Rehabilitating Statistical Evidence

Recently, the practice of deciding legal cases on purely statistical evidence has been widely criticised. Many feel uncomfortable with finding someone guilty on the basis of bare probabilities, even though the chance of error might be stupendously small. This is an important issue: with the rise of DNA profiling, courts are increasingly faced with purely statistical evidence. A prominent line of argument—endorsed by Blome-Tillmann 2017; Smith 2018; and Littlejohn 2018—rejects the use of such evidence by appealing to epistemic norms that apply to individual inquirers. My aim in this paper is to rehabilitate purely statistical evidence by arguing that, given the broader aims of legal systems, there are scenarios in which relying on such evidence is appropriate. Along the way I explain why popular arguments appealing to individual epistemic norms to reject legal reliance on bare statistics are unconvincing, by showing that courts and individuals face different epistemic predicaments (in short, individuals can hedge when confronted with statistical evidence, whilst legal tribunals cannot). I also correct some misconceptions about legal practice that have found their way into the recent literature

Explanation production by expert planners

Although the explanation capability of expert systems is usually listed as one of the distinguishing characteristics of these systems, the explanation facilities of most existing systems are quite primitive. Computer generated explanations are typically produced from canned text or by direct translation of the knowledge structures. Explanations produced in this manner bear little resemblance to those produced by humans for similar tasks. The focus of our research in explanation is the production of justifications for decisions by expert planning systems. An analysis of justifications written by people for planning tasks has been taken as the starting point. The purpose of this analysis is two-fold. First, analysis of the information content of the justifications will provide a basis for deciding what knowledge must be represented if human-like justifications are to be produced. Second, an analysis of the textual organization of the justifications will be used in the development of a mechanism for selecting and organizing the knowledge to be included in a computer-produced explanation. This paper describes a preliminary analysis done of justifications written by people for a planning task. It is clear that these justifications differ significantly from those that would be produced by an expert system by tracing the firing of production rules. The results from the text analysis have been used to develop an augmented phrase structured grammar (APSG) describing the organization of the justifications. The grammar was designed to provide a computationally feasible method for determining textual organization that will allow the necessary information to be communicated in a cohesive manner

Explaining and trusting expert evidence: What is a ‘sufficiently reliable scientific basis’?

Through a series of judicial decisions and Practice Directions, the English courts have developed a rule that expert evidence must have ‘a sufficiently reliable scientific basis to be admitted’. There is a dearth of case-law as to what degree of reliability is ‘sufficient’. This article argues that the test should be interpreted as analogous to one developed in the law of hearsay: expert evidence (scientific or otherwise) must be ‘potentially safely reliable’ in the context of the evidence as a whole. The implications of this test will vary according to the relationship between the expert evidence and the other evidence in the case. The article identifies three main patterns into which this relationship falls. Whether the jury relies upon the evidence will depend upon what they regard as the best explanation of the evidence and how far they trust the expert. Whether their reliance is safe (as a basis for conviction) depends on whether they could rationally rule out explanations consistent with innocence, and whether the degree to which they take the expert’s evidence on trust is consistent with prosecution’s burden of proving the essential elements of its case, including the reliability of any scientific techniques on which it relies

Scientific Method, Anti-Foundationalism, and Public Decision-making

An examination of the legitimacy of attacks on lay assessments of environmental or other technological Risk. The case is made that rational policy requires an epistemology in which what we believe about Risk is bootstrapped onto how we should act concerning Risk

An architecture for rule based system explanation

A system architecture is presented which incorporate both graphics and text into explanations provided by rule based expert systems. This architecture facilitates explanation of the knowledge base content, the control strategies employed by the system, and the conclusions made by the system. The suggested approach combines hypermedia and inference engine capabilities. Advantages include: closer integration of user interface, explanation system, and knowledge base; the ability to embed links to deeper knowledge underlying the compiled knowledge used in the knowledge base; and allowing for more direct control of explanation depth and duration by the user. User models are suggested to control the type, amount, and order of information presented

Expert-oriented abilities vs. novice-oriented abilities: An alternative account of epistemic authority

According to a recent account of epistemic authority proposed by Linda Zagzebski (2012), it is rational for laypersons to believe on authority when they conscientiously judge that the authority is more likely to form true beliefs and avoid false ones than they are in some domain. Christoph Jäger (2016) has recently raised several objections to her view. By contrast, I argue that both theories fail to adequately capture what epistemic authority is, and I offer an alternative account grounded in the abilities that different kinds of authorities are required to possess

Expert evidence and the Law Commission : implementation without legislation?

Argues that, despite a failure to implement the recommendations in the Law Commission's 2011 report entitled "Expert Evidence in Criminal Proceedings", many of its proposals on the exclusion of such evidence might be introduced by the judiciary's appropriate exercise of common law powers. Reviews the Commission's proposals, the common law principles determining when expert evidence is not admitted, and how such discretion could be used to exclude evidence failing the Commission's core test. Discusses the drawbacks of such an approach and whether the Commission proposals were too timid

Theory and Practice within HE Professional Education Courses: Integration of Academic Knowledge and Experiential Knowledge .

If we look historically at professional education we can see a movement from what Bines and Watson (1992) call a ‘technocratic’ (or technical-rational) model to what they call a ‘post-technocratic’model - one primarily concerned with professional knowledge and action/process rather than academic knowledge and content. Emphasis is placed on professional development, a practitioner’s theories-in-use, knowledge for practice, and on the skills required to use reflection, observation, analysis and evaluation to develop practice. Particular methods of learning and teaching concerned with enquiry, analysis, experience and reflection are advocated. If this model is fully embraced, the type of learning involved (especially when undertaken by qualified workers) is quite different from that of a more traditional, discipline-based, technocratic model. Firstly, it encompasses different ways of knowing, i.e. more subjective, reflexive, and implicit practice-based understanding. Secondly, it can also produce a different type of knowledge in the form of practice theory. The associated learning processes tend to be interpretive and inductive (Nixon and Murr 2006) and can form a more integrative relationship between practice knowledge and theory that encompasses ‘being’ and a personal ethical stance (Margetson 2000; Tynjala et al 2003)

Frameworks for Strategic Leadership

I suggest two frameworks that may improve understanding of strategic thinking, strategic decision making, and strategic leadership. The first I call the Epistemology Framework. The second which was described and continues to be promoted by David Snowdon and colleagues is the Cynefin Framework