Enriching Deontic Logic

It is well known that systems of action deontic logic emerging from a standard analysis of permission in terms of possibility of doing an action without incurring in a violation of the law are subject to paradoxes. In general, paradoxes are acknowledged as such if we have intuitions telling us that things should be different. The aim of this paper is to introduce a paradox-free deontic action system by (i) identifying the basic intuitions leading to the emergence of the paradoxes and (ii) exploiting these intuitions in order to develop a consistent deontic framework, where it can be shown why some phenomena seem to be paradoxical and why they are not so if interpreted in a correct way

Actors, actions, and initiative in normative system specification

The logic of norms, called deontic logic, has been used to specify normative constraints for information systems. For example, one can specify in deontic logic the constraints that a book borrowed from a library should be returned within three weeks, and that if it is not returned, the library should send a reminder. Thus, the notion of obligation to perform an action arises naturally in system specification. Intuitively, deontic logic presupposes the concept of anactor who undertakes actions and is responsible for fulfilling obligations. However, the concept of an actor has not been formalized until now in deontic logic. We present a formalization in dynamic logic, which allows us to express the actor who initiates actions or choices. This is then combined with a formalization, presented earlier, of deontic logic in dynamic logic, which allows us to specify obligations, permissions, and prohibitions to perform an action. The addition of actors allows us to expresswho has the responsibility to perform an action. In addition to the application of the concept of an actor in deontic logic, we discuss two other applications of actors. First, we show how to generalize an approach taken up by De Nicola and Hennessy, who eliminate from CCS in favor of internal and external choice. We show that our generalization allows a more accurate specification of system behavior than is possible without it. Second, we show that actors can be used to resolve a long-standing paradox of deontic logic, called the paradox of free-choice permission. Towards the end of the paper, we discuss whether the concept of an actor can be combined with that of an object to formalize the concept of active objects

A systematics of deontic action logics based on Boolean algebra

Within the scope of interest of deontic logic, systems in which names of actions are arguments of deontic operators (deontic action logic) have attracted less interest than purely propositional systems. However, in our opinion, they are even more interesting from both theoretical and practical point of view. The fundament for contemporary research was established by K. Segerberg, who introduced his systems of basic deontic logic of urn model actions in early 1980s. Nowadays such logics are considered mainly within propositional dynamic logic (PDL). Two approaches can be distinguished: in one of them deontic operators are introduced using dynamic operators and the notion of violation, in the other at least some of them are taken as primitive. The second approach may be further divided into the systems based on Boolean algebra of actions and the systems built on the top of standard PDL.In the present paper we are interested in the systems of deontic action logic based on Boolean algebra. We present axiomatizations of six systems and set theoretical models for them. We also show the relations among them and the position of some existing theories on the resulting picture. Such a presentation allows the reader to see the spectrum of possibilities of formalization of the subject

Dynamic context logic

International audienceBuilding on a simple modal logic of context, the paper presents a dynamic logic characterizing operations of contraction and expansion on theories. We investigate the mathematical properties of the logic, and show how it can capture some aspects of the dynamics of normative systems once they are viewed as logical theories

Basic Action Deontic Logic

The aim of this paper is to introduce a system of dynamic deontic logic in which the main problems related to the definition of deontic concepts, especially those emerging from a standard analysis of permission in terms of possibility of doing an action without incurring in a violation of the law, are solved. The basic idea is to introduce two crucial distinctions allowing us to differentiate (i) what is ideal with respect to a given code, which fixes the types of action that are abstractly prescribed, and what is ideal with respect to the specific situation in which the agent acts, and (ii) the transitions associated with actions and the results of actions, which can obtain even without the action being performed

A temporal dynamic deontic logic

This paper presents a formalization of refraining from actions and a deontic logic based on a process logic. The notion of refraining is needed to handle obligated actions. To refrain to do an action is to do something else. The process logic used is a mix of dynamic logic and temporal logic: actions in it are interpreted as sets of paths and temporal formulas describe the process of performing actions. The deontic logic has a temporal propositional constant saying that a bad thing will be done in the next moment. Normative properties of actions can be defined according to what happens in the process of performing actions