Davidson’s Wittgenstein

Although the later Wittgenstein appears as one of the most influential figures in Davidson’s later works on meaning, it is not, for the most part, clear how Davidson interprets and employs Wittgenstein’s ideas. In this paper, I will argue that Davidson’s later works on meaning can be seen as mainly a manifestation of his attempt to accommodate the later Wittgenstein’s basic ideas about meaning and understanding, especially the requirement of drawing the seems right/is right distinction and the way this requirement must be met. These ideas, however, are interpreted by Davidson in his own way. I will then argue that Davidson even attempts to respect Wittgenstein’s quietism, provided that we understand this view in the way Davidson does. Having argued for that, I will finally investigate whether, for Davidson at least, his more theoretical and supposedly explanatory projects, such as that of constructing a formal theory of meaning and his use of the notion of triangulation, are in conflict with this Wittgensteinian quietist view

Extending the Extended Mind : From Cognition to Consciousness

Where does conscious experience stop and the rest of the world begin? Is the material basis of consciousness confined to the brain, or can it be extended to include other parts of the body and environmental elements? This study proposes an extended account: when all the requirements are fulfilled, an external tool may become part of the realising basis for certain experiential processes. Andy Clark and David Chalmers argued famously that the material basis of cognitive states sometimes extends out of the barriers of skin and skull to external objects such as notebooks and other everyday tools. However, they draw the line there: only cognition, but not consciousness can have an extended base. The central argument of this study is that their constraint is not legitimate. If one is accepted, the other one follows. The first chapter lays an overview of the theoretical background of externalism and the 4E-theories in present-day philosophy of mind and cognitive sciences. It also examines the central concepts, accounts and methodological questions that will be used and further developed in later chapters. The second chapter presents three arguments for the position defended in this thesis, namely the hypothesis of extended conscious mind. The third chapter analyses the ongoing debate in the interface of philosophy of mind and philosophy of science about the causal–constitution distinction, and argues that rather than in mechanist terms, the causal–constitution distinction should be interpreted in diachronic terms when dealing with mental phenomena. When depicted that way, the extension relation in the hypothesis of extended conscious mind counts as constitutive. The fourth chapter distinguishes between several different levels of extension, from mere short-term extension to more robust functional incorporation, where the external tool has become part of the transparent bodily point of view of the subject. Based on the notion of functional incorporation, a set of demarcation criteria for the hypothesis of extended conscious mind will be developed. The chapter closes by discussing sensory substitution as a concrete example of functional incorporation. Finally, the fifth chapter introduces the most influential counter-arguments that have been set forth against the hypothesis of extended conscious mind. The critiques will be examined and answered.Väitöstutkimus esittää, että mielen ja tietoisen kokemuksen rajat laajentuvat pään ja ruumiin ulkopuolelle, esimerkiksi teknologisiin apuvälineisiin. Tutkimus kyseenalaistaa mielenfilosofiassa perinteisesti vallassa olleen näkemyksen, jonka mukaan mielen toiminnot voitaisiin selittää pelkän aivotoiminnan pohjalta – sen sijaan mielen toiminnot syntyvät aivojen, ruumiin ja ympäristön vuorovaikutuksessa. Andy Clark ja David Chalmers esittivät kuuluisassa artikkelissaan, että jokapäiväiset apuvälineet voivat olla kognitiivisten prosessien muodostamisessa mukana biologisen ruumiin ohella. Clark ja Chalmers kuitenkin rajoittivat laajentumisen tähän: heidän mukaansa pelkästään kognitiivisilla prosesseilla voi olla laajentunut perusta, mutta tietoinen kokemus rajoittuu pään sisään. Tämän tutkimuksen uusi avaus ja ydinargumentti on, että tällaista rajanvetoa ei ole mahdollista tehdä johdonmukaisesti. Jos hyväksymme kognitiivisten tilojen laajentumisen, tietoinen kokemus seuraa mukana. Biologisten toimintojen ohella esimerkiksi muistikirja tai älypuhelin voi toimia muistoja ja uskomuksia osaltaan toteuttavana välineenä, ja sokeankeppi tai tekoraaja osana tuntoaistimuksen toteuttavaa materiaalista pohjaa. Jotta laajentuminen voi tapahtua, ulkoisen välineen tulee täyttää tietyt ehdot, sen täytyy muun muassa tulla osaksi funktionaalista ruumiillista identiteettiä. Ulkoisiin apuvälineisiin laajentuminen on mahdollista aivojen ja ruumiin rakenteellisen muovautuvuuden ansiosta: ruumiillistetun osan ei tarvitse olla biologinen, mutta sen täytyy tulla ”läpinäkyväksi” osaksi subjektin näkökulmaa. Käsitteellisen analyysin lisäksi työssä käsitellään useita empiirisiä tutkimustapauksia (kuten aistikorvaavuuslaite-teknologia ja empiirinen unitutkimus). Mielen ja tietoisen kokemuksen laajentumisella on kauaskantoinen vaikutus, joka näkyy filosofian ohella useilla muillakin aloilla. Tutkimus auttaa vastaamaan erittäin ajankohtaisiin kysymyksiin, kuten millainen status käyttämillemme jokapäiväisille teknologisille laitteille tulisi antaa: tulisiko niitä pitää vain fyysisinä esineinä vai kognitiivisten prosessien jatkeena? Yksi esiin nouseva käytännönläheinen kysymys jatkotutkimukselle on kuinka ympäristön muokkaaminen (esim. hoitolaitoksissa tehtävät ratkaisut) vaikuttaa mieleen – ja tästä seuraa myös monenlaisia eettisiä kysymyksiä

Agent-based modelling and the environmental complexity thesis

Abstract A variation of Godfrey-Smith's 'environmental complexity thesis' is described which draws together two broad themes; the relation of functional properties of behaviour to environmental structure, and the distinction between behavioural and mechanistic levels of description. The specific idea defended here is that behavioural and/or mechanistic complexity can be understood in terms of mediating well-adapted responses to environmental variability. Particular attention is paid to the value of agent-based modelling within this framework

Mental models and meaning: an analysis into the validity of Philip Johnson-Laird’s adoption of Peircean iconism

The recent trend within cognitive science toward the adoption of a de re account of semantic content has been accepted by some theorists without due consideration, an oversight that has generated a number of logical inconsistencies in the literature. This thesis endeavours to shed light on this omission, and the effects thereof, by scrutinising the account of one such theorist: The psychologist Philip Johnson-Laird. Herein, Johnson-Laird’s introduction of a Peircean iconism is subjected to a thorough analysis and, in this way, an important example of the problematic tensions created by a failure to address the substantial nature of a theory, before its wholesale integration into a philosophy, is revealed. The philosophic method of analysis and synthesis is applied to the arguments and hypotheses of Philip Johnson-Laird, thereby demonstrating the base assumptions that constitute his account of cognition and the relationships between these assumptions. Investigation of the results of this method identifies logical inconsistency present in the hypothesis and, following Popper and Quine, logical inconsistency is taken as a disproof of a theory. The study concludes that, although Johnson-Laird’s updated philosophy was able to dissolve historical arguments against his theory, his use of Peircean iconism is inconsistent in its own right and produces serious tensions with aspects of his extant philosophy. As such, it is concluded that Johnson-Laird’s externalist semantics fails and it is recommended that his account of semantics be reconsidered

Minds Online: The Interface between Web Science, Cognitive Science, and the Philosophy of Mind

Alongside existing research into the social, political and economic impacts of the Web, there is a need to study the Web from a cognitive and epistemic perspective. This is particularly so as new and emerging technologies alter the nature of our interactive engagements with the Web, transforming the extent to which our thoughts and actions are shaped by the online environment. Situated and ecological approaches to cognition are relevant to understanding the cognitive significance of the Web because of the emphasis they place on forces and factors that reside at the level of agent–world interactions. In particular, by adopting a situated or ecological approach to cognition, we are able to assess the significance of the Web from the perspective of research into embodied, extended, embedded, social and collective cognition. The results of this analysis help to reshape the interdisciplinary configuration of Web Science, expanding its theoretical and empirical remit to include the disciplines of both cognitive science and the philosophy of mind

Making AI Intelligible

Can humans and artificial intelligences share concepts and communicate? One aim of Making AI Intelligible is to show that philosophical work on the metaphysics of meaning can help answer these questions. Cappelen and Dever use the externalist tradition in philosophy of to create models of how AIs and humans can understand each other. In doing so, they also show ways in which that philosophical tradition can be improved: our linguistic encounters with AIs revel that our theories of meaning have been excessively anthropocentric. The questions addressed in the book are not only theoretically interesting, but the answers have pressing practical implications. Many important decisions about human life are now influenced by AI. In giving that power to AI, we presuppose that AIs can track features of the world that we care about (e.g. creditworthiness, recidivism, cancer, and combatants.) If AIs can share our concepts, that will go some way towards justifying this reliance on AI. The book can be read as a proposal for how to take some first steps towards achieving interpretable AI. Making AI Intelligible is of interest to both philosophers of language and anyone who follows current events or interacts with AI systems. It illustrates how philosophy can help us understand and improve our interactions with AI

Health, Agency, and the Evolution of Consciousness

This goal of this thesis in the philosophy of nature is to move us closer towards a true biological science of consciousness in which the evolutionary origin, function, and phylogenetic diversity of consciousness are moved from the field's periphery of investigations to its very centre. Rather than applying theories of consciousness built top-down on the human case to other animals, I argue that we require an evolutionary bottom-up approach that begins with the very origins of subjective experience in order to make sense of the place of mind in nature. To achieve this goal, I introduce and defend the pathological complexity thesis as both a framework for the scientific investigation of consciousness and as a life-mind continuity thesis about the origins and function of consciousness

Can a Robot Smile? Wittgenstein on Facial Expression

Some researchers in social robotics aim to build ‘face robots’—machines that interact with human beings (or other robots) by means of facial expression and gesture. They aim, in part, to use these robots to test hypotheses concerning human social and psychological development (and disorders such as autism) in controlled, repeatable experiments. A robot may be said to ‘grin’ and ‘frown’, or to have ‘a smile on its face’. This is not to claim merely that the robot has a certain physical configuration or behaviour; nor is it to say merely that the robot’s ‘facial’ display is, like an emoticon or photograph, a representation of a smile or frown. Although researchers may refrain from claiming that their machines have emotions, they attribute expressive behaviours to them literally and without qualification. Wittgenstein said, however, ‘A smiling mouth smiles only in a human face’. Smiling is a complex conventional gesture. A facial display is a smile only if it has a certain meaning—the meaning that distinguishes a smile from a human grimace or facial tic, and from a chimpanzee’s bared-teeth display. In this paper I explore the implications of Wittgenstein’s remarks on expression for the claim that face robots can smile or frown

Can a Robot Smile? Wittgenstein on Facial Expression

Recent work in social robotics, which is aimed both at creating an artificial intelligence and providing a test-bed for psychological theories of human social development, involves building robots that can learn from ‘face-to-face’ interaction with human beings — as human infants do. The building-blocks of this interaction include the robot’s ‘expressive’ behaviours, for example, facial-expression and head-and-neck gesture. There is here an ideal opportunity to apply Wittgensteinian conceptual analysis to current theoretical and empirical work in the sciences. Wittgenstein’s philosophical psychology is sympathetic to embodied and situated Artificial Intelligence (see Proudfoot, 2002, 2004b), and his discussion of facial-expression is remarkably modern. In this chapter, I explore his approach to facial-expression, using smiling as a representative example, and apply it to the canonical interactive face robot, Cynthia Breazeal’s Kismet (see e.g. Breazeal, 2009, 2002). I assess the claim that Kismet has expressive behaviours, with the aim of generating philosophical insights for AI