We discuss a number of conceptual issues that arise in attempting to capture, in dynamic games, the notion that there is "common understanding" among the players that they are all rational.Belief revision, common belief, counterfactual, dynamic game, model of a game, rationality

Giacomo Bonanno

English

Research Papers in Economics

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Reasoning about strategies and rational play in dynamic games

Reasoning about strategies and rational play in dynamic games

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Research Papers in Economics