56 research outputs found
The Complexity of Welfare Maximization in Congestion Games
We investigate issues of complexity related to welfare maximization in congestion games. In particular, we provide a full classification of complexity results for the problem of finding a minimum cost solution to a congestion game, under the model of Rosenthal. We consider both network and general congestion games, and we examine several variants of the problem concerning the structure of the game and the properties of its associated cost functions. Many of these problem variants turn out to be NP-hard, and some are hard to approximate to within any finite factor, unless P = NP. We also identify several versions of the problem that are solvable in polynomial time.United States. Dept. of Energy (Grant Number: DE-AC52-07NA27344)Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (Grant Number: LLNL-JRNL-410585)United States. Office of Naval Research (Grant Number: N000141110056
Complexity and Approximation of the Continuous Network Design Problem
We revisit a classical problem in transportation, known as the continuous
(bilevel) network design problem, CNDP for short. We are given a graph for
which the latency of each edge depends on the ratio of the edge flow and the
capacity installed. The goal is to find an optimal investment in edge
capacities so as to minimize the sum of the routing cost of the induced Wardrop
equilibrium and the investment cost. While this problem is considered as
challenging in the literature, its complexity status was still unknown. We
close this gap showing that CNDP is strongly NP-complete and APX-hard, both on
directed and undirected networks and even for instances with affine latencies.
As for the approximation of the problem, we first provide a detailed analysis
for a heuristic studied by Marcotte for the special case of monomial latency
functions (Mathematical Programming, Vol.~34, 1986). Specifically, we derive a
closed form expression of its approximation guarantee for arbitrary sets S of
allowed latency functions. Second, we propose a different approximation
algorithm and show that it has the same approximation guarantee. As our final
-- and arguably most interesting -- result regarding approximation, we show
that using the better of the two approximation algorithms results in a strictly
improved approximation guarantee for which we give a closed form expression.
For affine latencies, e.g., this algorithm achieves a 1.195-approximation which
improves on the 5/4 that has been shown before by Marcotte. We finally discuss
the case of hard budget constraints on the capacity investment.Comment: 27 page
Approximation algorithms for distributed and selfish agents
Thesis (Ph. D.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Mathematics, 2005.Includes bibliographical references (p. 157-165).Many real-world systems involve distributed and selfish agents who optimize their own objective function. In these systems, we need to design efficient mechanisms so that system-wide objective is optimized despite agents acting in their own self interest. In this thesis, we develop approximation algorithms and decentralized mechanisms for various combinatorial optimization problems in such systems. First, we investigate the distributed caching and a general set of assignment problems. We develop an almost tight LP-based ... approximation algorithm and a local search ... approximation algorithm for these problems. We also design efficient decentralized mechanisms for these problems and study the convergence of the corresponding games. In the following chapters, we study the speed of convergence to high quality solutions on (random) best-response paths of players. First, we study the average social value on best response paths in basic-utility, market sharing, and cut games. Then, we introduce the sink equilibrium as a new equilibrium concept. We argue that, unlike Nash equilibria, the selfish behavior of players converges to sink equilibria and all strategic games have a sink equilibrium. To illustrate the use of this new concept, we study the social value of sink equilibria in weighted selfish routing (or weighted congestion) games and valid-utility (or submodular-utility) games. In these games, we bound the average social value on random best-response paths for sink equilibria.. Finally, we study cross-monotonic cost sharings and group-strategyproof mechanisms.(cont.) We study the limitations imposed by the cross-monotonicity property on cost-sharing schemes for several combinatorial optimization games including set cover and metric facility location. We develop a novel technique based on the probabilistic method for proving upper bounds on the budget-balance factor of cross-monotonic cost sharing schemes, deriving tight or nearly-tight bounds for these games. At the end, we extend some of these results to group-strategyproof mechanisms.by Vahab S. Mirrokni.Ph.D
Uniform Mixed Equilibria in Network Congestion Games with Link Failures
Motivated by possible applications in fault-tolerant routing, we introduce the notion of uniform mixed equilibria in network congestion games with adversarial link failures, where players need to route traffic from a source to a destination node. Given an integer rho >= 1, a rho-uniform mixed strategy is a mixed strategy in which a player plays exactly rho edge disjoint paths with uniform probabilities, so that a rho-uniform mixed equilibrium is a tuple of rho-uniform mixed strategies, one for each player, in which no player can lower her cost by deviating to another rho-uniform mixed strategy. For games with weighted players and affine latency functions, we show existence of rho-uniform mixed equilibria and provide a tight characterization of their price of anarchy. For games with unweighted players, instead, we extend the existential guarantee to any class of latency functions and, restricted to games with affine latencies, we derive a tight characterization of both the prices of anarchy and stability
Congestion Games with Multisets of Resources and Applications in Synthesis
In classical congestion games, players\u27 strategies are subsets of resources. We introduce and study multiset congestion games, where players\u27 strategies are multisets of resources. Thus, in each strategy a player may need to use each resource a different number of times, and his cost for using the resource depends on the load that he and the other players generate on the resource.
Beyond the theoretical interest in examining the effect of a repeated use of resources, our study enables better understanding of non-cooperative systems and environments whose behavior is not covered by previously studied models. Indeed, congestion games with multiset-strategies arise, for example, in production planing
and network formation with tasks that are more involved than reachability. We study in detail the application of synthesis from component libraries: different users synthesize systems by gluing together components from a component library. A component may be used in several systems and may be used several times in a system. The performance of a component and hence the system\u27s quality depends on the load on it.
Our results reveal how the richer setting of multisets congestion games affects the stability and equilibrium efficiency compared to standard congestion games. In particular, while we present very simple instances with no pure Nash equilibrium and prove tighter and simpler lower bounds for equilibrium inefficiency, we are also able to show that some of the positive results known for affine and weighted congestion games apply to the richer setting of multisets
The Network Improvement Problem for Equilibrium Routing
In routing games, agents pick their routes through a network to minimize
their own delay. A primary concern for the network designer in routing games is
the average agent delay at equilibrium. A number of methods to control this
average delay have received substantial attention, including network tolls,
Stackelberg routing, and edge removal.
A related approach with arguably greater practical relevance is that of
making investments in improvements to the edges of the network, so that, for a
given investment budget, the average delay at equilibrium in the improved
network is minimized. This problem has received considerable attention in the
literature on transportation research and a number of different algorithms have
been studied. To our knowledge, none of this work gives guarantees on the
output quality of any polynomial-time algorithm. We study a model for this
problem introduced in transportation research literature, and present both
hardness results and algorithms that obtain nearly optimal performance
guarantees.
- We first show that a simple algorithm obtains good approximation guarantees
for the problem. Despite its simplicity, we show that for affine delays the
approximation ratio of 4/3 obtained by the algorithm cannot be improved.
- To obtain better results, we then consider restricted topologies. For
graphs consisting of parallel paths with affine delay functions we give an
optimal algorithm. However, for graphs that consist of a series of parallel
links, we show the problem is weakly NP-hard.
- Finally, we consider the problem in series-parallel graphs, and give an
FPTAS for this case.
Our work thus formalizes the intuition held by transportation researchers
that the network improvement problem is hard, and presents topology-dependent
algorithms that have provably tight approximation guarantees.Comment: 27 pages (including abstract), 3 figure
Altruism in Atomic Congestion Games
This paper studies the effects of introducing altruistic agents into atomic
congestion games. Altruistic behavior is modeled by a trade-off between selfish
and social objectives. In particular, we assume agents optimize a linear
combination of personal delay of a strategy and the resulting increase in
social cost. Our model can be embedded in the framework of congestion games
with player-specific latency functions. Stable states are the Nash equilibria
of these games, and we examine their existence and the convergence of
sequential best-response dynamics. Previous work shows that for symmetric
singleton games with convex delays Nash equilibria are guaranteed to exist. For
concave delay functions we observe that there are games without Nash equilibria
and provide a polynomial time algorithm to decide existence for symmetric
singleton games with arbitrary delay functions. Our algorithm can be extended
to compute best and worst Nash equilibria if they exist. For more general
congestion games existence becomes NP-hard to decide, even for symmetric
network games with quadratic delay functions. Perhaps surprisingly, if all
delay functions are linear, then there is always a Nash equilibrium in any
congestion game with altruists and any better-response dynamics converges. In
addition to these results for uncoordinated dynamics, we consider a scenario in
which a central altruistic institution can motivate agents to act
altruistically. We provide constructive and hardness results for finding the
minimum number of altruists to stabilize an optimal congestion profile and more
general mechanisms to incentivize agents to adopt favorable behavior.Comment: 13 pages, 1 figure, includes some minor adjustment
Scheduling Games with Machine-Dependent Priority Lists
We consider a scheduling game in which jobs try to minimize their completion
time by choosing a machine to be processed on. Each machine uses an individual
priority list to decide on the order according to which the jobs on the machine
are processed. We characterize four classes of instances in which a pure Nash
equilibrium (NE) is guaranteed to exist, and show, by means of an example, that
none of these characterizations can be relaxed. We then bound the performance
of Nash equilibria for each of these classes with respect to the makespan of
the schedule and the sum of completion times. We also analyze the computational
complexity of several problems arising in this model. For instance, we prove
that it is NP-hard to decide whether a NE exists, and that even for instances
with identical machines, for which a NE is guaranteed to exist, it is NP-hard
to approximate the best NE within a factor of for all
. In addition, we study a generalized model in which players'
strategies are subsets of resources, each having its own priority list over the
players. We show that in this general model, even unweighted symmetric games
may not have a pure NE, and we bound the price of anarchy with respect to the
total players' costs.Comment: 19 pages, 2 figure
Network improvement for equilibrium routing
Routing games are frequently used to model the behavior of traffic in large networks, such as road networks. In transportation research, the problem of adding capacity to a road network in a cost-effective manner to minimize the total delay at equilibrium is known as the Network Design Problem, and has received considerable attention. However, prior to our work, little was known about guarantees for polynomial-time algorithms for this problem. We obtain tight approximation guarantees for general and series-parallel networks, and present a number of open questions for future work
The complexity of pure nash equilibria in max-congestion games
We study Network Max-Congestion Games (NMC games, for short), a
class of network games where each player tries to minimize the most congested
edge along the path he uses as strategy. We focus our study on the complexity
of computing a pure Nash equilibria in this kind of games. We show that, for
single-commodity games with non-decreasing delay functions, this problem
is in P when either all the paths from the source to the target node are
disjoint or all the delay functions are equal. For the general case, we prove
that the computation of a PNE belongs to the complexity class PLS through a
new technique based on generalized ordinal potential functions and a slightly
modified definition of the usual local search neighborhood. We further apply
this technique to a different class of games (which we call Pareto-efficient)
with restricted cost functions. Finally, we also prove some PLS-hardness
results, showing that computing a PNE for Pareto-efficient NMC games is
indeed a PLS-complete problem
- âŚ