Self-Organizing Flows in Social Networks

Social networks offer users new means of accessing information, essentially relying on "social filtering", i.e. propagation and filtering of information by social contacts. The sheer amount of data flowing in these networks, combined with the limited budget of attention of each user, makes it difficult to ensure that social filtering brings relevant content to the interested users. Our motivation in this paper is to measure to what extent self-organization of the social network results in efficient social filtering. To this end we introduce flow games, a simple abstraction that models network formation under selfish user dynamics, featuring user-specific interests and budget of attention. In the context of homogeneous user interests, we show that selfish dynamics converge to a stable network structure (namely a pure Nash equilibrium) with close-to-optimal information dissemination. We show in contrast, for the more realistic case of heterogeneous interests, that convergence, if it occurs, may lead to information dissemination that can be arbitrarily inefficient, as captured by an unbounded "price of anarchy". Nevertheless the situation differs when users' interests exhibit a particular structure, captured by a metric space with low doubling dimension. In that case, natural autonomous dynamics converge to a stable configuration. Moreover, users obtain all the information of interest to them in the corresponding dissemination, provided their budget of attention is logarithmic in the size of their interest set

The Social Medium Selection Game

We consider in this paper competition of content creators in routing their content through various media. The routing decisions may correspond to the selection of a social network (e.g. twitter versus facebook or linkedin) or of a group within a given social network. The utility for a player to send its content to some medium is given as the difference between the dissemination utility at this medium and some transmission cost. We model this game as a congestion game and compute the pure potential of the game. In contrast to the continuous case, we show that there may be various equilibria. We show that the potential is M-concave which allows us to characterize the equilibria and to propose an algorithm for computing it. We then give a learning mechanism which allow us to give an efficient algorithm to determine an equilibrium. We finally determine the asymptotic form of the equilibrium and discuss the implications on the social medium selection problem

Social Clicks: What and Who Gets Read on Twitter?

International audienceOnline news domains increasingly rely on social media to drive traffic to their websites. Yet we know surprisingly little about how a social media conversation mentioning an online article actually generates clicks. Sharing behaviors, in contrast, have been fully or partially available and scrutinized over the years. While this has led to multiple assumptions on the diffusion of information, each assumption was designed or validated while ignoring actual clicks. We present a large scale, unbiased study of social clicks - that is also the first data of its kind - gathering a month of web visits to online resources that are located in 5 leading news domains and that are mentioned in the third largest social media by web referral (Twitter). Our dataset amounts to 2.8 million shares, together responsible for 75 billion potential views on this social media, and 9.6 million actual clicks to 59,088 unique resources. We design a reproducible methodology and carefully correct its biases. As we prove, properties of clicks impact multiple aspects of information diffusion, all previously unknown. (i) Secondary resources, that are not promoted through headlines and are responsible for the long tail of content popularity, generate more clicks both in absolute and relative terms. (ii) Social media attention is actually long-lived, in contrast with temporal evolution estimated from shares or receptions. (iii) The actual influence of an intermediary or a resource is poorly predicted by their share count, but we show how that prediction can be made more precise

Self-Organizing Flows in Social Networks ∗

Social networks offer users new means of accessing information, essentially relying on “social filtering”, i.e. propagation and filtering of information by social contacts. The sheer amount of data flowing in these networks, combined with the limited budget of attention of each user, makes it difficult to ensure that social filtering brings relevant content to interested users. Our motivation in this paper is to measure to what extent self-organization of a social network results in efficient social filtering. To this end we introduce flow games, a simple abstraction that models network formation under selfish user dynamics, featuring user-specific interests and budget of attention. In the context of homogeneous user interests, we show that selfish dynamics converge to a stable network structure (namely a pure Nash equilibrium) with close-to-optimal information dissemination. We show that, in contrast, for the more realistic case of heterogeneous interests, selfish dynamics may lead to information dissemination that can be arbitrarily inefficient, as captured by an unbounded “price of anarchy”. Nevertheless the situation differs when user interests exhibit a particular structure, captured by a metric space with low doubling dimension. In that Supported by PROSE ANR project