22,795 research outputs found
Artificial consciousness and the consciousness-attention dissociation
Artificial Intelligence is at a turning point, with a substantial increase in projects aiming to implement sophisticated forms of human intelligence in machines. This research attempts to model specific forms of intelligence through brute-force search heuristics and also reproduce features of human perception and cognition, including emotions. Such goals have implications for artificial consciousness, with some arguing that it will be achievable once we overcome short-term engineering challenges. We believe, however, that phenomenal consciousness cannot be implemented in machines. This becomes clear when considering emotions and examining the dissociation between consciousness and attention in humans. While we may be able to program ethical behavior based on rules and machine learning, we will never be able to reproduce emotions or empathy by programming such control systems—these will be merely simulations. Arguments in favor of this claim include considerations about evolution, the neuropsychological aspects of emotions, and the dissociation between attention and consciousness found in humans. Ultimately, we are far from achieving artificial consciousness
Empiricism without Magic: Transformational Abstraction in Deep Convolutional Neural Networks
In artificial intelligence, recent research has demonstrated the remarkable potential of Deep Convolutional Neural Networks (DCNNs), which seem to exceed state-of-the-art performance in new domains weekly, especially on the sorts of very difficult perceptual discrimination tasks that skeptics thought would remain beyond the reach of artificial intelligence. However, it has proven difficult to explain why DCNNs perform so well. In philosophy of mind, empiricists have long suggested that complex cognition is based on information derived from sensory experience, often appealing to a faculty of abstraction. Rationalists have frequently complained, however, that empiricists never adequately explained how this faculty of abstraction actually works. In this paper, I tie these two questions together, to the mutual benefit of both disciplines. I argue that the architectural features that distinguish DCNNs from earlier neural networks allow them to implement a form of hierarchical processing that I call “transformational abstraction”. Transformational abstraction iteratively converts sensory-based representations of category exemplars into new formats that are increasingly tolerant to “nuisance variation” in input. Reflecting upon the way that DCNNs leverage a combination of linear and non-linear processing to efficiently accomplish this feat allows us to understand how the brain is capable of bi-directional travel between exemplars and abstractions, addressing longstanding problems in empiricist philosophy of mind. I end by considering the prospects for future research on DCNNs, arguing that rather than simply implementing 80s connectionism with more brute-force computation, transformational abstraction counts as a qualitatively distinct form of processing ripe with philosophical and psychological significance, because it is significantly better suited to depict the generic mechanism responsible for this important kind of psychological processing in the brain
Embodied Robot Models for Interdisciplinary Emotion Research
Due to their complex nature, emotions cannot be properly understood from the perspective of a single discipline. In this paper, I discuss how the use of robots as models is beneficial for interdisciplinary emotion research. Addressing this issue through the lens of my own research, I focus on a critical analysis of embodied robots models of different aspects of emotion, relate them to theories in psychology and neuroscience, and provide representative examples. I discuss concrete ways in which embodied robot models can be used to carry out interdisciplinary emotion research, assessing their contributions: as hypothetical models, and as operational models of specific emotional phenomena, of general emotion principles, and of specific emotion ``dimensions''. I conclude by discussing the advantages of using embodied robot models over other models.Peer reviewe
Enaction-Based Artificial Intelligence: Toward Coevolution with Humans in the Loop
This article deals with the links between the enaction paradigm and
artificial intelligence. Enaction is considered a metaphor for artificial
intelligence, as a number of the notions which it deals with are deemed
incompatible with the phenomenal field of the virtual. After explaining this
stance, we shall review previous works regarding this issue in terms of
artifical life and robotics. We shall focus on the lack of recognition of
co-evolution at the heart of these approaches. We propose to explicitly
integrate the evolution of the environment into our approach in order to refine
the ontogenesis of the artificial system, and to compare it with the enaction
paradigm. The growing complexity of the ontogenetic mechanisms to be activated
can therefore be compensated by an interactive guidance system emanating from
the environment. This proposition does not however resolve that of the
relevance of the meaning created by the machine (sense-making). Such
reflections lead us to integrate human interaction into this environment in
order to construct relevant meaning in terms of participative artificial
intelligence. This raises a number of questions with regards to setting up an
enactive interaction. The article concludes by exploring a number of issues,
thereby enabling us to associate current approaches with the principles of
morphogenesis, guidance, the phenomenology of interactions and the use of
minimal enactive interfaces in setting up experiments which will deal with the
problem of artificial intelligence in a variety of enaction-based ways
Advancing Perception in Artificial Intelligence through Principles of Cognitive Science
Although artificial intelligence (AI) has achieved many feats at a rapid
pace, there still exist open problems and fundamental shortcomings related to
performance and resource efficiency. Since AI researchers benchmark a
significant proportion of performance standards through human intelligence,
cognitive sciences-inspired AI is a promising domain of research. Studying
cognitive science can provide a fresh perspective to building fundamental
blocks in AI research, which can lead to improved performance and efficiency.
In this review paper, we focus on the cognitive functions of perception, which
is the process of taking signals from one's surroundings as input, and
processing them to understand the environment. Particularly, we study and
compare its various processes through the lens of both cognitive sciences and
AI. Through this study, we review all current major theories from various
sub-disciplines of cognitive science (specifically neuroscience, psychology and
linguistics), and draw parallels with theories and techniques from current
practices in AI. We, hence, present a detailed collection of methods in AI for
researchers to build AI systems inspired by cognitive science. Further, through
the process of reviewing the state of cognitive-inspired AI, we point out many
gaps in the current state of AI (with respect to the performance of the human
brain), and hence present potential directions for researchers to develop
better perception systems in AI.Comment: Summary: a detailed review of the current state of perception models
through the lens of cognitive A
On Cognitive Preferences and the Plausibility of Rule-based Models
It is conventional wisdom in machine learning and data mining that logical
models such as rule sets are more interpretable than other models, and that
among such rule-based models, simpler models are more interpretable than more
complex ones. In this position paper, we question this latter assumption by
focusing on one particular aspect of interpretability, namely the plausibility
of models. Roughly speaking, we equate the plausibility of a model with the
likeliness that a user accepts it as an explanation for a prediction. In
particular, we argue that, all other things being equal, longer explanations
may be more convincing than shorter ones, and that the predominant bias for
shorter models, which is typically necessary for learning powerful
discriminative models, may not be suitable when it comes to user acceptance of
the learned models. To that end, we first recapitulate evidence for and against
this postulate, and then report the results of an evaluation in a
crowd-sourcing study based on about 3.000 judgments. The results do not reveal
a strong preference for simple rules, whereas we can observe a weak preference
for longer rules in some domains. We then relate these results to well-known
cognitive biases such as the conjunction fallacy, the representative heuristic,
or the recogition heuristic, and investigate their relation to rule length and
plausibility.Comment: V4: Another rewrite of section on interpretability to clarify focus
on plausibility and relation to interpretability, comprehensibility, and
justifiabilit
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