The Complexity of Approximately Counting Stable Matchings

We investigate the complexity of approximately counting stable matchings in the $k$-attribute model, where the preference lists are determined by dot products of "preference vectors" with "attribute vectors", or by Euclidean distances between "preference points" and "attribute points". Irving and Leather proved that counting the number of stable matchings in the general case is #P-complete. Counting the number of stable matchings is reducible to counting the number of downsets in a (related) partial order and is interreducible, in an approximation-preserving sense, to a class of problems that includes counting the number of independent sets in a bipartite graph (#BIS). It is conjectured that no FPRAS exists for this class of problems. We show this approximation-preserving interreducibilty remains even in the restricted $k$-attribute setting when $k \geq 3$ (dot products) or $k \geq 2$ (Euclidean distances). Finally, we show it is easy to count the number of stable matchings in the 1-attribute dot-product setting.Comment: Fixed typos, small revisions for clarification, et

Counting Popular Matchings in House Allocation Problems

We study the problem of counting the number of popular matchings in a given instance. A popular matching instance consists of agents A and houses H, where each agent ranks a subset of houses according to their preferences. A matching is an assignment of agents to houses. A matching M is more popular than matching M' if the number of agents that prefer M to M' is more than the number of people that prefer M' to M. A matching M is called popular if there exists no matching more popular than M. McDermid and Irving gave a poly-time algorithm for counting the number of popular matchings when the preference lists are strictly ordered. We first consider the case of ties in preference lists. Nasre proved that the problem of counting the number of popular matching is #P-hard when there are ties. We give an FPRAS for this problem. We then consider the popular matching problem where preference lists are strictly ordered but each house has a capacity associated with it. We give a switching graph characterization of popular matchings in this case. Such characterizations were studied earlier for the case of strictly ordered preference lists (McDermid and Irving) and for preference lists with ties (Nasre). We use our characterization to prove that counting popular matchings in capacitated case is #P-hard

Approximating the partition function of the ferromagnetic Potts model

We provide evidence that it is computationally difficult to approximate the partition function of the ferromagnetic q-state Potts model when q>2. Specifically we show that the partition function is hard for the complexity class #RHPi_1 under approximation-preserving reducibility. Thus, it is as hard to approximate the partition function as it is to find approximate solutions to a wide range of counting problems, including that of determining the number of independent sets in a bipartite graph. Our proof exploits the first order phase transition of the "random cluster" model, which is a probability distribution on graphs that is closely related to the q-state Potts model.Comment: Minor correction

The Complexity of Approximately Counting Stable Roommate Assignments

We investigate the complexity of approximately counting stable roommate assignments in two models: (i) the $k$-attribute model, in which the preference lists are determined by dot products of "preference vectors" with "attribute vectors" and (ii) the $k$-Euclidean model, in which the preference lists are determined by the closeness of the "positions" of the people to their "preferred positions". Exactly counting the number of assignments is #P-complete, since Irving and Leather demonstrated #P-completeness for the special case of the stable marriage problem. We show that counting the number of stable roommate assignments in the $k$-attribute model ($k \geq 4$) and the 3-Euclidean model($k \geq 3$) is interreducible, in an approximation-preserving sense, with counting independent sets (of all sizes) (#IS) in a graph, or counting the number of satisfying assignments of a Boolean formula (#SAT). This means that there can be no FPRAS for any of these problems unless NP=RP. As a consequence, we infer that there is no FPRAS for counting stable roommate assignments (#SR) unless NP=RP. Utilizing previous results by the authors, we give an approximation-preserving reduction from counting the number of independent sets in a bipartite graph (#BIS) to counting the number of stable roommate assignments both in the 3-attribute model and in the 2-Euclidean model. #BIS is complete with respect to approximation-preserving reductions in the logically-defined complexity class #RH\Pi_1. Hence, our result shows that an FPRAS for counting stable roommate assignments in the 3-attribute model would give an FPRAS for all of #RH\Pi_1. We also show that the 1-attribute stable roommate problem always has either one or two stable roommate assignments, so the number of assignments can be determined exactly in polynomial time

Solving Hard Stable Matching Problems Involving Groups of Similar Agents

Many important stable matching problems are known to be NP-hard, even when strong restrictions are placed on the input. In this paper we seek to identify structural properties of instances of stable matching problems which will allow us to design efficient algorithms using elementary techniques. We focus on the setting in which all agents involved in some matching problem can be partitioned into k different types, where the type of an agent determines his or her preferences, and agents have preferences over types (which may be refined by more detailed preferences within a single type). This situation would arise in practice if agents form preferences solely based on some small collection of agents' attributes. We also consider a generalisation in which each agent may consider some small collection of other agents to be exceptional, and rank these in a way that is not consistent with their types; this could happen in practice if agents have prior contact with a small number of candidates. We show that (for the case without exceptions), several well-studied NP-hard stable matching problems including Max SMTI (that of finding the maximum cardinality stable matching in an instance of stable marriage with ties and incomplete lists) belong to the parameterised complexity class FPT when parameterised by the number of different types of agents needed to describe the instance. For Max SMTI this tractability result can be extended to the setting in which each agent promotes at most one `exceptional' candidate to the top of his/her list (when preferences within types are not refined), but the problem remains NP-hard if preference lists can contain two or more exceptions and the exceptional candidates can be placed anywhere in the preference lists, even if the number of types is bounded by a constant.Comment: Results on SMTI appear in proceedings of WINE 2018; Section 6 contains work in progres

Algorithms for #BIS-hard problems on expander graphs

We give an FPTAS and an efficient sampling algorithm for the high-fugacity hard-core model on bounded-degree bipartite expander graphs and the low-temperature ferromagnetic Potts model on bounded-degree expander graphs. The results apply, for example, to random (bipartite) $\Delta$-regular graphs, for which no efficient algorithms were known for these problems (with the exception of the Ising model) in the non-uniqueness regime of the infinite $\Delta$-regular tree. We also find efficient counting and sampling algorithms for proper $q$-colorings of random $\Delta$-regular bipartite graphs when $q$ is sufficiently small as a function of $\Delta$

Stable Matchings with Restricted Preferences: Structure and Complexity

In the stable marriage (SM) problem, there are two sets of agents–traditionally referred to as men and women–and each agent has a preference list that ranks (a subset of) agents of the opposite sex. The goal is to find a matching between men and women that is stable in the sense that no man-woman pair mutually prefer each other to their assigned partners. In a seminal work, Gale and Shapley showed that stable matchings always exist, and described an efficient algorithm for finding one. Irving and Leather defined the rotation poset of an SM instance and showed that it determines the structure of the set of stable matchings of the instance. They further showed that every finite poset can be realized as the rotation poset of some SM instance. Consequently, many problems–such as counting stable matchings and finding certain “fair” stable matchings–are computationally intractable (NP-hard) in general. In this paper, we consider SM instances in which certain restrictions are placed on the preference lists. We show that three natural preference models?k-bounded, k-attribute, and (k1, k2)-list–can realize arbitrary rotation posets for constant values of k. Hence even in these highly restricted preference models, many stable matching problems remain intractable. In contrast, we show that for any fixed constant k, the rotation posets of k-range instances are highly restricted. As a consequence, we show that exactly counting and uniformly sampling stable matchings, finding median, sex-equal, and balanced stable matchings are fixed-parameter tractable when parameterized by the range of the instance. Thus, these problems can be solved in polynomial time on instances of the k-range model for any fixed constant k