Some Epistemic Extensions of G\"odel Fuzzy Logic

In this paper, we introduce some epistemic extensions of G\"odel fuzzy logic whose Kripke-based semantics have fuzzy values for both propositions and accessibility relations such that soundness and completeness hold. We adopt belief as our epistemic operator, then survey some fuzzy implications to justify our semantics for belief is appropriate. We give a fuzzy version of traditional muddy children problem and apply it to show that axioms of positive and negative introspections and Truth are not necessarily valid in our basic epistemic fuzzy models. In the sequel, we propose a derivation system $K_F$ as a fuzzy version of classical epistemic logic $K$. Next, we establish some other epistemic-fuzzy derivation systems $B_F, T_F, B_F^n$ and $T_F^n$ which are extensions of $K_F$, and prove that all of these derivation systems are sound and complete with respect to appropriate classes of Kripke-based models

A domain equation for refinement of partial systems

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A Four-Valued Dynamic Epistemic Logic

Epistemic logic is usually employed to model two aspects of a situation: the factual and the epistemic aspects. Truth, however, is not always attainable, and in many cases we are forced to reason only with whatever information is available to us. In this paper, we will explore a four-valued epistemic logic designed to deal with these situations, where agents have only knowledge about the available information (or evidence), which can be incomplete or conflicting, but not explicitly about facts. This layer of available information or evidence, which is the object of the agents' knowledge, can be seen as a database. By adopting this sceptical posture in our semantics, we prepare the ground for logics where the notion of knowledge-or more appropriately, belief-is entirely based on evidence. The technical results include a set of reduction axioms for public announcements, correspondence proofs, and a complete tableau system. In summary, our contributions are twofold: on the one hand we present an intuition and possible application for many-valued modal logics, and on the other hand we develop a logic that models the dynamics of evidence in a simple and intuitively clear fashion

Frame definability in finitely-valued modal logics

In this paper we study frame definability in finitely valued modal logics and establish two main results via suitable translations: (1) in finitely valued modal logics one cannot define more classes of frames than are already definable in classical modal logic (cf. [27, Thm. 8]), and (2) a large family of finitely valued modal logics define exactly the same classes of frames as classical modal logic (including modal logics based on finite Heyting and MV-algebras, or even BL-algebras). In this way one may observe, for example, that the celebrated Goldblatt–Thomason theorem applies immediately to these logics. In particular, we obtain the central result from [26] with a much simpler proof and answer one of the open questions left in that paper. Moreover, the proposed translations allow us to determine the computational complexity of a big class of finitely valued modal logics

Prior’s System Q and its Extensions

Recently, and as happens from time to time in New Zealand, a typescript of Prior’s turned up. This one was in the personal collection of Oliver Sutherland. Prior typed it in November 1957 and used copies in his senior logic group, an informal research group at Canterbury University. A terse and relentlessly compressed couple of pages, it concerns Prior’s system Q, which even towards the end of his life he was still describing as ‘the true modal logic’. We analyse Prior’s typescript and the issues underlying it, as well as providing an exposition of Q, and an examination of Łukasiewicz’s objections to Q. The article also includes an interview with Prior’s student Robert Bull concerning Q

A Logical Modeling of Severe Ignorance

In the logical context, ignorance is traditionally defined recurring to epistemic logic. In particular, ignorance is essentially interpreted as “lack of knowledge”. This received view has - as we point out - some problems, in particular we will highlight how it does not allow to express a type of content-theoretic ignorance, i.e. an ignorance of φ that stems from an unfamiliarity with its meaning. Contrarily to this trend, in this paper, we introduce and investigate a modal logic having a primitive epistemic operator I, modeling ignorance. Our modal logic is essentially constructed on the modal logics based on weak Kleene three-valued logic introduced by Segerberg (Theoria, 33(1):53–71, 1997). Such non-classical propositional basis allows to define a Kripke-style semantics with the following, very intuitive, interpretation: a formula φ is ignored by an agent if φ is neither true nor false in every world accessible to the agent. As a consequence of this choice, we obtain a type of content-theoretic notion of ignorance, which is essentially different from the traditional approach. We dub it severe ignorance. We axiomatize, prove completeness and decidability for the logic of reflexive (three-valued) Kripke frames, which we find the most suitable candidate for our novel proposal and, finally, compare our approach with the most traditional one

A LOGICAL MODELING OF SEVERE IGNORANCE

In the logical context, ignorance is traditionally defined recurring to epistemic logic $S_4$ \cite{Hintikka1962}. In particular, an agent ignores a formula $\varphi$ when s/he does not know neither $\varphi$ nor its negation $\neg\varphi$: \neg\K\varphi\land\neg\K\neg\varphi (where \K is the epistemic operator for knowledge). In other words, ignorance is essentially interpreted as ``lack of knowledge''. \textcolor{red}{This received view has - as we point out - some problems, in particular we will highlight how it does not allow to express a type of content-theoretic ignorance, i.e. an ignorance of $\varphi$ that stems from an unfamiliarity with its meaning.} Contrarily to this trend, in this paper, we introduce and investigate a modal logic having a primitive epistemic operator \I, modeling ignorance. Our modal logic is essentially constructed on the modal logics based on weak Kleene three-valued logic introduced by Krister Segerberg \cite{Segerberg67}. Such non-classical propositional basis allows to define a Kripke-style semantics with the following, very intuitive, interpretation: a formula $\varphi$ is ignored by an agent if $\varphi$ is neither true nor false in every world accessible to the agent. As a consequence of this choice, we obtain \textcolor{red}{a type of content-theoretic} notion of ignorance, which is essentially different from the traditional approach based on $S_4$. \textcolor{red}{We dub it \emph{severe ignorance}.} We axiomatize, prove completeness and decidability for the logic of reflexive (three-valued) Kripke frames, which we find the most suitable candidate for our novel proposal and, finally, compare our approach with the most traditional one