Making the Distribution Subsystem Secure

This report presents how the Distribution Subsystem is made secure. A set of different security threats to a shared data programming system are identifed. The report presents the extensions nessesary to the DSS in order to cope with the identified security threats by maintaining reference security. A reference to a shared data structure cannot be forged or guessed; only by proper delegation can a thread acquire access to data originating at remote processes. Referential security is a requirement for secure distributed applications. By programmatically restricting access to distributed data to trusted nodes, a distributed application can be made secure. However, for this to be true, referential security must be supported on the level of the implementation

A Design of MAC Model Based on the Separation of Duties and Data Coloring: DSDC-MAC

Among the access control methods for database security, there is Mandatory Access Control (MAC) model in which the security level is set to both the subject and the object to enhance the security control. Legacy MAC models have focused only on one thing, either confidentiality or integrity. Thus, it can cause collisions between security policies in supporting confidentiality and integrity simultaneously. In addition, they do not provide a granular security class policy of subjects and objects in terms of subjects\u27 roles or tasks. In this paper, we present the security policy of Bell_LaPadula Model (BLP) model and Biba model as one complemented policy. In addition, Duties Separation and Data Coloring (DSDC)-MAC model applying new data coloring security method is proposed to enable granular access control from the viewpoint of Segregation of Duty (SoD). The case study demonstrated that the proposed modeling work maintains the practicality through the design of Human Resources management System. The proposed model in this study is suitable for organizations like military forces or intelligence agencies where confidential information should be carefully handled. Furthermore, this model is expected to protect systems against malicious insiders and improve the confidentiality and integrity of data

A Taxonomy of Data Grids for Distributed Data Sharing, Management and Processing

Data Grids have been adopted as the platform for scientific communities that need to share, access, transport, process and manage large data collections distributed worldwide. They combine high-end computing technologies with high-performance networking and wide-area storage management techniques. In this paper, we discuss the key concepts behind Data Grids and compare them with other data sharing and distribution paradigms such as content delivery networks, peer-to-peer networks and distributed databases. We then provide comprehensive taxonomies that cover various aspects of architecture, data transportation, data replication and resource allocation and scheduling. Finally, we map the proposed taxonomy to various Data Grid systems not only to validate the taxonomy but also to identify areas for future exploration. Through this taxonomy, we aim to categorise existing systems to better understand their goals and their methodology. This would help evaluate their applicability for solving similar problems. This taxonomy also provides a "gap analysis" of this area through which researchers can potentially identify new issues for investigation. Finally, we hope that the proposed taxonomy and mapping also helps to provide an easy way for new practitioners to understand this complex area of research.Comment: 46 pages, 16 figures, Technical Repor

Are Existing Security Models Suitable for Teleworking?

The availability of high performance broadband services from the home will allow a growing number of organisations to offer teleworking as an employee work practice. Teleworking delivers cost savings, improved productivity and provides a recruitment policy to attract and retain personnel. Information security is one of the management considerations necessary before an effective organisational teleworking policy can be implemented. The teleworking computing environment presents a different set of security threats to those present in an office environment. Teleworking requires a security model to provide security policy enforcement to counter the set of security threats present in the teleworking computing environment. This paper considers four existing security models and assesses each model’s suitability to define security policy enforcement for telework. The approach taken is to identify the information security threats that exist in a teleworking environment and to categorise the threats based upon their impact upon confidentiality of data, system and data integrity, and availability of service in the teleworking environment. It is found that risks exist to the confidentiality, integrity and availability of information in a teleworking environment and therefore a security model is required that provides appropriate policy enforcement. A set of security policy enforcement mechanisms to counter the identified information security threats is proposed. Using an abstraction of the identified threats and the security policy enforcement mechanisms, a set of attributes for a security model for teleworking is proposed. Each of the four existing security models is assessed against this set of attributes to determine its suitability to specify policy enforcement for telework. Although the four existing models were selected based upon their perceived suitability it is found that none provide the required policy enforcement for telework

Policy based roles for distributed systems security

Distributed systems are increasingly being used in commercial environments necessitating the development of trustworthy and reliable security mechanisms. There is often no clear informal or formal specification of enterprise authorisation policies and no tools to translate policy specifications to access control implementation mechanisms such as capabilities or Access Control Lists. It is thus difficult to analyse the policy to detect conflicts or flaws and it is difficult to verify that the implementation corresponds to the policy specification. We present in this paper a framework for the specification of management policies. We are concerned with two types of policies: obligations which specify what activities a manager or agent must or must not perform on a set of target objects and authorisations which specify what activities a subject (manager or agent) can or can not perform on the set of target objects. Management policies are then grouped into roles reflecting the organisation..