, deterministic nature and random-like behaviour. Several security algorithms based on chaotic systems have been proposed; unfortunately some of them were found to be insecure and/or slow.
In view of this, designing new secure and fast security algorithms based on chaotic systems which guarantee integrity, authentication and confidentiality is essential for electronic commerce development. In this thesis, we comprehensively explore the analysis and design of security primitives based on chaotic systems for electronic commerce: hash functions, encryption algorithms and pseudorandom number generators. Novel hash functions, encryption algorithms and pseudorandom number generators based on chaotic systems for electronic commerce are proposed. The securities of the proposed algorithms are analyzed based on some well-know statistical tests in this filed. In addition, a new one-dimensional triangle-chaotic map (TCM) with perfect chaotic behaviour is presented.
We have compared the proposed chaos-based hash functions, block cipher and pseudorandom number generator with well-know algorithms. The comparison results show that the proposed algorithms are better than some other existing algorithms. Several analyses and computer simulations are performed on the proposed algorithms to verify their characteristics, confirming that these proposed algorithms satisfy the characteristics and conditions of security algorithms. The proposed algorithms in this thesis are high-potential for adoption in e-commerce applications and protocols
Automatic Search of Meet-in-the-Middle Preimage Attacks on AES-like Hashing
The Meet-in-the-Middle (MITM) preimage attack is highly effective in breaking the preimage resistance of many hash functions, including but not limited to the full MD5, HAVAL, and Tiger, and reduced SHA-0/1/2. It was also shown to be a threat to hash functions built on block ciphers like AES by Sasaki in 2011. Recently, such attacks on AES hashing modes evolved from merely using the freedom of choosing the internal state to also exploiting the freedom of choosing the message state. However, detecting such attacks especially those evolved variants is difficult. In previous works, the search space of the configurations of such attacks is limited, such that manual analysis is practical, which results in sub-optimal solutions. In this paper, we remove artificial limitations in previous works, formulate the essential ideas of the construction of the attack in well-defined ways, and translate the problem of searching for the best attacks into optimization problems under constraints in Mixed-Integer-Linear-Programming (MILP) models. The MILP models capture a large solution space of valid attacks; and the objectives of the MILP models are attack configurations with the minimized computational complexity. With such MILP models and using the off-the-shelf solver, it is efficient to search for the best attacks exhaustively. As a result, we obtain the first attacks against the full (5-round) and an extended (5.5-round) version of Haraka-512 v2, and 8-round AES-128 hashing modes, as well as improved attacks covering more rounds of Haraka-256 v2 and other members of AES and Rijndael hashing modes
Inverting Cryptographic Hash Functions via Cube-and-Conquer
MD4 and MD5 are seminal cryptographic hash functions proposed in early 1990s.
MD4 consists of 48 steps and produces a 128-bit hash given a message of
arbitrary finite size. MD5 is a more secure 64-step extension of MD4. Both MD4
and MD5 are vulnerable to practical collision attacks, yet it is still not
realistic to invert them, i.e. to find a message given a hash. In 2007, the
39-step version of MD4 was inverted via reducing to SAT and applying a CDCL
solver along with the so-called Dobbertin's constraints. As for MD5, in 2012
its 28-step version was inverted via a CDCL solver for one specified hash
without adding any additional constraints. In this study, Cube-and-Conquer (a
combination of CDCL and lookahead) is applied to invert step-reduced versions
of MD4 and MD5. For this purpose, two algorithms are proposed. The first one
generates inversion problems for MD4 by gradually modifying the Dobbertin's
constraints. The second algorithm tries the cubing phase of Cube-and-Conquer
with different cutoff thresholds to find the one with minimal runtime
estimation of the conquer phase. This algorithm operates in two modes: (i)
estimating the hardness of a given propositional Boolean formula; (ii)
incomplete SAT-solving of a given satisfiable propositional Boolean formula.
While the first algorithm is focused on inverting step-reduced MD4, the second
one is not area-specific and so is applicable to a variety of classes of hard
SAT instances. In this study, 40-, 41-, 42-, and 43-step MD4 are inverted for
the first time via the first algorithm and the estimating mode of the second
algorithm. 28-step MD5 is inverted for four hashes via the incomplete
SAT-solving mode of the second algorithm. For three hashes out of them this is
done for the first time.Comment: 40 pages, 11 figures. A revised submission to JAI
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