The Logic of Joint Ability in Two-Player Tacit Games

Logics of joint strategic ability have recently received attention, with arguably the most influential being those in a family that includes Coalition Logic (CL) and Alternating-time Temporal Logic (ATL). Notably, both CL and ATL bypass the epistemic issues that underpin Schelling-type coordination problems, by apparently relying on the meta-level assumption of (perfectly reliable) communication between cooperating rational agents. Yet such epistemic issues arise naturally in settings relevant to ATL and CL: these logics are standardly interpreted on structures where agents move simultaneously, opening the possibility that an agent cannot foresee the concurrent choices of other agents. In this paper we introduce a variant of CL we call Two-Player Strategic Coordination Logic (SCL2). The key novelty of this framework is an operator for capturing coalitional ability when the cooperating agents cannot share strategic information. We identify significant differences in the expressive power and validities of SCL2 and CL2, and present a sound and complete axiomatization for SCL2. We briefly address conceptual challenges when shifting attention to games with more than two players and stronger notions of rationality

Model checking multi-agent systems

A multi-agent system (MAS) is usually understood as a system composed of interacting autonomous agents. In this sense, MAS have been employed successfully as a modelling paradigm in a number of scenarios, especially in Computer Science. However, the process of modelling complex and heterogeneous systems is intrinsically prone to errors: for this reason, computer scientists are typically concerned with the issue of verifying that a system actually behaves as it is supposed to, especially when a system is complex. Techniques have been developed to perform this task: testing is the most common technique, but in many circumstances a formal proof of correctness is needed. Techniques for formal verification include theorem proving and model checking. Model checking techniques, in particular, have been successfully employed in the formal verification of distributed systems, including hardware components, communication protocols, security protocols. In contrast to traditional distributed systems, formal verification techniques for MAS are still in their infancy, due to the more complex nature of agents, their autonomy, and the richer language used in the specification of properties. This thesis aims at making a contribution in the formal verification of properties of MAS via model checking. In particular, the following points are addressed: • Theoretical results about model checking methodologies for MAS, obtained by extending traditional methodologies based on Ordered Binary Decision Diagrams (OBDDS) for temporal logics to multi-modal logics for time, knowledge, correct behaviour, and strategies of agents. Complexity results for model checking these logics (and their symbolic representations). • Development of a software tool (MCMAS) that permits the specification and verification of MAS described in the formalism of interpreted systems. • Examples of application of MCMAS to various MAS scenarios (communication, anonymity, games, hardware diagnosability), including experimental results, and comparison with other tools available

Group synthesis for alternating-time temporal logic

We present an extension of Alternating-time Temporal Logic ATL, called ATLP (Parametric ATL), where parameters are allowed in place of concrete groups of agents. We devise a procedure to nd all instantiations for the parameters in a given formula of ATLP so that is true in a given model. We propose a formalisation of the problem and symbolic algorithms for its solution. We discuss an experimental implementation of the approach on top of the open-source model checker mcmas and demonstrate the bene ts of the technique through experimental results

Relentful Strategic Reasoning in 1 Alternating-Time Temporal Logic

Temporal logics are a well investigated formalism for the specification, verification, and synthesis of reactive systems. Within this family, Alternating-Time Temporal Logic (ATL , for short) has been introduced as a useful generalization of classical linear- and branching-time temporal logics, by allowing temporal operators to be indexed by coalitions of agents. Classically, temporal logics are memoryless: once a path in the computation tree is quantified at a given node, the computation that has led to that node is forgotten. Recently, mCTL has been defined as a memoryful variant of CTL , where path quantification is memoryful. In the context of multi-agent planning, memoryful quantification enables agents to “relent” and change their goals and strategies depending on their history. In this paper, we define mATL , a memoryful extension of ATL , in which a formula is satisfied at a certain node of a path by taking into account both the future and the past. We study the expressive power of mATL , its succinctness, as well as related decision problems. We also investigate the relationship between memoryful quantification and past modalities and show their equivalence. We show that both the memoryful and the past extensions come without any computational price; indeed, we prove that both the satisfiability and the model-checking problems are 2EXPTIME-COMPLETE, as they are for AT

Formal methods for analysing, coordinating, and controlling decisions in multi-agent systems

Multiagentensysteme sind verteilte (Computer)Systeme, die sich aus autonomen interagierenden Systemkomponenten, bezeichnet als Agenten, zusammensetzen. Sie bieten ein flexibles Framework zur Modellierung und Analyse von interaktiven Systemen, in denen Kooperation, Eigeninteresse und Autonomie eine entscheidende Rolle spielen. Dies ist zum Beispiel der Fall in Smart Grids. Eine Herausforderung in solchen Systemen ist die Kontrolle und die Koordination von Systemausführungen. Agenten handeln autonom und lassen sich daher oftmals nicht direkt kontrollieren, sondern bestenfalls beeinflussen. Aufgrund der Autonomie und des Selbstinteresses, ist es schwierig, angemessene Kontrollmechanismen zu finden. Die vorliegende Arbeit behandelt formale Grundlagen zu den Themen Entscheidungsfindung, Koordination und Kontrolle in Multiagentensystemen. Insbesondere werden in diesem Zusammenhang Logiken zur Analyse und Spezifikation von strategischen Fähigkeiten von Agenten, unter diversen Restriktionen, untersucht. Es werden formale Ansätze zur Beeinflussung und Überwachung von Systemausführungen eingeführt. In einem weiteren Teil der Arbeit wird mittels spieltheoretischer Verfahren analysiert, wie rationale Agenten interagieren und Entscheidungen treffen. Es wird argumentiert, dass formale Methoden und Werkzeuge zur Analyse und Kontrolle von autonomen Systemen entscheidend für deren verlässliche Entwicklung sind.Multi-agent systems (MASs) are distributed (computer) systems composed of autonomously (inter-)acting system components referred to as agents. MASs offer a flexible framework to model and analyse many real world settings in which cooperation, self-interest, and autonomy are crucial elements. A key challenge in such settings is the control and coordination of behavior. However, due to the agents' autonomy behavior can often not be controlled, but at best be influenced in some way or another. For example, agents can be given incentives in order to affect their decision-making in such a way that the emergent behavior of all actors is desirable from the system's perspective. The properties of self-interest and autonomy make it challenging to find appropriate control mechanisms. Existing coordination and control approaches from the distributed system literature are often not applicable due to the lack of direct control on the system components of MASs. New methods and tools are needed. In this thesis formal foundations related to the subjects of decision making, coordination and control in MASs are studied. In particular, we investigate (extensions of) temporal and strategic logics which capture specific capabilities of agents that influence their decision making. We also propose formal approaches to control, coordinate and monitor the emergent behavior in MASs. In the last part of the thesis we analyse how rational agents interact and make decisions using game theoretical methods. We argue that such formal approaches and tools to analyse and control autonomous systems are crucial for the development of reliable and flexible systems and will become even more crucial in the near future

06261 Abstracts Collection -- Foundations and Practice of Programming Multi-Agent Systems

From 25.06.06 to 30.06.06, the Dagstuhl Seminar 06261 ``Foundations and Practice of Programming Multi-Agent Systems\u27\u27 was held in the International Conference and Research Center (IBFI), Schloss Dagstuhl. During the seminar, several participants presented their current research, and ongoing work and open problems were discussed. Abstracts of the presentations given during the seminar as well as abstracts of seminar results and ideas are put together in this paper. The first section describes the seminar topics and goals in general. Links to extended abstracts or full papers are provided, if available

Playing to Learn, or to Keep Secret: Alternating-Time Logic Meets Information Theory

Many important properties of multi-agent systems refer to the participants' ability to achieve a given goal, or to prevent the system from an undesirable event. Among intelligent agents, the goals are often of epistemic nature, i.e., concern the ability to obtain knowledge about an important fact \phi. Such properties can be e.g. expressed in ATLK, that is, alternating-time temporal logic ATL extended with epistemic operators. In many realistic scenarios, however, players do not need to fully learn the truth value of \phi. They may be almost as well off by gaining some knowledge; in other words, by reducing their uncertainty about \phi. Similarly, in order to keep \phi secret, it is often insufficient that the intruder never fully learns its truth value. Instead, one needs to require that his uncertainty about \phi never drops below a reasonable threshold. With this motivation in mind, we introduce the logic ATLH, extending ATL with quantitative modalities based on the Hartley measure of uncertainty. The new logic enables to specify agents' abilities w.r.t. the uncertainty of a given player about a given set of statements. It turns out that ATLH has the same expressivity and model checking complexity as ATLK. However, the new logic is exponentially more succinct than ATLK, which is the main technical result of this paper