53,356 research outputs found
Voluntary Provision of Public Knowledge Goods: Group-Based Social Preferences and Coalition Formation
In this paper we develop a private-collective model of voluntary public knowledge production, where group-based social preferences have an impact on coalition formation. Our theoretical model builds on the large empirical literature on voluntary production of pooled public knowledge goods, including source code in communities of software developers or data provided to open access data repositories. Our analysis shows under which conditions social preferences such as 'group belonging' or 'peer approval' influence stable coalition size, as such rationalising several stylized facts emerging from large scale surveys of Free/Libre/Open-Source software developers (David and Shapiro, 2008), previously unaccounted for. Furthermore, heterogeneity of social preferences is added to the model to study the formation of stable, but mixed coalitions
Networked innovation and coalition formation: the effect of group-based social preferences
In this paper, we study the production and dissemination of public knowledge goods, such as technological knowledge, generated by a network of voluntarily cooperating innovators. We develop a private-collective model of public knowledge production in networked innovation systems, where group-based social preferences have an impact on the coalition formation of developers. Our model builds on the large empirical literature on voluntary production of pooled public knowledge goods, including source code in communities of software developers or data provided to open access data repositories. Our analysis shows under which conditions social preferences, such as ‘group belonging’ or ‘peer approval’, influence the stable coalition size, as such rationalising several stylized facts emerging from large-scale surveys of open-source software developers, previously unaccounted for. Furthermore, heterogeneity of social preferences is added to the model to study the formation of stable but mixed coalitions
Discourse network analysis: policy debates as dynamic networks
Political discourse is the verbal interaction between political actors. Political actors make normative claims about policies conditional on each other. This renders discourse a dynamic network phenomenon. Accordingly, the structure and dynamics of policy debates can be analyzed with a combination of content analysis and dynamic network analysis. After annotating statements of actors in text sources, networks can be created from these structured data, such as congruence or conflict networks at the actor or concept level, affiliation networks of actors and concept stances, and longitudinal versions of these networks. The resulting network data reveal important properties of a debate, such as the structure of advocacy coalitions or discourse coalitions, polarization and consensus formation, and underlying endogenous processes like popularity, reciprocity, or social balance. The added value of discourse network analysis over survey-based policy network research is that policy processes can be analyzed from a longitudinal perspective. Inferential techniques for understanding the micro-level processes governing political discourse are being developed
Human-agent collectives
We live in a world where a host of computer systems, distributed throughout our physical and information environments, are increasingly implicated in our everyday actions. Computer technologies impact all aspects of our lives and our relationship with the digital has fundamentally altered as computers have moved out of the workplace and away from the desktop. Networked computers, tablets, phones and personal devices are now commonplace, as are an increasingly diverse set of digital devices built into the world around us. Data and information is generated at unprecedented speeds and volumes from an increasingly diverse range of sources. It is then combined in unforeseen ways, limited only by human imagination. People’s activities and collaborations are becoming ever more dependent upon and intertwined with this ubiquitous information substrate. As these trends continue apace, it is becoming apparent that many endeavours involve the symbiotic interleaving of humans and computers. Moreover, the emergence of these close-knit partnerships is inducing profound change. Rather than issuing instructions to passive machines that wait until they are asked before doing anything, we will work in tandem with highly inter-connected computational components that act autonomously and intelligently (aka agents). As a consequence, greater attention needs to be given to the balance of control between people and machines. In many situations, humans will be in charge and agents will predominantly act in a supporting role. In other cases, however, the agents will be in control and humans will play the supporting role. We term this emerging class of systems human-agent collectives (HACs) to reflect the close partnership and the flexible social interactions between the humans and the computers. As well as exhibiting increased autonomy, such systems will be inherently open and social. This means the participants will need to continually and flexibly establish and manage a range of social relationships. Thus, depending on the task at hand, different constellations of people, resources, and information will need to come together, operate in a coordinated fashion, and then disband. The openness and presence of many distinct stakeholders means participation will be motivated by a broad range of incentives rather than diktat. This article outlines the key research challenges involved in developing a comprehensive understanding of HACs. To illuminate this agenda, a nascent application in the domain of disaster response is presented
Exploiting simple corporate memory in iterative coalition games
Amongst the challenging problems that must be addressed in order to create increasingly automated electronic commerce systems are those which involve forming coalitions of agents to exploit a particular market opportunity. Furthermore economic systems are normally continuous dynamic systems generating many instances of the same or similar problems (the regular calls for tender, regular emergence of new markets etc.).The work described in this paper explores how simple forms of memory can be exploited by agents over time to guide decision making in iterative sequences of coalition formation problems enabling them to build up social knowledge in order to improve their own utility and the ability of the population to produce increasingly well suited coalitions for a simple call-for-tender economy.Postprint (published version
Reconceptualizing major policy change in the advocacy coalition framework: a discourse network analysis of German pension politics
How does major policy change come about? This article identifies and rectifies weaknesses in the conceptualization of innovative policy change in the Advocacy Coalition Framework. In a case study of policy belief change preceding an innovative reform in the German subsystem of old-age security, important new aspects of major policy change are carved out. In particular, the analysis traces a transition from one single hegemonic advocacy coalition to another stable coalition, with a transition phase between the two equilibria. The transition phase is characterized (i) by a bipolarization of policy beliefs in the subsystem and (ii) by state actors with shifting coalition memberships due to policy learning across coalitions or due to executive turnover. Apparently, there are subsystems with specific characteristics (presumably redistributive rather than regulative subsystems) in which one hegemonic coalition is the default, or the "normal state." In these subsystems, polarization and shifting coalition memberships seem to interact to produce coalition turnover and major policy change. The case study is based on discourse network analysis, a combination of qualitative content analysis and social network analysis, which provides an intertemporal measurement of advocacy coalition realignment at the level of policy beliefs in a subsystem
Complexity of Determining Nonemptiness of the Core
Coalition formation is a key problem in automated negotiation among
self-interested agents, and other multiagent applications. A coalition of
agents can sometimes accomplish things that the individual agents cannot, or
can do things more efficiently. However, motivating the agents to abide to a
solution requires careful analysis: only some of the solutions are stable in
the sense that no group of agents is motivated to break off and form a new
coalition. This constraint has been studied extensively in cooperative game
theory. However, the computational questions around this constraint have
received less attention. When it comes to coalition formation among software
agents (that represent real-world parties), these questions become increasingly
explicit.
In this paper we define a concise general representation for games in
characteristic form that relies on superadditivity, and show that it allows for
efficient checking of whether a given outcome is in the core. We then show that
determining whether the core is nonempty is -complete both with
and without transferable utility. We demonstrate that what makes the problem
hard in both cases is determining the collaborative possibilities (the set of
outcomes possible for the grand coalition), by showing that if these are given,
the problem becomes tractable in both cases. However, we then demonstrate that
for a hybrid version of the problem, where utility transfer is possible only
within the grand coalition, the problem remains -complete even
when the collaborative possibilities are given
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