Silent reading of direct versus indirect speech activates voice-selective areas in the auditory cortex

In human communication, direct speech (e.g., Mary said: “I'm hungry”) is perceived to be more vivid than indirect speech (e.g., Mary said [that] she was hungry). However, for silent reading, the representational consequences of this distinction are still unclear. Although many of us share the intuition of an “inner voice,” particularly during silent reading of direct speech statements in text, there has been little direct empirical confirmation of this experience so far. Combining fMRI with eye tracking in human volunteers, we show that silent reading of direct versus indirect speech engenders differential brain activation in voice-selective areas of the auditory cortex. This suggests that readers are indeed more likely to engage in perceptual simulations (or spontaneous imagery) of the reported speaker's voice when reading direct speech as opposed to meaning-equivalent indirect speech statements as part of a more vivid representation of the former. Our results may be interpreted in line with embodied cognition and form a starting point for more sophisticated interdisciplinary research on the nature of auditory mental simulation during reading

Mental simulations in comprehension of direct versus indirect speech quotations

In human communication, direct speech (e.g., Mary said: ‘I’m hungry’) coincides with vivid paralinguistic demonstrations of the reported speech acts whereas indirect speech (e.g., Mary said [that] she was hungry) provides mere descriptions of what was said. Hence, direct speech is usually more vivid and perceptually engaging than indirect speech. This thesis explores how this vividness distinction between the two reporting styles underlies language comprehension. Using functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), we found that in both silent reading and listening, direct speech elicited higher brain activity in the voice-selective areas of the auditory cortex than indirect speech, consistent with the intuition of an ‘inner voice’ experience during comprehension of direct speech. In the follow-up behavioural investigations, we demonstrated that this ‘inner voice’ experience could be characterised in terms of modulations of speaking rate, reflected in both behavioural articulation (oral reading) and eye-movement patterns (silent reading). Moreover, we observed context-concordant modulations of pitch and loudness in oral reading but not straightforwardly in silent reading. Finally, we obtained preliminary results which show that in addition to reported speakers’ voices, their facial expressions may also be encoded in silent reading of direct speech but not indirect speech. The results show that individuals are more likely to mentally simulate or imagine reported speakers’ voices and perhaps also their facial expressions during comprehension of direct as opposed to indirect speech, indicating a more vivid representation of the former. The findings are in line with the demonstration hypothesis of direct speech (Clark & Gerrig, 1990) and the embodied theories of language comprehension (e.g., Barsalou, 1999; Zwaan, 2004), suggesting that sensory experiences with pragmatically distinct reporting styles underlie language comprehension

Inner voice experiences during processing of direct and indirect speech

In this chapter, we review a new body of research on language processing, focusing particularly on the distinction between direct speech (e.g., Mary said, “This dress is absolutely beautiful!”) and indirect speech (e.g., Mary said that the dress was absolutely beautiful). First, we will discuss an important pragmatic distinction between the two reporting styles and highlight the consequences of this distinction for prosodic processing. While direct speech provides vivid demonstrations of the reported speech act (informing recipients about how something was said by another speaker), indirect speech is more descriptive of what was said by the reported speaker. This is clearly reflected in differential prosodic contours for the two reporting styles during speaking: Direct speech is typically delivered with a more variable and expressive prosody, whereas indirect speech tends to be used in combination with a more neutral and less expressive prosody. Next, we will introduce recent evidence in support of an “inner voice” during language comprehension, especially during silent reading of direct speech quotations. We present and discuss a coherent stream of research using a wide range of methods, including speech analysis, functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), and eye-tracking. The findings are discussed in relation to overt (or ‘explicit’) prosodic characteristics that are likely to be observed when direct and indirect speech are used in spoken utterances (such as during oral reading). Indeed, the research we review here makes a convincing case for the hypothesis that recipients spontaneously activate voice-related mental representations during silent reading, and that such an “inner voice” is particularly pronounced when reading direct speech quotations (and much less so for indirect speech). The corresponding brain activation patterns, as well as correlations between silent and oral reading data, furthermore suggest that this “inner voice” during silent reading is related to the supra-segmental and temporal characteristics of actual speech. For ease of comparison, we shall dub this phenomenon of an “inner voice” (particularly during silent reading of direct speech) simulated implicit prosody to distinguish it from default implicit prosody that is commonly discussed in relation to syntactic ambiguity resolution. In the final part of this chapter, we will attempt to specify the relation between simulated and default implicit prosody. Based on the existing empirical data and our own theoretical conclusions, we will discuss the similarities and discrepancies between the two not necessarily mutually exclusive terms. We hope that our discussion will motivate a new surge of interdisciplinary research that will not only extend our knowledge of prosodic processes during reading, but could potentially unify the two phenomena in a single theoretical framework

The Influence of Direct and Indirect Speech on Mental Representations

Language can be viewed as a set of cues that modulate the comprehender's thought processes. It is a very subtle instrument. For example, the literature suggests that people perceive direct speech (e.g., Joanne said: 'I went out for dinner last night') as more vivid and perceptually engaging than indirect speech (e.g., Joanne said that she went out for dinner last night). But how is this alleged vividness evident in comprehenders' mental representations? We sought to address this question in a series of experiments. Our results do not support the idea that, compared to indirect speech, direct speech enhances the accessibility of information from the communicative or the referential situation during comprehension. Neither do our results support the idea that the hypothesized more vivid experience of direct speech is caused by a switch from the visual to the auditory modality. However, our results do show that direct speech leads to a stronger mental representation of the exact wording of a sentence than does indirect speech. These results show that language has a more subtle influence on memory representations than was previously suggested

Literary Narrative and Mental Imagery: A View from Embodied Cognition

The objective of this article is twofold. In the first part, I discuss two issues central to any theoretical inquiry into mental imagery: embodiment and consciousness. I do so against the backdrop of second-generation cognitive science, more specifically the increasingly popular research framework of embodied cognition, and I consider two caveats attached to its current exploitation in narrative theory. In the second part, I attempt to cast new light on readerly mental imagery by offering a typology of what I propose to be its four basic varieties. The typology is grounded in the framework of embodied cognition and it is largely compatible with key neuroscientific and other experimental evidence produced within the framework. For each imagery variety, I make some elementary suggestions as to how it may typically be cued by distinct narrative strategies

Reading direct speech quotes increases theta phase-locking:Evidence for cortical tracking of inner speech?

Growing evidence shows that theta-band (4–7 Hz) activity in the auditory cortex phase-locks to rhythms of overt speech. Does theta activity also encode the rhythmic dynamics of inner speech? Previous research established that silent reading of direct speech quotes (e.g., Mary said: “This dress is lovely!”) elicits more vivid inner speech than indirect speech quotes (e.g., Mary said that the dress was lovely). As we cannot directly track the phase alignment between theta activity and inner speech over time, we used EEG to measure the brain's phase-locked responses to the onset of speech quote reading. We found that direct (vs. indirect) quote reading was associated with increased theta phase synchrony over trials at 250–500 ms post-reading onset, with sources of the evoked activity estimated in the speech processing network. An eye-tracking control experiment confirmed that increased theta phase synchrony in direct quote reading was not driven by eye movement patterns, and more likely reflects synchronous phase resetting at the onset of inner speech. These findings suggest a functional role of theta phase modulation in reading-induced inner speech

From Introspection to Essence: The Auditory Nature of Inner Speech

To some it is a shallow platitude that inner speech always has an auditory-phonological component. To others, it is an empirical hypothesis with accumulating support. To yet others it is a false dogma. In this chapter, I defend the claim that inner speech always has an auditory-phonological component, confining the claim to adults with ordinary speech and hearing. It is one thing, I emphasize, to assert that inner speech often, or even typically, has an auditory-phonological component—quite another to propose that it always does. When forced to argue for the stronger point, we stand to make a number of interesting discoveries about inner speech itself, and about our means for discriminating it from other psycholinguistic phenomena. Establishing the stronger conclusion also provides new leverage on debates concerning how we should conceive of, diagnose, and explain auditory verbal hallucinations and “inserted thoughts” in schizophrenia