A Discrete Choquet Integral for Ordered Systems

A model for a Choquet integral for arbitrary finite set systems is presented. The model includes in particular the classical model on the system of all subsets of a finite set. The general model associates canonical non-negative and positively homogeneous superadditive functionals with generalized belief functions relative to an ordered system, which are then extended to arbitrary valuations on the set system. It is shown that the general Choquet integral can be computed by a simple Monge-type algorithm for so-called intersection systems, which include as a special case weakly union-closed families. Generalizing Lov\'asz' classical characterization, we give a characterization of the superadditivity of the Choquet integral relative to a capacity on a union-closed system in terms of an appropriate model of supermodularity of such capacities

Monge extensions of cooperation and communication structures

Cooperation structures without any {\it a priori} assumptions on the combinatorial structure of feasible coalitions are studied and a general theory for mar\-ginal values, cores and convexity is established. The theory is based on the notion of a Monge extension of a general characteristic function, which is equivalent to the Lovász extension in the special situation of a classical cooperative game. It is shown that convexity of a cooperation structure is tantamount to the equality of the associated core and Weber set. Extending Myerson's graph model for game theoretic communication, general communication structures are introduced and it is shown that a notion of supermodularity exists for this class that characterizes convexity and properly extends Shapley's convexity model for classical cooperative games.

A Discrete Choquet Integral for Ordered Systems

A model for a Choquet integral for arbitrary finite set systems is presented. The model includes in particular the classical model on the system of all subsets of a finite set. The general model associates canonical non-negative and positively homogeneous superadditive functionals with generalized belief functions relative to an ordered system, which are then extended to arbitrary valuations on the set system. It is shown that the general Choquet integral can be computed by a simple Monge-type algorithm for so-called intersection systems, which include as a special case weakly union-closed families. Generalizing Lovász' classical characterization, we give a characterization of the superadditivity of the Choquet integral relative to a capacity on a union-closed system in terms of an appropriate model of supermodularity of such capacities.Choquet integral, belief function, measurability, set systems, Monge algorithm, supermodularity

Ensuring the boundedness of the core of games with restricted cooperation

The core of a cooperative game on a set of players N is one of the most popular concept of solution. When cooperation is restricted (feasible coalitions form a subcollection F of 2N), the core may become unbounded, which makes it usage questionable in practice. Our proposal is to make the core bounded by turning some of the inequalities defining the core into equalities (additional efficiency constraints). We address the following mathematical problem : can we find a minimal set of inequalities in the core such that, if turned into equalities, the core becomes bounded ? The new core obtained is called the restricted core. We completely solve the question when F is a distributive lattice, introducing also the notion of restricted Weber set. We show that the case of regular set systems amounts more or less to the case of distributive lattices. We also study the case of weakly union-closed systems and give some results for the general case.Cooperative game, core, restricted cooperation, bounded core, Weber set.

Weighted Component Fairness for Forest Games

We present the axiom of weighted component fairness for the class of forest games, a generalization of component fairness introduced by Herings, Talman and van der Laan (2008) in order to characterize the average tree solution. Given a system of weights, component eciency and weighted component fairness yield a unique allocation rule. We provide an analysis of the set of allocation rules generated by component eciency and weighted component fairness. This allows us to provide a new characterization of the random tree solutions.(Weighted) component fairness ; Core ; Graph games ; Alexia value ; Harsanyi solutions ; Random tree solutions.

Solution Concepts for Games with General Coalitional Structure (Replaces CentER DP 2011-025)

We introduce a theory on marginal values and their core stability for cooperative games with arbitrary coalition structure. The theory is based on the notion of nested sets and the complex of nested sets associated to an arbitrary set system and the M-extension of a game for this set. For a set system being a building set or partition system, the corresponding complex is a polyhedral complex, and the vertices of this complex correspond to maximal strictly nested sets. To each maximal strictly nested set is associated a rooted tree. Given characteristic function, to every maximal strictly nested set a marginal value is associated to a corresponding rooted tree as in [9]. We show that the same marginal value is obtained by using the M-extension for every permutation that is associated to the rooted tree. The GC-solution is defined as the average of the marginal values over all maximal strictly nested sets. The solution can be viewed as the gravity center of the image of the vertices of the polyhedral complex. The GC-solution differs from the Myerson-kind value defined in [2] for union stable structures. The HS-solution is defined as the average of marginal values over the subclass of so-called half-space nested sets. The NT-solution is another solution and is defined as the average of marginal values over the subclass of NT-nested sets. For graphical buildings the collection of NT-nested sets corresponds to the set of spanning normal trees on the underlying graph and the NT-solution coincides with the average tree solution. We also study core stability of the solutions and show that both the HS-solution and NT-solution belong to the core under half-space supermodularity, which is a weaker condition than convexity of the game. For an arbitrary set system we show that there exists a unique minimal building set containing the set system. As solutions we take the solutions for this building covering by extending in a natural way the characteristic function to it by using its Möbius inversion.Core;polytope;building set;nested set complex;Möbius inversion;permutations;normal fan;average tree solution;Myerson value