Why is language vague?

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The epistemic value of rationality

Models of rational choice use different definitions of rationality. However, there is no clear description of the latter. We recognize rationality as a conceptual conglomerate where reason, judgment, deliberation, relativity, behavior, experience, and pragmatism interact. Using our definition, the game theoretic idealized principle of rationality becomes absolute. Our model gives a more precise account of the players, of their true behavior. We show that the Rational Method (RM) is the only process that can be used to achieve a specific goal. We also provide schematics of how information, beliefs, knowledge, actions, and purposes interact with and influence each other in order to achieve a specific goal. Furthermore, ration, the ability to think in the RM framework, is a singularity in time and space. Having a unilateral definition of rationality, different models and theories have now a common ground on which we can judge their soundness.conceptual conglomerate, traditional rationality, rational method, ration

Reasoning about strategies and rational play in dynamic games

We discuss a number of conceptual issues that arise in attempting to capture, in dynamic games, the notion that there is "common understanding" among the players that they are all rational.Belief revision, common belief, counterfactual, dynamic game, model of a game, rationality

Epistemic Foundations for Backward Induction: An Overview

In this survey we analyze, and compare, various sufficient epistemic conditions for backward induction that have been proposed in the literature. To this purpose we present a simple epistemic base model for games with perfect information, and translate the different models into the language of this base model. As such, we formulate the various sufficient conditions for backward induction in a uniform language, which enables us to explictly analyze their differences and similarities.mathematical economics;

An abstract approach to reasoning about games with mistaken and changing beliefs

We do not believe that logic is the sole answer to deep and intriguing questions about human behaviour, but we think that it might be a useful tool in simulating and understanding it to a certain degree and in specifically restricted areas of application. We do not aim to resolve the question of what rational behaviour in games with mistaken and changing beliefs is. Rather, we develop a formal and abstract framework that allows us to reason about behaviour in games with mistaken and changing beliefs leaving aside normative questions concerning whether the agents are behaving “rationally”; we focus on what agents do in a game. In this paper, we are not concerned with the reasoning process of the (ideal) economic agent; rather, our intended application is artificial agents, e.g., autonomous agents interacting with a human user or with each other as part of a computer game or in a virtual world. We give a story of mistaken beliefs that is a typical example of the situation in which we should want our formal setting to be applied. Then we give the definitions for our formal system and how to use this setting to get a backward induction solution. We then apply our semantics to the story related earlier and give an analysis of it. Our final section contains a discussion of related work and future projects. We discuss the advantages of our approach over existing approaches and indicate how it can be connected to the existing literature

The epistemic value of rationality

Models of rational choice use different definitions of rationality. However, there is no clear description of the latter. We recognize rationality as a conceptual conglomerate where reason, judgment, deliberation, relativity, behavior, experience, and pragmatism interact. Using our definition, the game theoretic idealized principle of rationality becomes absolute. Our model gives a more precise account of the players, of their true behavior. We show that the Rational Method (RM) is the only process that can be used to achieve a specific goal. We also provide schematics of how information, beliefs, knowledge, actions, and purposes interact with and influence each other in order to achieve a specific goal. Furthermore, ration, the ability to think in the RM framework, is a singularity in time and space. Having a unilateral definition of rationality, different models and theories have now a common ground on which we can judge their soundness

The epistemic value of rationality

Models of rational choice use different definitions of rationality. However, there is no clear description of the latter. We recognize rationality as a conceptual conglomerate where reason, judgment, deliberation, relativity, behavior, experience, and pragmatism interact. Using our definition, the game theoretic idealized principle of rationality becomes absolute. Our model gives a more precise account of the players, of their true behavior. We show that the Rational Method (RM) is the only process that can be used to achieve a specific goal. We also provide schematics of how information, beliefs, knowledge, actions, and purposes interact with and influence each other in order to achieve a specific goal. Furthermore, ration, the ability to think in the RM framework, is a singularity in time and space. Having a unilateral definition of rationality, different models and theories have now a common ground on which we can judge their soundness

Epistemic Considerations on Extensive-Form Games

In this thesis, we study several topics in extensive-form games. First, we consider perfect information games with belief revision with players who are tolerant of each other’s hypothetical errors. We bound the number of hypothetical non-rational moves of a player that will be tolerated by other players without revising the belief on that player’s rationality on future moves, and investigate which games yield the backward induction solution. Second, we consider players who have no way of assigning probabilities to various possible outcomes, and define players as conservative, moderate and aggressive depending on the way they choose, and show that all such players could be considered rational. We then concentrate on games with imperfect and incomplete information and study how conservative, moderate and aggressive players might play such games. We provide models for the behavior of a (truthful) knowledge manipulator whose motives are not known to the active players, and look into how she can bring about a certain knowledge situation about a game, and change the way the game will be played