Game Theoretic Approach to the Stabilization of Heterogeneous Multiagent Systems Using Subsidy

We consider a multiagent system consisting of selfish and heterogeneous agents. Its behavior is modeled by multipopulation replicator dynamics, where payoff functions of populations are different from each other. In general, there exist several equilibrium points in the replicator dynamics. In order to stabilize a desirable equilibrium point, we introduce a controller called a government which controls the behaviors of agents by offering them subsidies. In previous work, it is assumed that the government determines the subsidies based on the populations the agents belong to. In general, however, the government cannot identify the members of each population. In this paper, we assume that the government observes the action of each agent and determines the subsidies based on the observed action profile. Then, we model the controlled behaviors of the agents using replicator dynamics with feedback. We derive a stabilization condition of the target equilibrium point in the replicator dynamics.Comment: 6 pages, IEEE Conference on Decision and Control, 201

A survey on the analysis and control of evolutionary matrix games

In support of the growing interest in how to efficiently influence complex systems of interacting self interested agents, we present this review of fundamental concepts, emerging research, and open problems related to the analysis and control of evolutionary matrix games, with particular emphasis on applications in social, economic, and biological networks. (C) 2018 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved

2008,06: Evolutionary modelling in economics : a survey of methods and building blocks

In this paper we present an overview of methods and components of formal economic models employing evolutionary approaches. This compromises two levels: (1) techniques of evolutionary modelling, including multi-agent modelling, evolutionary algorithms and evolutionary game theory; (2) building blocks or components of formal models classified into core processes and features of evolutionary systems - diversity, innovation and selection - and additional elements, such as bounded rationality, diffusion, path dependency and lock-in, co-evolutionary dynamics, multilevel and group selection, and evolutionary growth. We focus our attention on the characteristics of models and techniques and their underlying assumptions. -- bounded rationality ; evolutionary algorithms ; evolutionary game theory ; evolutionary growth ; innovation ; multilevel evolution ; neo-Schumpeterian models

Convergence Analysis and Strategy Control of Evolutionary Games with Imitation Rule on Toroidal Grid: A Full Version

This paper investigates discrete-time evolutionary games with a general stochastic imitation rule on the toroidal grid, which is a grid network with periodic boundary conditions. The imitation rule has been considered as a fundamental rule to the field of evolutionary game theory, while the grid is treated as the most basic network and has been widely used in the research of spatial (or networked) evolutionary games. However, currently the investigation of evolutionary games on grids mainly uses simulations or approximation methods, while few strict analysis is carried out on one-dimensional grids. This paper proves the convergence of evolutionary prisoner's dilemma, evolutionary snowdrift game, and evolutionary stag hunt game with the imitation rule on the two-dimensional grid, for the first time to our best knowledge. Simulations show that our results may almost reach the critical convergence condition for the evolutionary snowdrift (or hawk-dove, chicken) game. Also, this paper provides some theoretical results for the strategy control of evolutionary games, and solves the Minimum Agent Consensus Control (MACC) problem under some parameter conditions. We show that for some evolutionary games (like the evolutionary prisoner's dilemma) on the toroidal grid, one fixed defection node can drive all nodes almost surely converging to defection, while at least four fixed cooperation nodes are required to lead all nodes almost surely converging to cooperation

Agent-Based Macroeconomics

Dawid H, Delli Gatti D. Agent-Based Macroeconomics. Universität Bielefeld Working Papers in Economics and Management. Vol 02-2018. Bielefeld: Bielefeld University, Department of Business Administration and Economics; 2018.This chapter surveys work dedicated to macroeconomic analysis using an agent- based modeling approach. After a short review of the origins and general characteristics of this approach a systemic comparison of the structure and modeling assumptions of a set of important (families of) agent-based macroeconomic models is provided. The comparison highlights substantial similarities between the different models, thereby identifying what could be considered an emerging common core of macroeconomic agent-based modeling. In the second part of the chapter agent-based macroeconomic research in different domains of economic policy is reviewed

Incorporating human behaviour in an agent based model of technology adoption in the transition to a smart grid

The requirement for affordable, secure and sustainable energy production is a pressing global challenge and the production of electricity with low carbon emissions is crucial. This usually entails large quantities of renewable energy generation, which is intermittent and often highly distributed throughout the electricity supply system. One of the proposed schemes to manage such generation is the smart grid, the transition to which forms the context for this research. The aim is to investigate the effect of certain psychological and social influences on the adoption of technology necessary to enable smart grids, in order to understand the implications for effective energy policy. In particular, the case of photovoltaic (PV) system adoption in the UK is studied. Empirical data detailing PV installations registered for the Feed in Tariff is analysed in order to understand rates of adoption and how they vary across both time and space. This analysis is combined with a review of policy intervention and literature from psychology to understand drivers for adoption among householders. The results from this study are then used to inform the design of an Agent Based Model of technology adoption within the smart grid context. The decision making of householders is modelled using an algorithm based on Social Cognitive Theory. The model is used to simulate different conditions and generate adoption scenarios in order to understand the potential effects of different parameters on adoption rates. In order to combine the analysis resulting from these methods, the multi-level perspective on transition in socio-technical systems is used to understand how a transition to a smart grid could be described and how adoption of PV in the UK under the Feed in Tariff incentive fits into such a transition. The results show that whilst economic incentive policies have had success in some areas adoption is also dependent on many non-financial parameters. Simulations show that the observability of adoption and the perceived inconvenience or urgency of adoption can have dramatic effects on rates of adoption, in some cases outweighing the rational economic effects of financial incentives. The implication for smart grid related policy is that non-financial factors should be taken into account as well as the more typical financial considerations in efforts to encourage adoption of necessary enabling technology by householders. The models developed could be used in further work to examine in detail adoption of other technologies such as smart home energy management systems and the interaction between adoption rates of multiple smart technologies.The initial 3 years of the PhD were funded by a bursary from the Engineering and Physical Sciences Research Council (EPSRC) under grant number EP/GO59969/1