Trade & Cap: A Customer-Managed, Market-Based System for Trading Bandwidth Allowances at a Shared Link

We propose Trade & Cap (T&C), an economics-inspired mechanism that incentivizes users to voluntarily coordinate their consumption of the bandwidth of a shared resource (e.g., a DSLAM link) so as to converge on what they perceive to be an equitable allocation, while ensuring efficient resource utilization. Under T&C, rather than acting as an arbiter, an Internet Service Provider (ISP) acts as an enforcer of what the community of rational users sharing the resource decides is a fair allocation of that resource. Our T&C mechanism proceeds in two phases. In the first, software agents acting on behalf of users engage in a strategic trading game in which each user agent selfishly chooses bandwidth slots to reserve in support of primary, interactive network usage activities. In the second phase, each user is allowed to acquire additional bandwidth slots in support of presumed open-ended need for fluid bandwidth, catering to secondary applications. The acquisition of this fluid bandwidth is subject to the remaining "buying power" of each user and by prevalent "market prices" – both of which are determined by the results of the trading phase and a desirable aggregate cap on link utilization. We present analytical results that establish the underpinnings of our T&C mechanism, including game-theoretic results pertaining to the trading phase, and pricing of fluid bandwidth allocation pertaining to the capping phase. Using real network traces, we present extensive experimental results that demonstrate the benefits of our scheme, which we also show to be practical by highlighting the salient features of an efficient implementation architecture.National Science Foundation (CCF-0820138, CSR-0720604, EFRI-0735974, CNS-0524477, and CNS-0520166); Universidad Pontificia Bolivariana and COLCIENCIAS–Instituto Colombiano para el Desarrollo de la Ciencia y la Tecnología “Francisco Jose ́ de Caldas”

Implications of Selfish Neighbor Selection in Overlay Networks

In a typical overlay network for routing or content sharing, each node must select a fixed number of immediate overlay neighbors for routing traffic or content queries. A selfish node entering such a network would select neighbors so as to minimize the weighted sum of expected access costs to all its destinations. Previous work on selfish neighbor selection has built intuition with simple models where edges are undirected, access costs are modeled by hop-counts, and nodes have potentially unbounded degrees. However, in practice, important constraints not captured by these models lead to richer games with substantively and fundamentally different outcomes. Our work models neighbor selection as a game involving directed links, constraints on the number of allowed neighbors, and costs reflecting both network latency and node preference. We express a node's "best response" wiring strategy as a k-median problem on asymmetric distance, and use this formulation to obtain pure Nash equilibria. We experimentally examine the properties of such stable wirings on synthetic topologies, as well as on real topologies and maps constructed from PlanetLab and AS-level Internet measurements. Our results indicate that selfish nodes can reap substantial performance benefits when connecting to overlay networks composed of non-selfish nodes. On the other hand, in overlays that are dominated by selfish nodes, the resulting stable wirings are optimized to such great extent that even non-selfish newcomers can extract near-optimal performance through naive wiring strategies.Marie Curie Outgoing International Fellowship of the EU (MOIF-CT-2005-007230); National Science Foundation (CNS Cybertrust 0524477, CNS NeTS 0520166, CNS ITR 0205294, EIA RI 020206

Μελέτη και εγκατάσταση συστήματος απογύμνωσης ιόντων στον 5.5 MV επιταχυντή Tandem Van de Graaff του Ε.Κ.Ε.Φ.Ε. "Δημόκριτος".

Εθνικό Μετσόβιο Πολυτεχνείο--Μεταπτυχιακή Εργασία. Διεπιστημονικό-Διατμηματικό Πρόγραμμα Μεταπτυχιακών Σπουδών (Δ.Π.Μ.Σ.) “Φυσική και Τεχνολογικές Εφαρμογές

Distributed Selfish Coaching

Although cooperation generally increases the amount of resources available to a community of nodes, thus improving individual and collective performance, it also allows for the appearance of potential mistreatment problems through the exposition of one node's resources to others. We study such concerns by considering a group of independent, rational, self-aware nodes that cooperate using on-line caching algorithms, where the exposed resource is the storage at each node. Motivated by content networking applications -- including web caching, CDNs, and P2P -- this paper extends our previous work on the on-line version of the problem, which was conducted under a game-theoretic framework, and limited to object replication. We identify and investigate two causes of mistreatment: (1) cache state interactions (due to the cooperative servicing of requests) and (2) the adoption of a common scheme for cache management policies. Using analytic models, numerical solutions of these models, as well as simulation experiments, we show that on-line cooperation schemes using caching are fairly robust to mistreatment caused by state interactions. To appear in a substantial manner, the interaction through the exchange of miss-streams has to be very intense, making it feasible for the mistreated nodes to detect and react to exploitation. This robustness ceases to exist when nodes fetch and store objects in response to remote requests, i.e., when they operate as Level-2 caches (or proxies) for other nodes. Regarding mistreatment due to a common scheme, we show that this can easily take place when the "outlier" characteristics of some of the nodes get overlooked. This finding underscores the importance of allowing cooperative caching nodes the flexibility of choosing from a diverse set of schemes to fit the peculiarities of individual nodes. To that end, we outline an emulation-based framework for the development of mistreatment-resilient distributed selfish caching schemes. Our framework utilizes a simple control-theoretic approach to dynamically parameterize the cache management scheme. We show performance evaluation results that quantify the benefits from instantiating such a framework, which could be substantial under skewed demand profiles.National Science Foundation (CNS Cybertrust 0524477, CNS NeTS 0520166, CNS ITR 0205294, EIA RI 0202067); EU IST (CASCADAS and E-NEXT); Marie Curie Outgoing International Fellowship of the EU (MOIF-CT-2005-007230

EGOIST: Overlay Routing Using Selfish Neighbor Selection

A foundational issue underlying many overlay network applications ranging from routing to P2P file sharing is that of connectivity management, i.e., folding new arrivals into an existing overlay, and re-wiring to cope with changing network conditions. Previous work has considered the problem from two perspectives: devising practical heuristics for specific applications designed to work well in real deployments, and providing abstractions for the underlying problem that are analytically tractable, especially via game-theoretic analysis. In this paper, we unify these two thrusts by using insights gleaned from novel, realistic theoretic models in the design of Egoist – a prototype overlay routing system that we implemented, deployed, and evaluated on PlanetLab. Using measurements on PlanetLab and trace-based simulations, we demonstrate that Egoist's neighbor selection primitives significantly outperform existing heuristics on a variety of performance metrics, including delay, available bandwidth, and node utilization. Moreover, we demonstrate that Egoist is competitive with an optimal, but unscalable full-mesh approach, remains highly effective under significant churn, is robust to cheating, and incurs minimal overhead. Finally, we discuss some of the potential benefits Egoist may offer to applications.National Science Foundation (CISE/CSR 0720604, ENG/EFRI 0735974, CISE/CNS 0524477, CNS/NeTS 0520166, CNS/ITR 0205294; CISE/EIA RI 0202067; CAREER 04446522); European Commission (RIDS-011923