55 research outputs found

    Improving the Policy Specification for Practical Access Control Systems

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    Access control systems play a crucial role in protecting the security of information systems by ensuring that only authorized users are granted access to sensitive resources, and the protection is only as good as the access control policies. For enabling a security administrator to express her desired policy conveniently, it is paramount that a policy specification is expressive, comprehensible, and free of inconsistencies. In this dissertation, we study the policy specifications for three practical access control systems (i.e., obligation systems, firewalls, and Security-Enhanced Linux in Android) and improve their expressiveness, comprehensibility, and consistency. First, we improve the expressiveness of obligation policies for handling different types of obligations. We propose a language for specifying obligations as well as an architecture for handling access control policies with these obligations, by extending XACML (i.e., the de facto standard for specifying access control policies). We also implement our design into a prototype system named ExtXACML to handle various obligations. Second, we improve the comprehensibility of firewall policies enabling administrators to better understand and manage the policies. We introduce the tri-modularized design of firewall policies for elevating them from monolithic to modular. To support legacy firewall policies, we also define a five-step process and present algorithms for converting them into their modularized form. Finally, we improve the consistency of Security-Enhanced Linux in Android (SEAndroid) policies for reducing the attack surface in Android systems. We propose a systematic approach as well as a semiautomatic tool for uncovering three classes of policy misconfigurations. We also analyze SEAndroid policies from four Android versions and seven Android phone vendors, and in all of them we observe examples of potential policy misconfigurations

    FINE-GRAINED ACCESS CONTROL ON ANDROID COMPONENT

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    The pervasiveness of Android devices in today’s interconnected world emphasizes the importance of mobile security in protecting user privacy and digital assets. Android’s current security model primarily enforces application-level mechanisms, which fail to address component-level (e.g., Activity, Service, and Content Provider) security concerns. Consequently, third-party code may exploit an application’s permissions, and security features like MDM or BYOD face limitations in their implementation. To address these concerns, we propose a novel Android component context-aware access control mechanism that enforces layered security at multiple Exception Levels (ELs), including EL0, EL1, and EL3. This approach effectively restricts component privileges and controls resource access as needed. Our solution comprises Flasa at EL0, extending SELinux policies for inter-component interactions and SQLite content control; Compac, spanning EL0 and EL1, which enforces component-level permission controls through Android runtime and kernel modifications; and TzNfc, leveraging TrustZone technologies to secure third-party services and limit system privileges via Trusted Execution Environment (TEE). Our evaluations demonstrate the effectiveness of our proposed solution in containing component privileges, controlling inter-component interactions and protecting component level resource access. This enhanced solution, complementing Android’s existing security architecture, provides a more comprehensive approach to Android security, benefiting users, developers, and the broader mobile ecosystem

    Improving the Policy Specification for Practical Access Control Systems

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    Access control systems play a crucial role in protecting the security of information systems by ensuring that only authorized users are granted access to sensitive resources, and the protection is only as good as the access control policies. For enabling a security administrator to express her desired policy conveniently, it is paramount that a policy specification is expressive, comprehensible, and free of inconsistencies. In this dissertation, we study the policy specifications for three practical access control systems (i.e., obligation systems, firewalls, and Security-Enhanced Linux in Android) and improve their expressiveness, comprehensibility, and consistency. First, we improve the expressiveness of obligation policies for handling different types of obligations. We propose a language for specifying obligations as well as an architecture for handling access control policies with these obligations, by extending XACML (i.e., the de facto standard for specifying access control policies). We also implement our design into a prototype system named ExtXACML to handle various obligations. Second, we improve the comprehensibility of firewall policies enabling administrators to better understand and manage the policies. We introduce the tri-modularized design of firewall policies for elevating them from monolithic to modular. To support legacy firewall policies, we also define a five-step process and present algorithms for converting them into their modularized form. Finally, we improve the consistency of Security-Enhanced Linux in Android (SEAndroid) policies for reducing the attack surface in Android systems. We propose a systematic approach as well as a semiautomatic tool for uncovering three classes of policy misconfigurations. We also analyze SEAndroid policies from four Android versions and seven Android phone vendors, and in all of them we observe examples of potential policy misconfigurations

    Evaluating Smartphone Application Security: A Case Study on Android

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    Currently, smart phones are becoming indispensable for meeting the social expectation ofalways staying connected and the need for an increase inproductivity are the reasons for the increase in smartphone usage. One of the leaders of the smart phone evolution is Google2019;s Android operating system. It ishighly likely that Android is going to be installed in manymillions of cell phones during the near future. With thepopularity of Android smart phones everyone finds it convenient to make transactions through these smartphones because of the openness of Android applications. The malware attacks are also significant. Androidsecurity is complex and we evaluate an applicationdevelopment environment which is susceptible tomalware attacks. This paper evaluates Android securitywith the purpose of identifying a secure applicationdevelopment environment for performing securetransactions on Android-based smart phones

    An Historical Analysis of the SEAndroid Policy Evolution

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    Android adopted SELinux's mandatory access control (MAC) mechanisms in 2013. Since then, billions of Android devices have benefited from mandatory access control security policies. These policies are expressed in a variety of rules, maintained by Google and extended by Android OEMs. Over the years, the rules have grown to be quite complex, making it challenging to properly understand or configure these policies. In this paper, we perform a measurement study on the SEAndroid repository to understand the evolution of these policies. We propose a new metric to measure the complexity of the policy by expanding policy rules, with their abstraction features such as macros and groups, into primitive "boxes", which we then use to show that the complexity of the SEAndroid policies has been growing exponentially over time. By analyzing the Git commits, snapshot by snapshot, we are also able to analyze the "age" of policy rules, the trend of changes, and the contributor composition. We also look at hallmark events in Android's history, such as the "Stagefright" vulnerability in Android's media facilities, pointing out how these events led to changes in the MAC policies. The growing complexity of Android's mandatory policies suggests that we will eventually hit the limits of our ability to understand these policies, requiring new tools and techniques.Comment: 16 pages, 11 figures, published in ACSAC '1

    SELint : An SEAndroid policy analysis tool

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