The e-mail game revisited - Modeling rough inductive reasoning

I study the robustness of Rubinstein´s (1989) E-Mail Game results towards rough inductive reasoning. Rough induction is a form of boundedly rational reasoning where a player does not carry out every inductive step. The information structure in the E-Mail game is generalized and the conditions are characterized under which Rubinstein´s results hold. Rough induction generates a payoff dominant equilibrium where the expected payoffs change continously in the probability of "faulty" communication. The article follows one of Morris´(2001a) reactions to the E-Mail game "that one should try to come up with a model of boundedly rational behavior that delivers predictions that are insensitive to whether there is common knowledge or a large number of levels of knowledge".

Quotient spaces of boundedly rational types

By identifying types whose low-order beliefs – up to level li – about the state of nature coincide, we obtain quotient type spaces that are typically smaller than the original ones, preserve basic topological properties, and allow standard equilibrium analysis even under bounded reasoning. Our Bayesian Nash (li; l-i)-equilibria capture players’ inability to distinguish types belonging to the same equivalence class. The case with uncertainty about the vector of levels (li; l-i) is also analyzed. Two examples illustrate the constructions.Incomplete-information games, high-order reasoning, type space, quotient space, hierarchies of beliefs, bounded rationality

Mathematics and Statistics in the Social Sciences

Over the years, mathematics and statistics have become increasingly important in the social sciences1 . A look at history quickly confirms this claim. At the beginning of the 20th century most theories in the social sciences were formulated in qualitative terms while quantitative methods did not play a substantial role in their formulation and establishment. Moreover, many practitioners considered mathematical methods to be inappropriate and simply unsuited to foster our understanding of the social domain. Notably, the famous Methodenstreit also concerned the role of mathematics in the social sciences. Here, mathematics was considered to be the method of the natural sciences from which the social sciences had to be separated during the period of maturation of these disciplines. All this changed by the end of the century. By then, mathematical, and especially statistical, methods were standardly used, and their value in the social sciences became relatively uncontested. The use of mathematical and statistical methods is now ubiquitous: Almost all social sciences rely on statistical methods to analyze data and form hypotheses, and almost all of them use (to a greater or lesser extent) a range of mathematical methods to help us understand the social world. Additional indication for the increasing importance of mathematical and statistical methods in the social sciences is the formation of new subdisciplines, and the establishment of specialized journals and societies. Indeed, subdisciplines such as Mathematical Psychology and Mathematical Sociology emerged, and corresponding journals such as The Journal of Mathematical Psychology (since 1964), The Journal of Mathematical Sociology (since 1976), Mathematical Social Sciences (since 1980) as well as the online journals Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation (since 1998) and Mathematical Anthropology and Cultural Theory (since 2000) were established. What is more, societies such as the Society for Mathematical Psychology (since 1976) and the Mathematical Sociology Section of the American Sociological Association (since 1996) were founded. Similar developments can be observed in other countries. The mathematization of economics set in somewhat earlier (Vazquez 1995; Weintraub 2002). However, the use of mathematical methods in economics started booming only in the second half of the last century (Debreu 1991). Contemporary economics is dominated by the mathematical approach, although a certain style of doing economics became more and more under attack in the last decade or so. Recent developments in behavioral economics and experimental economics can also be understood as a reaction against the dominance (and limitations) of an overly mathematical approach to economics. There are similar debates in other social sciences. It is, however, important to stress that problems of one method (such as axiomatization or the use of set theory) can hardly be taken as a sign of bankruptcy of mathematical methods in the social sciences tout court. This chapter surveys mathematical and statistical methods used in the social sciences and discusses some of the philosophical questions they raise. It is divided into two parts. Sections 1 and 2 are devoted to mathematical methods, and Sections 3 to 7 to statistical methods. As several other chapters in this handbook provide detailed accounts of various mathematical methods, our remarks about the latter will be rather short and general. Statistical methods, on the other hand, will be discussed in-depth

Self-Esteem in Adolescence Females: The Athletic Connection

This study investigated the self-esteem, feelings, and experiences of five exceptional skill level and five average skill level female adolescent athletes. Although mainly a qualitative study, with emphasis given to in-depth interviews, this research design also used a quantitative instrument in order to record the self-esteem of each subject. Both methods were used to generate themes and analyze concepts relating to the self-esteem and experience of female adolescent athletes. The quantitative instrument revealed that all athletes had self-esteem scores in the average to very high categories. Exceptional skill athletes did have higher mean scores than the regular skill athletes and their self-reporting was consistent with those findings. Low participation in risk-taking behaviors, challenging academics, support of family and friends, recognition, and positive relationships with coaches emerged as the central themes for all athletes. More athletic opportunities, increased stress and higher personal standards were additional topics reported by exceptional athletes. All athletes agreed that improvements could be made to female adolescent athletics through improved promotion and advocacy for girl\u27s sports, improved coaching, and better recruitment to increase the number of athletes

Mutual Knowledge of Rationality in the Electronic Mail Game

This paper reexamines the paradoxical aspect of the electronic mail game (Rubinstein, 1989). The electronic mail game is a coordination game with payoff uncertainty. At a Bayesian Nash equilibrium of the game, players cannot achieve the desired coordination of actions even when a high order of mutual knowledge of payoff functions obtains. We want to make explicit the role of knowledge about rationality of players, not only that of payoff functions. For this purpose, we use an extended version of the belief system model developed by Aumann and Brandenburger (1995). We propose a certain way of embedding the electronic mail game in an belief system. And we show that for rational players to coordinate their actions, for any embedding belief systems, it is necessary that the upper bound order of mutual knowledge of payoff functions exceeds the upper bound order of mutual knowledge of rationality. This result implies that under common knowledge of rationality, the coordination never occurs, which is similar to Rubinstein's result. We point out, however, that there exists a class embedding belief systems for which the above condition is also sufficient for the desired coordination.

Zero-one laws with respect to models of provability logic and two Grzegorczyk logics

It has been shown in the late 1960s that each formula of first-order logic without constants and function symbols obeys a zero-one law: As the number of elements of finite models increases, every formula holds either in almost all or in almost no models of that size. Therefore, many properties of models, such as having an even number of elements, cannot be expressed in the language of first-order logic. Halpern and Kapron proved zero-one laws for classes of models corresponding to the modal logics K, T, S4, and S5 and for frames corresponding to S4 and S5. In this paper, we prove zero-one laws for provability logic and its two siblings Grzegorczyk logic and weak Grzegorczyk logic, with respect to model validity. Moreover, we axiomatize validity in almost all relevant finite models, leading to three different axiom systems

Generic models for business applications. Towards a framework for identification and assessment

This thesis proposes a framework for identifying and assessing generic system dynamics models in business and suggests a list of candidate models. Results are meant to support isee systems, inc. in its aim to make system dynamics more accessible to managers and to further develop knowledge in the field. The main contributions of this study are a) synthesizing the current discourse not only theoretically by a literature review, but also empirically by interviews with experts b) offering concrete steps in form of an operative framework and c) relating problems with the concept of generic models to critical problems in the field. The main limitation of this study is that practical testing of the framework was not possible. Results of the empirical study suggest that the operative framework needs to be further developed because there is substantial disagreement on underlying theories in the conceptual framework. Therefore, the operative steps can only be seen as tentative and as a starting point for further research