Strategic Argumentation is NP-Complete

In this paper we study the complexity of strategic argumentation for dialogue games. A dialogue game is a 2-player game where the parties play arguments. We show how to model dialogue games in a skeptical, non-monotonic formalism, and we show that the problem of deciding what move (set of rules) to play at each turn is an NP-complete problem

Dilemmas in Legal Governance

This article develops the issue of power and language in Artificial Intelligence governance through three dilemmas that should be considered in the design of regulatory systems. Some previous uses of this figure in the literature are described. The article inspects some design choices that determine how legal governance in AI can be engineered. Stemming from the conundrum that enactment of rights and the implementation of good or better government can be facilitated at the cost of increasing control over citizens through AI-based systems, the article formulates three dilemmas—normative autonomy, legal isomorphism, and modes of regulation. Beyond deliberative and epistemic democracy, it expands then the notion of legal governance, connecting the three dilemmas with the ethical and political stances of the concept of linked democracy

On the interplay between games, argumentation and dialogues

Game theory, argumentation and dialogues all address problems concerning inter-agent interaction, but from different perspectives. In this paper, we contribute to the study of the interplay between these fields. In particular, we show that by mapping games in normal form into structured argumentation, computing dominant solutions and Nash equilibria is equivalent to computing admissible sets of arguments. Moreover, when agents lack complete information, computing dominant solutions/Nash equilibria is equivalent to constructing successful (argumentation-based) dialogues. Finally, we study agents’ behaviour in these dialogues in reverse game-theoretic terms and show that, using specific notions of utility, agents engaged in (argumentation-based) dialogues are guaranteed to be truthful and disclose relevant information, and thus can converge to dominant solutions/Nash equilibria of the original games even under incomplete information

On the Interplay between Games, Argumentation and Dialogues

Game theory, argumentation and dialogues all address problems concerning inter-agent interaction, but from different perspectives. In this paper, we contribute to the study of the interplay between these fields. In particular, we show that by mapping games in normal form into structured argumentation, computing dominant solutions and Nash equilibria is equivalent to computing admissible sets of arguments. Moreover, when agents lack complete information, computing dominant solutions/Nash equilibria is equivalent to constructing successful (argumentation-based) dialogues. Finally, we study agents' behaviour in these dialogues in reverse game-theoretic terms and show that, using specific notions of utility, agents engaged in (argumentation-based) dialogues are guaranteed to be truthful and disclose relevant information, and thus can converge to dominant solutions/Nash equilibria of the original games even under incomplete information

Strategic Argumentation is NP-Complete

The paper shows that the process of selecting the best possible sequence of arguments in a strategic game is an NP-complete proble