The Price of Defense

We consider a game on a graph G= ⟨ V, E⟩ with two confronting classes of randomized players: νattackers, who choose vertices and seek to minimize the probability of getting caught, and a single defender, who chooses edges and seeks to maximize the expected number of attackers it catches. In a Nash equilibrium, no player has an incentive to unilaterally deviate from her randomized strategy. The Price of Defense is the worst-case ratio, over all Nash equilibria, of ν over the expected utility of the defender at a Nash equilibrium. We orchestrate a strong interplay of arguments from Game Theory and Graph Theory to obtain both general and specific results in the considered setting: (1) Via a reduction to a Two-Players, Constant-Sum game, we observe that an arbitrary Nash equilibrium is computable in polynomial time. Further, we prove a general lower bound of |V|2 on the Price of Defense. We derive a characterization of graphs with a Nash equilibrium attaining this lower bound, which reveals a promising connection to Fractional Graph Theory; thereby, it implies an efficient recognition algorithm for such Defense-Optimal graphs. (2) We study some specific classes of Nash equilibria, both for their computational complexity and for their incurred Price of Defense. The classes are defined by imposing structure on the players’ randomized strategies: either graph-theoretic structure on the supports, or symmetry and uniformity structure on the probabilities. We develop novel graph-theoretic techniques to derive trade-offs between computational complexity and the Price of Defense for these classes. Some of the techniques touch upon classical milestones of Graph Theory; for example, we derive the first game-theoretic characterization of König-Egerváry graphs as graphs admitting a Matching Nash equilibrium

The Development Of Indonesia's Defense Industry Economic Independence Through Offset Schemes: License, Co-Production, and Codevelopment

The purpose of this study discusses the acceleration of the mastery of defense technology in the development of the independence of the Indonesian defense industry economic through offset schemes: license, coproduction, and codevelopment. This research is a qualitative research, the type of research uses a comprehensive analytical study and analytical normative approach. In order to be independent of the domestic defense industry, the purchase of a defense equipment product must be accompanied by a process of technology transfer through an offset mechanism or the level of achievement of technology transfer from foreign producers into the country. The implementation of the defense offset mechanism for the procurement of defense equipment has been ongoing since the early 1960s, although it was only effectively carried out when PT DI, PT. PAL and PT. PINDAD established cooperation with strategic weapons and industrial producing countries in the mid 1970s, with a variety of strategic weapons and industry variations, ranging from light weaponry, rockets, helicopters, fast boats, corvettes, to aircraft. The defense offset mechanism in the procurement of defense weapons has been carried out with three types of offsets: purchasing licenses, coproduction, and codevelopment

Indigenous Siberian Food Sharing Networks: Social Innovation in a Transforming Economy

The sustainability of indigenous communities in the Arctic, and the vulnerable households within, is in large part dependent on their continuing food security. A social food-sharing network within the Ust’-Avam community on the Taimyr Peninsula in northern Siberia is analyzed for underlying patterns of resilience and key evolutionarily stable strategies supporting cooperative behavior. Factors influencing the network include interhousehold relatedness, reciprocal sharing, and interaction effects. Social association also influences sharing. Evidence for multiple determinants of food sharing in this sample is discussed in reference to major evolutionary hypotheses and comparable studies. In sum, the findings illustrate the robustness of self-organizing distribution networks in an economic context of uncertainty

Concerned Philosophers, Vol. 1, No. 4

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