Mechanism Design when players' Preferences and information coincide

It is well known that when players have private information, vis a vis the designer, and their preferences coincide it is hard to implement the socially desirable outcome. We show that with arbitrarily small fines and arbitrarily noisy inspections, the social choice correspondence can be fully implemented (truth telling is the unique Nash equilibrium)

Strategy proofness and unanimity in many-to-one matching markets

In this paper, we consider a standard model of many-to-one matching markets. First, we study the relation between strategy-proofness and unanimity under a certain requirement and we prove these two properties become equivalent. Second, we illustrate that this result has an immediate impact on the relation between strategy-proofness and Maskin monotonicity. Finally, we determine a close connexion between strategy-proofness and implementation literature. We provide under certain minimal requirements the foundation for reasoning the equivalence among dominant strategy implementation, standard Nash implementation, and partially honest Nash implementation

Strategy proofness and unanimity in many-to-one matching markets

In this paper, we consider a standard model of many-to-one matching markets. First, we study the relation between strategy-proofness and unanimity under a certain requirement and we prove these two properties become equivalent. Second, we illustrate that this result has an immediate impact on the relation between strategy-proofness and Maskin monotonicity. Finally, we determine a close connexion between strategy-proofness and implementation literature. We provide under certain minimal requirements the foundation for reasoning the equivalence among dominant strategy implementation, standard Nash implementation, and partially honest Nash implementation

Complicity without connection or communication

We use a novel laboratory experiment involving a die rolling task embedded within a coordination game to investigate whether complicity can emerge when decision-making is simultaneous, the potential accomplices are strangers and neither communication nor signaling is possible. Then, by comparing the behavior observed in this original game to that in a variant in which die-roll reporting players are paired with passive players instead of other die-roll reporters, while everything else is held constant, we isolate the effect of having a potential accomplice on the likelihood of an individual acting immorally. We find that complicity can emerge between strangers in the absence of opportunities to communicate or signal and that having a potential accomplice increases the likelihood of an individual acting immorally

Strategy proofness and unanimity in many-to-one matching markets

In this paper, we consider a standard model of many-to-one matching markets. First, we study the relation between strategy-proofness and unanimity under a certain requirement and we prove these two properties become equivalent. Second, we illustrate that this result has an immediate impact on the relation between strategy-proofness and Maskin monotonicity. Finally, we determine a close connexion between strategy-proofness and implementation literature. We provide under certain minimal requirements the foundation for reasoning the equivalence among dominant strategy implementation, standard Nash implementation, and partially honest Nash implementation

Mechanism Design when players' Preferences and information coincide

It is well known that when players have private information, vis a vis the designer, and their preferences coincide it is hard to implement the socially desirable outcome. We show that with arbitrarily small fines and arbitrarily noisy inspections, the social choice correspondence can be fully implemented (truth telling is the unique Nash equilibrium)

Incentive-Compatible Inference from Subjective Opinions Without Common Belief Systems

Abstract. Peer-prediction mechanisms elicit information about unverifiable or subjective states of the world. Existing mechanisms in the class are designed so participants maximize their expected payments when reporting honestly. However, these mechanisms do not account for participants desiring influence over how reports are used. When participants want the conclusions drawn from reports to reflect their own opinion, the inference procedure must be subjected to incentive-compatibility constraints to ensure honesty. In this paper, I develop mechanisms without payments for discerning the true answer to a binary question, even in the presence of a false consensus. I first characterize all continuous, neutral, and anonymous mechanisms in this setting that can be implemented in interimrationalizable strategies. Using this representation, I optimize across the class of mechanisms for accuracy in distinguishing the true state. Because the mechanism does not require knowledge of the distribution of agent types and is neutral between both outcomes, it can serve as a test for bias in the surveyed population

Promises and Endogenous Reneging Costs

We present a novel theoretical mechanism that explains the capacity for non-enforceable communication about future actions to improve efficiency. We explore a two-player partnership game where, before choosing a level of effort to exert on a joint project, each player makes a cheap talk promise to their partner about their own future effort. We allow agents to incur a psychological cost of reneging on their promises. We demonstrate a strong tendency for evolutionary processes to select agents who incur intermediate costs of reneging, and show that these intermediate costs induce second-best optimal outcomes

¿Tiene la interacción social un efecto positivo en la honestidad?

The following work measures the effect of the interaction with the experimenter on the honesty of the individual when reporting private information, report on which their payment depends. The methodology used in a series of studies where honesty is measured bases on the veracity of the reports of the results of flipping a coin is adapted...El siguiente trabajo mide el efecto de la interacción con el experimentador en la honestidad del individuo al reportar información privada, reporte del cual depende su pago. Se adapta la metodología utilizada en una serie de estudios donde se mide la honestidad en base de la veracidad de los reportes de los resultados del lanzamiento de una moneda..