Застосування модальної логіки при прийнятті рішень на моделях знань

Створення систем ситуаційного управління та підтримки прийняття рішень на основі знань повинні враховувати модальні відношення між компонентами моделі знань та враховувати їх при визначенні альтернатив та системи переваг між ними. Особливості модальної логіки обумовлюють її використання в якості інструмента для представлення та обробки моделей знань. В роботі розглядаються варіанти використання модальностей в моделях знань та способи їх інтерпретації в процедурах побудови запитів до баз знань.Creating of situational management and decision support systems based on knowledge must take into account the modality of knowledge models in determining the alternatives and the benefits of them. Features of modal logic determines its use as the tool for representation and processing of knowledge models. We consider variations of modalities in models of knowledge and methods of their interpretation in the procedures for querying the knowledge base

ЗАСТОСУВАННЯ МОДАЛЬНОЇ ЛОГІКИ ПРИ ПРИЙНЯТТІ РІШЕНЬ НА МОДЕЛЯХ ЗНАНЬ

Створення систем ситуаційного управління та підтримки прийняття рішень на основі знань повинні враховувати модальні відношення між компонентами моделі знань та враховувати їх при визначенні альтернатив та системи переваг між ними. Особливості модальної логіки обумовлюють її використання в якості інструмента для представлення та обробки моделей знань. В роботі розглядаються варіанти використання модальностей в моделях знань та способи їх інтерпретації в процедурах побудови запитів до баз знань

The critics of paraconsistency and of many-valuedness and the geometry of oppositions

In 1995 Slater argued both against Priest’s paraconsistent system LP (1979) and against paraconsistency in general, invoking the fundamental opposition relations ruling the classical logical square. Around 2002 Béziau constructed a double defence of paraconsistency (logical and philosophical), relying, in its philosophical part, on Sesmat’s (1951) and Blanche’s (1953) “logical hexagon”, a geometrical, conservative extension of the logical square, and proposing a new (tridimensional) “solid of opposition”, meant to shed new light on the point raised by Slater. By using n-opposition theory (NOT) we analyse Beziau’s anti-Slater move and show both its right intuitions and its technical limits. Moreover, we suggest that Slater’s criticism is much akin to a well-known one by Suszko (1975) against the conceivability of many-valued logics. This last criticism has been addressed by Malinowski (1990) and Shramko and Wansing (2005), who developed a family of tenable logical counter-examples to it: trans-Suszkian systems are radically many-valued. This family of new logics has some strange logical features, essentially: each system has more than one consequence operator. We show that a new, deeper part of the aforementioned geometry of logical oppositions (NOT), the “logical poly-simplexes of dimension m”, generates new logical-geometrical structures, essentially many-valued, which could be a very natural (and intuitive) geometrical counterpart to the “strange”, new, non-Suszkian logics of Malinowski, Shramko and Wansing. By a similar move, the geometry of opposition therefore sheds light both on the foundations of paraconsistent logics and on those of many-valued logics

A análise axiológica do direito civil

Este estudo ocupa-se sobretudo de dois temas, o conceito de direito-pretensão, correlato do de dever dirigido, e o de direitos de base. Ambos são tomados como figuras éticas gerais, mas com uma intenção de utilidade no direito privado. Escolhe-se, no capítulo II um conceito de direito em si mesmo interessante — e jusnaturalista — e que delimitasse uma área em que os conceitos de direito-pretensão e direito de base mais facilmente se aplicassem. No capítulo III, reflecte-se sobre o lugar do pensamento analítico em direito, defendendo várias possibilidades da sua utilização. O conceito de direito-pretensão é analisado no capítulo IV através do de valor pessoal e do de sentido dos deveres, sem análise do próprio conceito de dever. O conceito de direitos de base tem maiores aplicações na teorização do direito privado. Os direitos de base são um projecto de entender mais profundamente a atribuição, dando-lhe como par o conceito de libertação e inserindo-as no espaço natural da teoria dos direitos. O valor pessoal é ainda o conceito de partida para os direitos de base, agora já pressuposta uma análise do conceito de dever. Conclui-se que os direitos de base têm utilidade em várias construções dogmáticas do direito privado.This study deals mainly with two subjects, the concept of claim-right, correlated with that of directed duty, and that of base-rights. Both are taken as general ethical notions, but with an intention of usefulness in private law. In chapter II, right after the introduction, a concept of law is chosen which is in itself interesting - a natural-law concept - and that delimits an area in which the concepts of claim-rights and base-rights more easily apply. Chapter III dwells on the place of analytical thinking in law, arguing for various possibilities of its use. The concept of claim-right is analyzed in Chapter IV through the concept of personal value and the point of duties, without analyzing the concept of duty itself. The concept of base-rights is more useful in the theorization of private law. Base-rights, which occupy chapter V, are a project to understand attributions more deeply, giving it as a pair the concept of liberation and inserting both in their natural in the theory of rights. Personal value is still the concept of departure for base-rights. An analysis of the concept of duty was then presupposed. It is argued that base-rights are useful in several doctrines of private-law theory