National Security Space Launch

The United States Space Force’s National Security Space Launch (NSSL) program, formerly known as the Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle (EELV) program, was first established in 1994 by President William J. Clinton’s National Space Transportation Policy. The policy assigned the responsibility for expendable launch vehicles to the Department of Defense (DoD), with the goals of lowering launch costs and ensuring national security access to space. As such, the United States Air Force Space and Missile Systems Center (SMC) started the EELV program to acquire more affordable and reliable launch capability for valuable U.S. military satellites, such as national reconnaissance satellites that cost billions per satellite. In March 2019, the program name was changed from EELV to NSSL, which reflected several important features: 1.) The emphasis on “assured access to space,” 2.) transition from the Russian-made RD-180 rocket engine used on the Atlas V to a US-sourced engine (now scheduled to be complete by 2022), 3.) adaptation to manifest changes (such as enabling satellite swaps and return of manifest to normal operations both within 12 months of a need or an anomaly), and 4.) potential use of reusable launch vehicles. As of August 2019, Blue Origin, Northrop Grumman Innovation Systems, SpaceX, and United Launch Alliance (ULA) have all submitted proposals. From these, the U.S. Air Force will be selecting two companies to fulfill approximately 34 launches over a period of five years, beginning in 2022. This paper will therefore first examine the objectives for the NSSL as presented in the 2017 National Security Strategy, Fiscal Year 2019, Fiscal Year 2020, and Fiscal Year 2021 National Defense Authorization Acts (NDAA), and National Presidential Directive No. 40. The paper will then identify areas of potential weakness and gaps that exist in space launch programs as a whole and explore the security implications that impact the NSSL specifically. Finally, the paper will examine how the trajectory of the NSSL program could be adjusted in order to facilitate a smooth transition into new launch vehicles, while maintaining mission success, minimizing national security vulnerabilities, and clarifying the defense acquisition process.No embargoAcademic Major: EnglishAcademic Major: International Studie

Russian and Chinese Responses to U.S. Military Plans in Space

Explores what countermeasures China and Russia are likely to take if the United States continues to pursue the weaponization of space, and what the broader implications for international security will be

Pakistan’s Nuclear Weapons Program and Implications for US National Security.

This article analyzes Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program and the characteristics of the environment in which the program is nested. These characteristics include Pakistan’s history of internal and external instability; nuclear saber rattling during crises; support for Islamic terrorism in order to advance state goals; indigenous production of many elements of its nuclear forces; possession of delivery and command and control systems with destabilizing characteristics; and finally, nuclear doctrine that appears to advocate first use of nuclear weapons. The article argues that the characteristics of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program generate threats to US national security interests. The article examines six interrelated and synergistic challenges for US national security: first, Pakistan is engaged in an arms race in Southwest Asia that has negative implications for Pakistan’s stability; second, the threat of nuclear proliferation from Pakistan continues; third, Pakistan’s arsenal characteristics make accidental and/or unauthorized nuclear war more likely; fourth, there is an ongoing possibility of war with India; fifth, Islamist influence is spreading through key sectors of Pakistani society; and finally, there is an increasing danger of state failure in Pakistan

Export Control Regulations in the United Arab Emirates - Comparative Analysis with the United Kingdom

Governments across the world appreciate the need for checks on the transfer or exportation of commodities, information, software, and technology considered of strategic value. In order to control exports, countries rely on laws, treaties, international arrangements and other related instruments. In the current case, the UAE is largely dependent on Federal Law No. 12 of 2008 while the UK depends on the Export Control Act of 2002. It is established that the legislations enact amendments to reflect the dynamic nature of the state environment. However, the entry into international arrangements supports the view that the fight against trading in dual-use, military, or sensitive products require cooperative efforts from state parties in order to attain success. The current paper assesses export controls in the United Arab Emirates and the United Kingdom

The ISCIP Analyst, Volume V, Issue 10

This repository item contains a single issue of The ISCIP Analyst, an analytical review journal published from 1996 to 2010 by the Boston University Institute for the Study of Conflict, Ideology, and Policy

"Out of the loop": autonomous weapon systems and the law of armed conflict

The introduction of autonomous weapon systems into the “battlespace” will profoundly influence the nature of future warfare. This reality has begun to draw the attention of the international legal community, with increasing calls for an outright ban on the use of autonomous weapons systems in armed conflict. This Article is intended to help infuse granularity and precision into the legal debates surrounding such weapon systems and their future uses. It suggests that whereas some conceivable autonomous weapon systems might be prohibited as a matter of law, the use of others will be unlawful only when employed in a manner that runs contrary to the law of armed conflict’s prescriptive norms governing the “conduct of hostilities.” This Article concludes that an outright ban of autonomous weapon systems is insupportable as a matter of law, policy, and operational good sense. Indeed, proponents of a ban underestimate the extent to which the law of armed conflict, including its customary law aspect, will control autonomous weapon system operations. Some autonomous weapon systems that might be developed would already be unlawful per se under existing customary law, irrespective of any treaty ban. The use of certain others would be severely limited by that law. Furthermore, an outright ban is premature since no such weapons have even left the drawing board. Critics typically either fail to take account of likely developments in autonomous weapon systems technology or base their analysis on unfounded assumptions about the nature of the systems. From a national security perspective, passing on the opportunity to develop these systems before they are fully understood would be irresponsible. Perhaps even more troubling is the prospect that banning autonomous weapon systems altogether based on speculation as to their future form could forfeit their potential use in a manner that would minimize harm to civilians and civilian objects when compared to non-autonomous weapon systems

Considering a war with Iran

The paper is a strategic studies analyis of the war-fronts, weapon systems and political-military tactics of a U.S.-Iranian war, including the U.S. use of nuclear weapons

The ISCIP Analyst, Volume IV, Issue 4

This repository item contains a single issue of The ISCIP Analyst, an analytical review journal published from 1996 to 2010 by the Boston University Institute for the Study of Conflict, Ideology, and Policy

Autonomous weapon systems and international humanitarian law: a reply to the critics

In November 2012, Human Rights Watch, in collaboration with the International Human Rights Clinic at Harvard Law School, released Losing Humanity: The Case against Killer Robots.[2] Human Rights Watch is among the most sophisticated of human rights organizations working in the field of international humanitarian law. Its reports are deservedly influential and have often helped shape application of the law during armed conflict. Although this author and the organization have occasionally crossed swords,[3] we generally find common ground on key issues. This time, we have not. “Robots” is a colloquial rendering for autonomous weapon systems. Human Rights Watch’s position on them is forceful and unambiguous: “[F]ully autonomous weapons would not only be unable to meet legal standards but would also undermine essential non-safeguards for civilians.”[4] Therefore, they “should be banned and . . . governments should urgently pursue that end.”[5] In fact, if the systems cannot meet the legal standards cited by Human Rights Watch, then they are already unlawful as such under customary international law irrespective of any policy or treaty law ban on them.[6] Unfortunately, Losing Humanity obfuscates the on-going legal debate over autonomous weapon systems. A principal flaw in the analysis is a blurring of the distinction between international humanitarian law’s prohibitions on weapons per se and those on the unlawful use of otherwise lawful weapons.[7] Only the former render a weapon illegal as such. To illustrate, a rifle is lawful, but may be used unlawfully, as in shooting a civilian. By contrast, under customary international law, biological weapons are unlawful per se; this is so even if they are used against lawful targets, such as the enemy’s armed forces. The practice of inappropriately conflating these two different strands of international humanitarian law has plagued debates over other weapon systems, most notably unmanned combat aerial systems such as the armed Predator. In addition, some of the report’s legal analysis fails to take account of likely developments in autonomous weapon systems technology or is based on unfounded assumptions as to the nature of the systems. Simply put, much of Losing Humanity is either counter-factual or counter-normative. This Article is designed to infuse granularity and precision into the legal debates surrounding such weapon systems and their use in the future “battlespace.” It suggests that whereas some conceivable autonomous weapon systems might be prohibited as a matter of law, the use of others will be unlawful only when employed in a manner that runs contrary to international humanitarian law’s prescriptive norms. This Article concludes that Losing Humanity’s recommendation to ban the systems is insupportable as a matter of law, policy, and operational good sense. Human Rights Watch’s analysis sells international humanitarian law short by failing to appreciate how the law tackles the very issues about which the organization expresses concern. Perhaps the most glaring weakness in the recommendation is the extent to which it is premature. No such weapons have even left the drawing board. To ban autonomous weapon systems altogether based on speculation as to their future form is to forfeit any potential uses of them that might minimize harm to civilians and civilian objects when compared to other systems in military arsenals