Solvency Markov Decision Processes with Interest

Solvency games, introduced by Berger et al., provide an abstract framework for modelling decisions of a risk-averse investor, whose goal is to avoid ever going broke. We study a new variant of this model, where, in addition to stochastic environment and fixed increments and decrements to the investor\u27s wealth, we introduce interest, which is earned or paid on the current level of savings or debt, respectively. We study problems related to the minimum initial wealth sufficient to avoid bankruptcy (i.e. steady decrease of the wealth) with probability at least p. We present an exponential time algorithm which approximates this minimum initial wealth, and show that a polynomial time approximation is not possible unless P=NP. For the qualitative case, i.e. p=1, we show that the problem whether a given number is larger than or equal to the minimum initial wealth belongs to NP cap coNP, and show that a polynomial time algorithm would yield a polynomial time algorithm for mean-payoff games, existence of which is a longstanding open problem. We also identify some classes of solvency MDPs for which this problem is in P. In all above cases the algorithms also give corresponding bankruptcy avoiding strategies

Expectations or Guarantees? I Want It All! A crossroad between games and MDPs

When reasoning about the strategic capabilities of an agent, it is important to consider the nature of its adversaries. In the particular context of controller synthesis for quantitative specifications, the usual problem is to devise a strategy for a reactive system which yields some desired performance, taking into account the possible impact of the environment of the system. There are at least two ways to look at this environment. In the classical analysis of two-player quantitative games, the environment is purely antagonistic and the problem is to provide strict performance guarantees. In Markov decision processes, the environment is seen as purely stochastic: the aim is then to optimize the expected payoff, with no guarantee on individual outcomes. In this expository work, we report on recent results introducing the beyond worst-case synthesis problem, which is to construct strategies that guarantee some quantitative requirement in the worst-case while providing an higher expected value against a particular stochastic model of the environment given as input. This problem is relevant to produce system controllers that provide nice expected performance in the everyday situation while ensuring a strict (but relaxed) performance threshold even in the event of very bad (while unlikely) circumstances. It has been studied for both the mean-payoff and the shortest path quantitative measures.Comment: In Proceedings SR 2014, arXiv:1404.041

A Review and Bibliography of Early Warning Models

This note is intended to share some observations regarding a non-exhaustive collection of the early warning literature from 1971 to 2011. Evolution of the interest in early warning models, methodological spectrum of studies and coverage of economic variables are briefly discussed in addition to providing a bibliography.Early warning systems, bibliometric analysis

One-Counter Stochastic Games

We study the computational complexity of basic decision problems for one-counter simple stochastic games (OC-SSGs), under various objectives. OC-SSGs are 2-player turn-based stochastic games played on the transition graph of classic one-counter automata. We study primarily the termination objective, where the goal of one player is to maximize the probability of reaching counter value 0, while the other player wishes to avoid this. Partly motivated by the goal of understanding termination objectives, we also study certain "limit" and "long run average" reward objectives that are closely related to some well-studied objectives for stochastic games with rewards. Examples of problems we address include: does player 1 have a strategy to ensure that the counter eventually hits 0, i.e., terminates, almost surely, regardless of what player 2 does? Or that the liminf (or limsup) counter value equals infinity with a desired probability? Or that the long run average reward is >0 with desired probability? We show that the qualitative termination problem for OC-SSGs is in NP intersection coNP, and is in P-time for 1-player OC-SSGs, or equivalently for one-counter Markov Decision Processes (OC-MDPs). Moreover, we show that quantitative limit problems for OC-SSGs are in NP intersection coNP, and are in P-time for 1-player OC-MDPs. Both qualitative limit problems and qualitative termination problems for OC-SSGs are already at least as hard as Condon's quantitative decision problem for finite-state SSGs.Comment: 20 pages, 1 figure. This is a full version of a paper accepted for publication in proceedings of FSTTCS 201

A market-consistent framework for the fair evaluation of insurance contracts under Solvency II

The entry into force of the Solvency II regulatory regime is pushing insurance companies in engaging into market consistence evaluation of their balance sheet, mainly with reference to financial options and guarantees embedded in life with-profit funds. The robustness of these valuations is crucial for insurance companies in order to produce sound estimates and good risk management strategies, in particular, for liability-driven products such as with-profit saving and pension funds. This paper introduces a Monte Carlo simulation approach for evaluation of insurance assets and liabilities, which is more suitable for risk management of liability-driven products than common approaches generally adopted by insurance companies, in particular, with respect to the assessment of valuation risk

Managing uncertainty:financial, actuarial and statistical modelling.

present value; Value; Actuarial;

Public Debt, Fiscal Solvency, and Macroeconomic Uncertainty in Latin America: The Cases of Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, and Mexico

The ratios of public debt as a share of GDP of Brazil, Colombia, and Mexico were 12 percentage points higher on average during the period 1996-2005 than in the period 1990-1995. Costa Rica's debt ratio remained stable but at a high level near 50 percent. Is there reason to be concerned for the solvency of the public sector in these economies? We provide an answer to this question based on the quantitative predictions of a variant of the framework proposed by Mendoza and Oviedo (2006). This methodology yields forward-looking estimates of debt ratios that are consistent with fiscal solvency for a government that faces revenue uncertainty and can issue only non-state-contingent debt. In this environment, aversion to a collapse in outlays leads the government to respect a ``natural debt limit" equal to the annuity value of the primary balance in a ``fiscal crisis." A fiscal crisis occurs after a long sequence of adverse revenue shocks and public outlays adjust to their tolerable minimum. The debt limit also represents a credible commitment to remain able to repay even in a fiscal crisis. The debt limit is not, in general, the same as the sustainable debt, which is driven by the probabilistic dynamics of the primary balance. The results of a baseline scenario question the sustainability of current debt ratios in Brazil and Colombia, while those in Costa Rica and Mexico are inside the limits consistent with fiscal solvency. In contrast, current debt ratios are found to be unsustainable in all four countries for plausible changes to lower average growth rates or higher real interest rates. Moreover, sustainable debt ratios fall sharply when default risk is taken into account.

When is Market Incompleteness Irrelevant for the Price of Aggregate Risk (and when is it not)?

In a standard incomplete markets model with a continuum of households that have constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) preferences, the absence of insurance markets for idiosyncratic labor income risk has no effect on the premium for aggregate risk if the distribution of idiosyncratic risk is independent of aggregate shocks and aggregate consumption growth is independent over time. In the equilibrium, which features trade and binding solvency constraints, as opposed to Constantinides and Duffie (1996), households only use the stock market to smooth consumption; the bond market is inoperative. Furthermore we show that the cross-sectional wealth and consumption distributions are not affected by aggregate shocks. These results hold regardless of the persistence of idiosyncratic shocks, and arise even when households face tight solvency constraints, but only a weaker irrelevance result survives when we allow for predictability in aggregate consumption growth.