Choosing between Auctions and Negotiations in Online B2B Markets for IT Services: The Effect of Prior Relationships and Performance

The choice of contract allocation mechanism in procurement affects such aspects of transactions as information exchange between buyer and supplier, supplier competition, pricing and, eventually, performance. In this study we investigate the buyer’s choice between reverse auctions and bilateral negotiations as an allocation mechanism for IT services contracts. Prior studies into allocation mechanism choice focused on factors pertaining to discrete exchange situation, such as con-tract complexity or availability of suppliers. We broaden the research by focusing on buyers’ past exchange relationships with vendors. Based on the literature on the economics of contracting and agency theory, we hypothesize that prior re-peat interaction with vendors favors the use of negotiations over auctions in the next transaction, while the need to explore the marketplace due to buyer’s inexperience or dissatisfaction with vendor’s performance in the most recent project leads to the use of auctions instead of negotiations. We find support for these hypotheses in a longitudinal dataset of 2,081 IT projects realized by 91 repeat buyers at a leading online services marketplace over a period of eight years. Taken together, the results show that analyzing B2B auctions and negotiations should move beyond analyzing discrete instances and instead analyze them in the context of the individual firm’s history and supplier strategy.outsourcing;IT services;online marketplace;reverse auctions

Supplier selection and procurement in SMEs: Insights from the literature on key criteria and purchasing strategies

Effective strategic purchasing and supplier selection in companies provides businesses with leverage in acquiring goods and services. Thus, companies are in a better position to negotiate prices, discounts, delivery times and logistic channels. Also, strategic purchasing allows for performing a risk assessment to ensure the company's profitability. This research aimed to identify the key currently deliberated by SMEs for supplier selection, considering such purchasing strategies as (1) cost reduction, (2) risk management, (3) global sourcing, (4) total quality management, (5) sustainable management and (6) supplier management. Also, it aimed to identify the emerging issues related to purchasing strategies. This research work performed a content analysis following a literature review. The Scopus indexation database was selected to conduct the document search. After the refinement process, based on 59 analysed documents, bibliometric assessment tools were applied to identify the key criteria for supplier selection. The TOP6 highest ranked criteria, which corresponds to 80 % of the most referred criteria, include: (1) the quality of goods; (2) compliance with the delivery times; (3) price/cost; (4) supplier reputation and/or market positioning; (5) geographical location; and (6) supplier performance history. The goal of strategic purchasing is to support the companies in achieving long-term goals through its integration into the company's strategic planning process. It should be identified by the managers as an important resource. Several factors elevate the importance of strategic purchasing, namely, environmental protection, technology advances related to logistics 4.0, and risk assessment related to global sourcing and sustainability. The present research is in line with the findings of the referred literature, i.e., the application of prioritised criteria for the procurement and supplier selection operations in the industrial context, aiming to reduce lead times and logistic costs. The criteria must be aligned w- (undefined

Choosing between Auctions and Negotiations in Online B2B Markets for IT Services: The Effect of Prior Relationships and Performance

The choice of contract allocation mechanism in procurement affects such aspects of transactions as information exchange between buyer and supplier, supplier competition, pricing and, eventually, performance. In this study we investigate the buyer’s choice between reverse auctions and bilateral negotiations as an allocation mechanism for IT services contracts. Prior studies into allocation mechanism choice focused on factors pertaining to discrete exchange situation, such as con-tract complexity or availability of suppliers. We broaden the research by focusing on buyers’ past exchange relationships with vendors. Based on the literature on the economics of contracting and agency theory, we hypothesize that prior re-peat interaction with vendors favors the use of negotiations over auctions in the next transaction, while the need to explore the marketplace due to buyer’s inexperience or dissatisfaction with vendor’s performance in the most recent project leads to the use of auctions instead of negotiations. We find support for these hypotheses in a longitudinal dataset of 2,081 IT projects realized by 91 repeat buyers at a leading online services marketplace over a period of eight years. Taken together, the results show that analyzing B2B auctions and negotiations should move beyond analyzing discrete instances and instead analyze them in the context of the individual firm’s history and supplier strategy

The Sourcing Hub and Upstream Supplier Networks

In this paper, we explore how firms can better manage their sourcing by developing relationships not only with their suppliers but also with their suppliers' suppliers. We detail an empirical case study explaining how the firm developed relationships with its suppliers and raw material suppliers via a collaborative center, the sourcing hub. We then analytically model the scenarios encountered in our empirical work and examine two facets of upstream sourcing under uncertain demand scenarios: (a) firms can supply raw material directly to their suppliers, and this may be beneficial for the firm and its suppliers; and (b) firms can bring their suppliers together at the sourcing hub, and the resulting cooperation between suppliers is beneficial for the suppliers and the raw material suppliers. Overall, our work explores the market and economic conditions under which active management of upstream sourcing can add value to supply chains. </jats:p

Econometric Analysis of Pricing and Operational Strategies

This dissertation contains three essays. The first essay, entitled Pricing and Production Flexibility: An Empirical Analysis of the U.S. Automotive Industry, uses a detailed dataset of the U.S. auto industry to examine the relationship between production flexibility and responsive pricing. Our analysis shows that deploying production flexibility is associated with a reduction in observed discounts and with an increase in plant utilization. Our results allow quantifying some of the benefits of production flexibility. The second essay, entitled An Empirical Analysis of Reputation in Online Service Marketplaces, uses a detailed dataset from a leading online intermediary for software development services to empirically examine the role of reputation on choices and prices in service marketplaces. We find that buyers trade off reputation and price and are willing to accept higher bids posted by more reputable bidders. Sellers primarily use a superior reputation to increase their probability of being selected, as opposed to increasing their prices. Our analysis shows that the numerical reputation score has a smaller effect in situations where there exists a previous relationship between buyer and seller, when the seller has certified his or her skills, when the seller is local, or in situations that prompt higher interpersonal trust. The third essay, entitled The Effects of Product Line Breadth: Evidence from the Automotive Industry, studies the effects of product line breadth on market shares and costs, using data from the U.S. automotive industry. Our results show a positive association between product line breadth and market share and production costs. Beyond the effects on production costs, we study the effect of product line breadth on mismatch costs, which arise from demand uncertainty, and we find that product line breadth has a substantial impact on average discounts and inventories. Our results also show that platform strategies can reduce production costs and that a broader product line can provide a hedge against changes in demand conditions

Public Procurement with Unverifiable Quality: The Case for Discriminatory Competitive Procedures

Unverifiable quality may affect the enforcement of procurement contracts even when the award procedure is able to select the most efficient firm in the market. In this paper, we show that a discriminatory competitive mechanism – which awards the contract on the basis of price and (firms') past performance – yields an efficient allocation of the contract and allows the buyer to implement her desired quality. Quality enforcement arises out of relational contracting whereby the buyer ‘handicaps' a contractor in future competitive tendering processes if it fails to provide the required quality. We study an infinitely repeated procurement model with two firms and one buyer imperfectly informed on the firms' cost, in which, in each period, the buyer runs a discriminatory auction. We restrict our analysis to the case of a buyer committed to her handicapping strategy, a case which captures some of the features of a public buyer. When players use either grim trigger or stick-and-carrot strategies, we find that the buyer can induce the delivery of optimal (unverifiable) quality with a variety of handicap levels and, when applicable, durations of the punishment period; for some values of the handicap and the length of the punishment period, both firms remain active in the market even when punished

Sourcing Flexibility, Spot Trading, and Procurement Contract Structure

We analyze the structure and pricing of option contracts for an industrial good in the presence of spot trading. We combine the analysis of spot trading and buyers' disparate private valuations for different suppliers' products, and we jointly endogenize the determination of three major dimensions in contract design: (i) sales contracts versus options contracts, (ii) flat-price versus volume-dependent contracts, and (iii) volume discounts versus volume premia. We build a model in which a supplier of an industrial good transacts with a manufacturer who uses the supplier's product to produce an end good with an uncertain demand. We show that, consistent with industry observations, volume-dependent optimal sales contracts always demonstrate volume discounts (i.e., involve concave pricing). However, options are more complex agreements, and optimal option contracts can involve both volume discounts and volume premia. Three major contract structures commonly emerge in optimality. First, if the seller has a high discount rate relative to the buyer and the seller's production costs or the production capacity is low, the optimal contracts tend to be flat-price sales contracts. Second, when the seller has a relatively high discount rate compared to the buyer but production costs or production capacity are high, the optimal contracts are sales contracts with volume discounts. Third, if the buyer's discount rate is high relative to the seller's, then the optimal contracts tend to be volume-dependent options contracts and can involve both volume discounts and volume premia. However, when the seller's production capacity is sufficiently low, it is possible to observe flat-price option contracts. Furthermore, we provide links between production and spot market characteristics, contract design, and efficiency.National Science Foundation (U.S.) (contract CMMI-0758069)National Science Foundation (U.S.) (contract DMI-0245352

Towards a unified theory of procurement contract design : production flexibility, spot market trading, and contract structure

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Sloan School of Management, Operations Research Center, 2008.Includes bibliographical references (p. 115-116).We present in this work a unified approach and provide the optimal solution to the pricing problem of option contracts for a supplier of an industrial good in the presence of spot trading. Specifically, our approach fully and jointly endogenizes the determination of three major characteristics in contract design, namely (i) Sales contracts versus options contracts; (ii) Flat fee versus volume- dependent contracts; and (iii) Volume discounts versus volume premia; combining them together with spot market trading decisions and also the option of delaying production for the seller. We build a model where a supplier of an industrial good transacts with a manufacturer who uses the supplier's product to produce an end good with an uncertain demand. We derive the general non-linear pricing solution for the contracts under information asymmetry of the buyer's production flexibility. We show that confirming industry observations, volume-dependent optimal sales contracts always demonstrate volume discounts (i.e., involve concave pricing). On the other hand the options contracts are more complex agreements, and optimal contracts for them can involve both volume discounts and volume premia. Further, we find that in the optimal contracts, there are three major pricing regimes. First, if the seller has a higher discount rate than the buyer and the production costs are lower than a critical threshold value, the optimal contract is a flat fee sales contract. Second, when the seller is less patient than the buyer but production costs are higher than the critical threshold, the optimal contract is a sales contract with volume discounts. Third, if the buyer has a higher discount rate than the seller, then the optimal contract is a volume-dependent options contract and can involve both volume discounts and volume premia. We further provide links between industry and spot market characteristics, contract characteristics and efficiency. Last, we look into an extension of our basic model, where we give an analysis for the case when the seller is given a last minute production option.by Pamela Pen-Erh Pei.Ph.D