Beyond Personalization: Research Directions in Multistakeholder Recommendation

Recommender systems are personalized information access applications; they are ubiquitous in today's online environment, and effective at finding items that meet user needs and tastes. As the reach of recommender systems has extended, it has become apparent that the single-minded focus on the user common to academic research has obscured other important aspects of recommendation outcomes. Properties such as fairness, balance, profitability, and reciprocity are not captured by typical metrics for recommender system evaluation. The concept of multistakeholder recommendation has emerged as a unifying framework for describing and understanding recommendation settings where the end user is not the sole focus. This article describes the origins of multistakeholder recommendation, and the landscape of system designs. It provides illustrative examples of current research, as well as outlining open questions and research directions for the field.Comment: 64 page

Hedonic price equilibria, stable matching, and optimal transport: equivalence, topology, and uniqueness

Hedonic pricing with quasi-linear preferences is shown to be equivalent to stable matching with transferable utilities and a participation constraint, and to an optimal transportation (Monge-Kantorovich) linear programming problem. Optimal assignments in the latter correspond to stable matchings, and to hedonic equilibria. These assignments are shown to exist in great generality; their marginal indirect payoffs with respect to agent type are shown to be unique whenever direct payoffs vary smoothly with type. Under a generalized Spence-Mirrlees condition (also known as a twist condition) the assignments are shown to be unique and to be pure, meaning the matching is one-to-one outside a negligible set. For smooth problems set on compact, connected type spaces such as the circle, there is a topological obstruction to purity, but we give a weaker condition still guaranteeing uniqueness of the stable match

Semantic Service Substitution in Pervasive Environments

A computing infrastructure where everything is a service offers many new system and application possibilities. Among the main challenges, however, is the issue of service substitution for the application execution in such heterogeneous environments. An application would like to continue to execute even when a service disappears, or it would like to benefit from the environment by using better services with better QoS when possible. In this article, we define a generic service model and describe the equivalence relations between services considering the functionalities they propose and their non functional QoS properties. We define semantic equivalence relations between services and equivalence degree between non functional QoS properties. Using these relations we propose semantic substitution mechanisms upon the appearance and disappearance of services that fits the application needs. We developed a prototype as a proof of concept and evaluated its efficiency over a real use case

Should Optimal Designers Worry About Consideration?

Consideration set formation using non-compensatory screening rules is a vital component of real purchasing decisions with decades of experimental validation. Marketers have recently developed statistical methods that can estimate quantitative choice models that include consideration set formation via non-compensatory screening rules. But is capturing consideration within models of choice important for design? This paper reports on a simulation study of a vehicle portfolio design when households screen over vehicle body style built to explore the importance of capturing consideration rules for optimal designers. We generate synthetic market share data, fit a variety of discrete choice models to the data, and then optimize design decisions using the estimated models. Model predictive power, design "error", and profitability relative to ideal profits are compared as the amount of market data available increases. We find that even when estimated compensatory models provide relatively good predictive accuracy, they can lead to sub-optimal design decisions when the population uses consideration behavior; convergence of compensatory models to non-compensatory behavior is likely to require unrealistic amounts of data; and modeling heterogeneity in non-compensatory screening is more valuable than heterogeneity in compensatory trade-offs. This supports the claim that designers should carefully identify consideration behaviors before optimizing product portfolios. We also find that higher model predictive power does not necessarily imply better design decisions; that is, different model forms can provide "descriptive" rather than "predictive" information that is useful for design.Comment: 5 figures, 26 pages. In Press at ASME Journal of Mechanical Design (as of 3/17/15

Truthful Mechanisms for Matching and Clustering in an Ordinal World

We study truthful mechanisms for matching and related problems in a partial information setting, where the agents' true utilities are hidden, and the algorithm only has access to ordinal preference information. Our model is motivated by the fact that in many settings, agents cannot express the numerical values of their utility for different outcomes, but are still able to rank the outcomes in their order of preference. Specifically, we study problems where the ground truth exists in the form of a weighted graph of agent utilities, but the algorithm can only elicit the agents' private information in the form of a preference ordering for each agent induced by the underlying weights. Against this backdrop, we design truthful algorithms to approximate the true optimum solution with respect to the hidden weights. Our techniques yield universally truthful algorithms for a number of graph problems: a 1.76-approximation algorithm for Max-Weight Matching, 2-approximation algorithm for Max k-matching, a 6-approximation algorithm for Densest k-subgraph, and a 2-approximation algorithm for Max Traveling Salesman as long as the hidden weights constitute a metric. We also provide improved approximation algorithms for such problems when the agents are not able to lie about their preferences. Our results are the first non-trivial truthful approximation algorithms for these problems, and indicate that in many situations, we can design robust algorithms even when the agents may lie and only provide ordinal information instead of precise utilities.Comment: To appear in the Proceedings of WINE 201

Hedonic price equilibria, stable matching, and optimal transport: equivalence, topology, and uniqueness

Hedonic pricing with quasilinear preferences is shown to be equivalent to stable matching with transferable utilities and a participation constraint, and to an optimal transportation (Monge-Kantorovich) linear programming problem. Optimal assignments in the latter correspond to stable matchings, and to hedonic equilibria. These assignments are shown to exist in great generality; their marginal indirect payoffs with respect to agent type are shown to be unique whenever direct payoffs vary smoothly with type. Under a generalized Spence-Mirrlees condition the assignments are shown to be unique and to be pure, meaning the matching is one-to-one outside a negligible set. For smooth problems set on compact, connected type spaces such as the circle, there is a topological obstruction to purity, but we give a weaker condition still guaranteeing uniqueness of the stable match. An appendix resolves an old problem (# 111) of Birkhoff in probability and statistics [5], by giving a necessary and sufficient condition on the support of a joint probability to guarantee extremality among all joint measures with the same marginals.

Stock ownership and political behavior: evidence from demutualizations

A natural experiment in which customer-owned mutual companies converted to publicly listed firms created a plausibly exogenous shock to the stock market participation status of tens of thousands of people. We find the shock changed the way people vote in the affected areas, with a 10% increase in share-ownership rate being followed by a 1.3%–3.1% increase in right-of-center vote share. The institutional details and additional tests suggest that wealth, liquidity, and tax-related incentives cannot fully explain the results. A plausible explanation is that the associated increase in the salience of stock ownership causes a shift in voters’ attention