Overview and classification of coordination contracts within forward and reverse supply chains

Among coordination mechanisms, contracts are valuable tools used in both theory and practice to coordinate various supply chains. The focus of this paper is to present an overview of contracts and a classification of coordination contracts and contracting literature in the form of classification schemes. The two criteria used for contract classification, as resulted from contracting literature, are transfer payment contractual incentives and inventory risk sharing. The overview classification of the existing literature has as criteria the level of detail used in designing the coordination models with applicability on the forward and reverse supply chains.Coordination contracts; forward supply chain; reverse supply chain

How can we improve the performance of supply chain contracts? An experimental Study

Although optimal forms of supply chain contracts have been widely studied in the literature, it has also been observed that decision makers fail to make optimal decisions in these contract setups. In this research, we propose different approaches to improve the performance of supply chain contracts in practice. We consider revenue sharing and buyback contracts between a rational supplier and a retailer who, unlike the supplier, is susceptible to decision errors. We propose five approaches to improve the retailer’s decisions which are in response to contract terms offered by the supplier. Through laboratory experiments, we examine the effectiveness of each approach. Among the proposed approaches, we observe that offering free items can bring the retailer’s effective order quantity close to the optimal level. We also observe that the retailer’s learning trend can be improved by providing him with collective feedbacks on the profits associated with his decisions

Analysis of the Project Supply Chains: Coordination and Fair Allocation

This research investigates how project contracts can coordinate the supply chain between a project manager and contractor and if the solutions can be ensured as equitable. The main features of this type of supply chain are the trade-offs between the selection of a higher rate of resource consumption with a consequent higher cost to the contractor and a lower rate of resource consumption leading to later delivery and a reduction of the project-reward to the project manager. This broader problem could lead to a coordination problem for the overall supply chain. This research proposed a solution to this broader problem in two different scenarios: Take it or leave it scenario and negotiation scenario. Finally, the fair allocation of the risks and benefits and the related decision-making issues are addressed as one of the behavioural barriers to the supply chain coordination. The coordination issues in a take it or leave it scenario are addressed using time-based and fixed price project contracts using Stackelberg games. Models of coordination were proposed with time-based contracts, but the fixed price contracts failed to coordinate. The coordination problems in negotiation scenario are addressed with the Nash's bargaining, the Kalai Smorodinsky bargaining, and the utilitarian approach. A cost plus contract has been found to dominate the solutions over any cost sharing contract and fixed price contract for Nash's bargaining and Kalai Smorodinsky bargaining cases. Finally, the issues of fairness of allocation of risks and benefits as one of the challenges of supply chain coordination, have been investigated. The fixed price contracts were found to coordinate the supply chain under consideration alongside the time-based contracts if the members had fairness concern. Some of the key features of this research include the incorporation of various probability distributions for the project completion time and cost, the inclusion of various forms of risk preference, and addressing the challenges of fair allocation in project supply chains

Coordinating a Supply Chain With a Manufacturer-Owned Online Channel: A Dual Channel Model Under Price Competition

We consider a dual channel supply chain in which a manufacturer sells a single product to end-users through both a traditional retail channel and a manufacturer-owned direct online channel. We adopt a commonly used linear demand substitution model in which the mean demand in each channel is a function of the prices in each channel.We model each channel as a news vendor problem, with price and order quantity as decision variables. In addition, the manufacturer must choose the wholesale price to charge to the independent retailer. We analyze the optimal decisions for each channel and prove the existence of a unique equilibrium for the system. We compare this equilibrium solution to the solution for an integrated system, in which the manufacturer owns both the online store and the retailer. To enable supply chain coordination, we propose two contract schemes: a modified revenue-sharing contract and gain/loss sharing contract. We show that, in cases where the retail channel has a larger market than the online channel, such contracts enable the manufacturer to maintain price discrimination, selling the products in different channels at different prices. Finally, we perform a comprehensive numerical study to consider the impact of the model parameters on the equilibrium and to demonstrate the performance of the proposed coordination contracts. We conclude that coordination is most critical for products which are highly price sensitive and for systems in which the online and traditional retail channels are not viewed as close substitutes

Consumer Returns Policies and Supply Chain Performance

This paper develops a model of consumer returns policies. In our model, consumers face valuation uncertainty and realize their valuations only after purchase. There is also aggregate demand uncertainty, captured using the conventional newsvendor model. In this environment, consumers decide whether to purchase and then whether to return the product, whereas the seller sets the price, quantity, and refund amount. Using our model, we study the impact of full returns policies (e.g., using 100% money-back guarantees) and partial returns policies (e.g., when restocking fees are charged) on supply chain performance. Next, we demonstrate that consumer returns policies may distort incentives under common supply contracts (such as manufacturer buy-backs), and we propose strategies to coordinate the supply chain in the presence of consumer returns. Finally, we explore several extensions and demonstrate the robustness of our findings

Effective contracts in supply chains

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Sloan School of Management, Operations Research Center, 2007.Includes bibliographical references (p. 115-121).In the past decade, we have seen significant increase in the level of outsourcing in many industries. This increase in the level of outsourcing increases the importance of implementing effective contracts in supply chains. In this thesis, we study several issues in supply chain contracts. In the first part of the thesis, we study the impact of effort in a supply chain with multiple retailers. The costly effort engaged by a retailer may increase or decrease the demands of other retailers. However, effort is usually not verifiable and hence not contractible. Based on the impact of a retailer's effort on its own and other retailers' revenue, we classify each retailer into different categories. According to the corresponding categories of all retailers, we identify coordinating contracts and general classes of contracts that cannot coordinate. Second, we study the stability of coordinating contracts in supply chains. We illustrate that, due to competition, not all coordinating contracts are achievable. Thus, we introduce the notion of rational contracts, which reflects the agents "bargaining power". We propose a general framework for coordinating and rational contracts. Using this framework, we analyze two supply chains, a supply chain with multiple suppliers and single retailer, and a supply chain with a single supplier and price-competing retailers.(cont.) We identify coordinating contracts for each case and characterize the bounds on profit shares for the agents in any rational contracts. Finally, we study the robustness of coordinating contracts to renegotiation. Applying the concept of contract equilibrium, we show that many coordinating contracts are not robust to bilateral renegotiation if the relationship between the supplier and the retailers is a one-shot game. If the supplier and retailers engage in long-term relationship, then many coordinating contracts are robust to bilateral renegotiation. We also extend concept of contract equilibrium to the concept of strong contract equilibrium to study the robustness of contracts to multilateral renegotiation. We show that, in repeated game setting, the concept of strong contract equilibrium is related to the concept of rational contracts.by Wanhang (Stephen) Shum.Ph.D

An Efficient Approach for Coordination of Dual-Channel Closed-Loop Supply Chain Management

[EN] In this paper, a closed-loop supply chain composed of dual-channel retailers and manufacturers, a dynamic game model under the direct recovery, and an entrusted third-party recycling mode of the manufacturer is constructed. The impact of horizontal fairness concern behavior is introduced on the pricing strategies and utility of decision makers under different recycling models. The equilibrium strategy at fair neutrality is used as a reference to compare offline retails sales. Research shows that in the closed-loop supply chain of dual-channel sales, whether in the case of fair neutrality or horizontal fairness concerns, the manufacturer's direct recycling model is superior to the entrusted third-party recycling, and the third-party recycling model is transferred by the manufacturer. In the direct recycling model, the horizontal fairness concern of offline retailers makes two retailers in the positive supply chain compete to lower the retail price in order to increase market share. Manufacturers will lower the wholesale price to encourage competition, and the price will be the horizontal fairness concern coefficient, which is negatively correlated. In the reverse supply chain, manufacturers increase the recycling rate of used products. This pricing strategy increases the utility of manufacturers and the entire supply chain system compared to fair neutral conditions, while two retailers receive diminished returns. Manufacturers, as channel managers to encourage retailers to compete for price cuts, can be coordinated through a three-way revenue sharing contract to achieve Pareto optimality.This research was funded by Ministerio de Economia, Industria y Competitividad, Gobierno de Espana grant number BIA2017-87573-C2-2-P.Arshad, M.; Khalid, QS.; Lloret, J.; León Fernández, A. (2018). An Efficient Approach for Coordination of Dual-Channel Closed-Loop Supply Chain Management. Sustainability. 10(10). https://doi.org/10.3390/su10103433S101

Supply chain contracting coordination for fresh products with fresh-keeping effort

Purpose – Fresh product loss rates in supply chain operations are particularly high due to the nature of perishable products. This paper aims to maximize profit through the contract between retailer and supplier. The optimized prices for the retailer and the supplier, taking the fresh-keeping effort into consideration, are derived. Design/methodology/approach – To address this issue, we consider a two-echelon supply chain consisting of a retailer and a supplier (i.e., wholesaler) for two scenarios: centralized and decentralized decision-making. We start from investigating the optimal decision in the centralized supply chain and then comparing the results with those of the decentralized decision. Meanwhile, a fresh-keeping cost-sharing contract and a fresh-keeping cost- and revenue-sharing contract are designed. Numerical examples are provided, and managerial insights are discussed at end. Findings – The results show that (a) the centralized decision is more profitable than the decentralized decision; (b) a fresh product supply chain can only be coordinated through a fresh-keeping cost- and revenue-sharing contract; (c) the optimal retail price, wholesale price and fresh-keeping effort can all be achieved; (d) the profit of a fresh product supply chain is positively related to consumers’ sensitivity to freshness and negatively correlated with their sensitivity to price. Originality/value – Few studies have considered fresh-keeping effort as a decision variable in the modelling of supply chain. In this paper, a mathematical model for the fresh-keeping effort and for price decisions in a supply chain is developed. In particular, fresh-keeping cost sharing contract and revenue-sharing contract are examined simultaneously in the study of the supply chain coordination problem

VMI-type Supply Chains: a Brief Review

The primary purpose of this paper is to highlight for the research community and practitioners the various aspects of using VMI-type supply chains in today’s business environment as well as a number of directions for future studies. In this regard, fifty articles published in major international journals, beginning in 1995, which contribute to the VMI-type supply chains are reviewed via a systematic review methodology. Our findings show there is an incremental growth in employing of VMI strategies in logistic and supply chains. This paper characterizes the design aspects required to configure and establish a VMI-type supply chain in the industry including demand pattern, number of products, contract type between two parties, and profit sharing scheme. Moreover, the current gaps on the current state of VMI-type supply chain in literature are highlighted in last section of this paper that may motivate future studies