Controlled Data Sharing for Collaborative Predictive Blacklisting

Although sharing data across organizations is often advocated as a promising way to enhance cybersecurity, collaborative initiatives are rarely put into practice owing to confidentiality, trust, and liability challenges. In this paper, we investigate whether collaborative threat mitigation can be realized via a controlled data sharing approach, whereby organizations make informed decisions as to whether or not, and how much, to share. Using appropriate cryptographic tools, entities can estimate the benefits of collaboration and agree on what to share in a privacy-preserving way, without having to disclose their datasets. We focus on collaborative predictive blacklisting, i.e., forecasting attack sources based on one's logs and those contributed by other organizations. We study the impact of different sharing strategies by experimenting on a real-world dataset of two billion suspicious IP addresses collected from Dshield over two months. We find that controlled data sharing yields up to 105% accuracy improvement on average, while also reducing the false positive rate.Comment: A preliminary version of this paper appears in DIMVA 2015. This is the full version. arXiv admin note: substantial text overlap with arXiv:1403.212

MobileTrust: Secure Knowledge Integration in VANETs

Vehicular Ad hoc NETworks (VANET) are becoming popular due to the emergence of the Internet of Things and ambient intelligence applications. In such networks, secure resource sharing functionality is accomplished by incorporating trust schemes. Current solutions adopt peer-to-peer technologies that can cover the large operational area. However, these systems fail to capture some inherent properties of VANETs, such as fast and ephemeral interaction, making robust trust evaluation of crowdsourcing challenging. In this article, we propose MobileTrust—a hybrid trust-based system for secure resource sharing in VANETs. The proposal is a breakthrough in centralized trust computing that utilizes cloud and upcoming 5G technologies to provide robust trust establishment with global scalability. The ad hoc communication is energy-efficient and protects the system against threats that are not countered by the current settings. To evaluate its performance and effectiveness, MobileTrust is modelled in the SUMO simulator and tested on the traffic features of the small-size German city of Eichstatt. Similar schemes are implemented in the same platform to provide a fair comparison. Moreover, MobileTrust is deployed on a typical embedded system platform and applied on a real smart car installation for monitoring traffic and road-state parameters of an urban application. The proposed system is developed under the EU-founded THREAT-ARREST project, to provide security, privacy, and trust in an intelligent and energy-aware transportation scenario, bringing closer the vision of sustainable circular economy

A Comprehensive Insight into Game Theory in relevance to Cyber Security

The progressively ubiquitous connectivity in the present information systems pose newer challenges tosecurity. The conventional security mechanisms have come a long way in securing the well-definedobjectives of confidentiality, integrity, authenticity and availability. Nevertheless, with the growth in thesystem complexities and attack sophistication, providing security via traditional means can beunaffordable. A novel theoretical perspective and an innovative approach are thus required forunderstanding security from decision-making and strategic viewpoint. One of the analytical tools whichmay assist the researchers in designing security protocols for computer networks is game theory. Thegame-theoretic concept finds extensive applications in security at different levels, including thecyberspace and is generally categorized under security games. It can be utilized as a robust mathematicaltool for modelling and analyzing contemporary security issues. Game theory offers a natural frameworkfor capturing the defensive as well as adversarial interactions between the defenders and the attackers.Furthermore, defenders can attain a deep understanding of the potential attack threats and the strategiesof attackers by equilibrium evaluation of the security games. In this paper, the concept of game theoryhas been presented, followed by game-theoretic applications in cybersecurity including cryptography.Different types of games, particularly those focused on securing the cyberspace, have been analysed andvaried game-theoretic methodologies including mechanism design theories have been outlined foroffering a modern foundation of the science of cybersecurity

TRIDEnT: Building Decentralized Incentives for Collaborative Security

Sophisticated mass attacks, especially when exploiting zero-day vulnerabilities, have the potential to cause destructive damage to organizations and critical infrastructure. To timely detect and contain such attacks, collaboration among the defenders is critical. By correlating real-time detection information (alerts) from multiple sources (collaborative intrusion detection), defenders can detect attacks and take the appropriate defensive measures in time. However, although the technical tools to facilitate collaboration exist, real-world adoption of such collaborative security mechanisms is still underwhelming. This is largely due to a lack of trust and participation incentives for companies and organizations. This paper proposes TRIDEnT, a novel collaborative platform that aims to enable and incentivize parties to exchange network alert data, thus increasing their overall detection capabilities. TRIDEnT allows parties that may be in a competitive relationship, to selectively advertise, sell and acquire security alerts in the form of (near) real-time peer-to-peer streams. To validate the basic principles behind TRIDEnT, we present an intuitive game-theoretic model of alert sharing, that is of independent interest, and show that collaboration is bound to take place infinitely often. Furthermore, to demonstrate the feasibility of our approach, we instantiate our design in a decentralized manner using Ethereum smart contracts and provide a fully functional prototype.Comment: 28 page

Modelling Telecommunications Operators and Adversaries using Game Theory

Telecommunications systems being inherently distributed and collaborative in nature present a plurality of attack surfaces to malicious entities and hence vulnerable to many potential attacks even indirectly demanding a need in prioritising security. The choice of security implementations depends upon the currently understood threats, future possible threat vectors, and the dependencies between systems. Executing these choices while contemplating the financial aspects is exceptionally difficult. It is thus critical to have a perceptible decision support framework for better security decision-making. This thesis studies the strategic nature of the interaction between the Telecoms operators and attackers utilising game theory to understand their strategic decision-making characteristics strengthening security decisions. To understand the security investment decision-making criteria of operators, this thesis utilises static security investment games. Through these games, we study the effects of security investment decision of an operator on other operators' behaviour. We determine conditions supporting the security investment decisions and propose strategic recommendations supplementing the dependency conditions. We then study attackers' behaviour considering them with strategic incentives in contrary to their strictly-bounded rationality in traditional game-theoretic modelling approaches. We utilise a behavioural approach and design a decision-flow model capturing the choices of attackers in the attack process. An outcome of this work is a generalised attack framework. Moreover, using this framework, we derive attack strategies optimising attackers' effort. Through this work, we are probing the foundations for drawing inferences about attackers' strategic characteristics from a cybersecurity perspective

Sharing Computer Network Logs for Security and Privacy: A Motivation for New Methodologies of Anonymization

Logs are one of the most fundamental resources to any security professional. It is widely recognized by the government and industry that it is both beneficial and desirable to share logs for the purpose of security research. However, the sharing is not happening or not to the degree or magnitude that is desired. Organizations are reluctant to share logs because of the risk of exposing sensitive information to potential attackers. We believe this reluctance remains high because current anonymization techniques are weak and one-size-fits-all--or better put, one size tries to fit all. We must develop standards and make anonymization available at varying levels, striking a balance between privacy and utility. Organizations have different needs and trust other organizations to different degrees. They must be able to map multiple anonymization levels with defined risks to the trust levels they share with (would-be) receivers. It is not until there are industry standards for multiple levels of anonymization that we will be able to move forward and achieve the goal of widespread sharing of logs for security researchers.Comment: 17 pages, 1 figur

Gaming security by obscurity

Shannon sought security against the attacker with unlimited computational powers: *if an information source conveys some information, then Shannon's attacker will surely extract that information*. Diffie and Hellman refined Shannon's attacker model by taking into account the fact that the real attackers are computationally limited. This idea became one of the greatest new paradigms in computer science, and led to modern cryptography. Shannon also sought security against the attacker with unlimited logical and observational powers, expressed through the maxim that "the enemy knows the system". This view is still endorsed in cryptography. The popular formulation, going back to Kerckhoffs, is that "there is no security by obscurity", meaning that the algorithms cannot be kept obscured from the attacker, and that security should only rely upon the secret keys. In fact, modern cryptography goes even further than Shannon or Kerckhoffs in tacitly assuming that *if there is an algorithm that can break the system, then the attacker will surely find that algorithm*. The attacker is not viewed as an omnipotent computer any more, but he is still construed as an omnipotent programmer. So the Diffie-Hellman step from unlimited to limited computational powers has not been extended into a step from unlimited to limited logical or programming powers. Is the assumption that all feasible algorithms will eventually be discovered and implemented really different from the assumption that everything that is computable will eventually be computed? The present paper explores some ways to refine the current models of the attacker, and of the defender, by taking into account their limited logical and programming powers. If the adaptive attacker actively queries the system to seek out its vulnerabilities, can the system gain some security by actively learning attacker's methods, and adapting to them?Comment: 15 pages, 9 figures, 2 tables; final version appeared in the Proceedings of New Security Paradigms Workshop 2011 (ACM 2011); typos correcte