Klaus Mann\u27s Mephisto: A Secret Rivalry

Critics of the 1960s and 1970s have focused their attention on Klaus Mann\u27s use of his former brother-in-law, Gustaf Gründgens, as the model for the hero of his controversial novel, Mephisto, while more recent critics have emphasized its significance as a work of anti-Fascist literature. This essay seeks to resolve some of the apparent contradictions in Klaus Mann\u27s motivation for writing Mephisto by viewing the novel primarily in the context of his life and career. Although Mephisto is the only political satire that Klaus Mann wrote, it is consistent with his life-long tendency to use autobiographical material as the basis for much of his plot and characterization. Mann transformed his ambivalent feelings about Gründgens, which long antedated the writing of Mephisto, into a unique work of fiction which simultaneously expresses his indignation over the moral bankruptcy of the Third Reich and reveals his envy of Gründgens\u27s career successes

Faculty Senate Newsletter, Holiday 2014

Message from President: Christmas, as it was called before it became a generic all-purpose “holiday,” is, at least in the propaganda of western cultures, all about universality: about the day when, so it seemed, the whole world lay at rest, when benefactions went out, if not to all mankind, at least to those on Santa’s good-person list. Christmas, indeed most any winter holiday, depends on the mass distribution of information: on everyone learning (a) that this is the day to keep calm and (b) what it is—what is the cultural and philosophical context—for at least a temporary peace. Everybody’s favorite winter festival thus enjoys a leadership position among those personal and social factors, figures, and influences that advocate for what higher-education professionals call “General Education”: that curriculum or that set of courses or that body of requirements required of everyone who enters the learning’s hallowed halls. That General Education takes at least three forms—either a curriculum or courses or requirements or some combination of these—suggests that it remains somewhat loose and general in its identity. The grandest, richest institutions, which possess the greatest means and resources to implement a mixed program of socialization, acculturation, and education, have, in recent decades, tended to prefer “core” curricula to “general” course distribution requirements. A “core” curriculum, with its strong suggestion of centrality and essentiality, suggests concentration and focus, unlike “general education” or “distribution requirements,” which suggest a hit-or-miss fulfillment of quotas. Closeup examination of both sorts of curricula, however, reveal a curious inversion. Core curricula in tony institutions tend to congregate a smattering of focused courses while general education programs, more common in large state institutions, emphasize the most general, introductory and even “skills” courses. Neither model stands completely on the elusive middle ground of all-purpose instruction that adjectives such as “general” and “core” imply. What is easy enough to recognize is that General Education in any of its current forms either lacks a clear purpose (other than its being required by most accrediting agencies) or cannot, in its current form, fulfil the purposes that we may have recognized. Contemporary American academe prizes enthusiasm and dislikes skepticism. Phrases such as “deep commitment” and “exciting new approaches” garner more applause than doubts about the latest pedagogical fashion. Yet, privately, most honest academic professionals will admit that a large number of students seldom attend General Education courses; that the level of difficulty in these courses has dipped to so low a level as to sink to an elementary allegory of the intended subject matter; and that it is a stretch to imagine that students are learning about foreign cultures by struggling through one semester of German or are grasping the operation of the universe by taking “finite math” or are coming to an appreciation of Condorcet in Social Studies 101. However impressive the skills of the dedicated scholars who teach beginning courses, it is more than a little challenging to observe the formation of an educated citizenry in the typical General Education class. General Education is, indeed, a good deal of what traditional universities have to offer to the general public. The requirement to study broadly and diversely sets legitimate universities apart from online providers and industrial certification schools. It is critical, if universities are to survive in anything resembling their present form, that colleagues begin rethinking General Education. Robust transformations are possible even within the present educational architecture. For example, an institution might choose to end the age of experimentation and create a single first-year curriculum for its students by way not only of educating but of creating an institutional identity. For another suggestion, some campuses might be re-purposed specifically for General Education. Mid-State Regional University of South Dakota, for an imaginary example, might become the designated Dakota State General Education Institute, at which students would spend their first year or two in concentrated General Education study, perhaps at a lower cost than at their intended senior colleges and perhaps in imitation of community colleges but with a four-year upgrade and overlay. The body of material that could be assimilated into a General Education program is greater and more stimulating than ever before. Re-developing General Education could also re-energize a faculty that sorely needs good news, stimulating prospects, and appreciation from the society that it teaches

Disjointed Confessions: Adikia and Radical Deradicalization in Schlingensief’s Hamlet

In 2001, in Zürich Switzerland, German director Christoph Schlingensief staged a version of Shakespeare’s Hamlet. In this version’s famous mousetrap scene, in which Hamlet wants to force his uncle to confess to fratricide, all the players of the mise en abyme are portrayed by a group of neo-Nazis endeavouring to separate themselves from the right–wing scene. In a dramatic break from Shakespeare’s text the group go on to share their own personal experiences with the audience. The production attempted to comment on and create debate about the ‘rottenness’ of the State, not just Switzerland, amid the rise in approval ratings and growing influence of far-right parties in the surrounding countries. I posit that Schlingensief’s project is a form of radical deradicalization (i.e., a radical method of deradicalizing neo-Nazis). This paper analyses Schlingensief’s Hamlet by utilizing the concepts of adikia (disjointure, dislocation, injustice) and dike (jointure, ordering, justice), which go back to the oldest extant Greek text: the Anaximander fragment. Drawing on Martin Heidegger and Jacques Derrida’s reinterpretations of adikia and dike I endeavour to illustrate how Schlingensief’s work attempts to intervene in the disjointure caused by the contemporary politics of fear by bringing adikia to the production of Hamlet itself

The law of defamation - a comparison between the South African, the Canadian and the German legal systems

"The law of defamation aims at the protection of a person's reputation." This definition was found in the Canadian, the South African as well as in the German law. However, the question that arises is whether the law of defamation only protects the reputation and the good name of a person. Defamation can affect an individual's personality with all its aspects such as reputation, dignity or privacy. One can think of a broad range of possible violations. Due to the broad concept of the law of defamation, this article can only focus on the civil law of defamation and will analyse some specific legal problems that arise in all of the aforementioned legal systems. Therefore, the thesis begins with an analysis of the ambit of the law of defamation in the three different legal systems and examines the similarities and the differences. The second chapter deals with the problem of the title to sue in a defamation action. Not only living persons can be the target of defamatory words and conduct but also deceased person as well as legal entities. What parties have a right to sue for compensation in the aforementioned legal systems will be analysed. The third chapter illustrates under which circumstances a person will be held liable in a defamation action. Here, some major differences between the three legal systems are presented. In the fourth chapter the criteria of defamatory words and conduct, which are required in the Canadian, the South African and the German law, are examined and it is demonstrated how the different legal systems deal with the difficult problem of defining a defamatory action. After examining the different criteria for a successful action of defamation, the article goes on to compare the different defences that a defendant can raise under the three different legal systems. Eventually, the issue of compensation in an action for defamation arises. Therefore, the last chapter analyses what kind of damages the plaintiff can claim in an action for defamation and makes clear that major differences exist between the three legal systems

The Jurisprudence of Free Speech in the United States and the Federal Republic of Germany

This Article compares the constitutional thought of the United States Supreme Court and the West German Federal Constitutional Court in the area of free speech. The primary focus is on cases dealing with governmental restraints on speech arising out of concern for internal security\u27 and commentary affecting the reputation of public figures. These cases reflect major lines of German and American free speech thought. The objective of this Article is to compare the concepts of free speech that have evolved in the opinions of the two tribunals and to consider the significance of the separate doctrinal paths taken by each court