Electo Electro 2020, an Interactive Voting Booth Installation

Electo Electro 2020 was a project that was created specifically for the 2020 presidential election cycle. This paper is a follow-up to an article published in 2019 for the Journal of Network Music and Arts, “Voting Booths and Interactive Art Installations: The Diebold AccuVote-TS in Context.” In that paper, I discussed the original concept and goals for the project, several examples of work from other artists, and an earlier project from 2016 that served as the impetus for Electo Electro. This paper will discuss the outcomes and iterations of the project, specifically how it was adapted to an online format. It will also delve into specific design and technical decisions regarding the interface, branding and collateral materials, and the networked aspect of the project. There have been recent developments concerning the debate surrounding voting technology and security which will be discussed as well

E-Voting: Kebutuhan Vs. Kesiapan (Menyongsong) E-Demokrasi

Along with the success of e-voting in the election of leaders at the village in Jembrana District, Bali Province, the Chief Electoral Hamlet (Kelihan Banjar Dinas) in the Village Yehembang, Pohsanten Village, District and Village Mendoyo Perancak, Jembrana district by using the e-ID card, opening new opportunities for Indonesia to use these methods in the upcoming election. However, by retaining Article 88 of Law Number 32 Year 2004 regarding Regional Government provides the opportunity for areas not yet ready for e-voting to keep using conventional mencontreng election or vote

Voting Booths and Interactive Art Installations: The Diebold Accuvote TS in Context

In 2016, I created an interactive installation called Video Voto Matic. This project was a mashup between the Votomatic voting system and a Roland TR-808 drum machine. To coincide with the 2020 election season, I am currently working on an update of the project that will include a touch screen voting interface and multiple networked stations that also produce audio and video output. The interface will be housed in the same voting booths that once housed the Diebold Accuvote TS. The Diebold Accuvote TS is a screen-based voting machine that does not utilize paper as a backup. Researchers have examined it and have determined that it is easy to hack. They have also made several recommendations to improve security and accountability in voting machines. In addition to the many security flaws, the Accuvote has a long and controversial history. This paper will also discuss preceding interactive art installations that involve networking, unique user interfaces, and high levels of audience engagement—specifically, works from David Byrne, Matthew Matthew, Luke Jerram, the ReacTable team, Jennifer and Kevin McCoy, and Sheryl Oring

Elektronik Oy Verme Sistemlerinde Guvenlik: Deneyimler ve Turkiye Icin Oneriler

Electronic voting systems are no longer a theoretical matter and they have been successfully used in elections and referendums in some countries. With such systems some problems of paper ballots can be eliminated easily. However, these systems have their own security problems. In this article, first an evaluation of the India, Brazil and Venezuela examples within the context of the criteria for voting systems for just elections is made. Next, some suggestions about the electronic voting systems and the voting process that can be used for a secure and problem free manner application of such systems are proposed.Electronic voting systems, security, ballot, multiple vote, wholesale fraud, retail fraud, NP-completeness, Mercuri Method.

American Digital Election Infrastructure: Policy, Risks, Options

Why is US digital election infrastructure (DEI) in a vulnerable state and what are the possible options to better secure it? To answer these questions systematically, federal policy and current DEI are analyzed through a risk management lens, including both elite and democratic models of risk management. This analysis suggests that DEI is at risk because federal policy currently enables states to use Direct-Recording Electronic (DRE) voting machines without a paper trail and allows states to manage their own risk environment with respect to digital voter registration databases (VRDs). This in turn produces significant variance in outcomes in levels of cyber security and priority of VRD governance. These factors combine to present serious vulnerabilities that could be exploited in a targeted attack during a Presidential election to disastrous consequence. As a result, policy options and potential technical improvements to DEI should be explored

Technical Audit of an Electronic Polling Station: A Case Study

P. 16-30This paper shows the lack of standard procedures to audit e-voting systems and also describes a practical process of auditing an e-voting experience based on a Direct-recording Electronic system (D.R.E). This system has been tested in a real situation, in the city council of Coahuila, Mexico, in November 2008. During the auditing, several things were kept in mind, in particular those critical in complex contexts, as democratic election processes are. The auditing process is divided into three main complementary stages: analysis of voting protocol, analysis of polling station hardware elements, and analysis of the software involved. Each stage contains several items which have to be analyzed at low level with the aim to detect and resolve possible security problemsS