Mutual recognition of national military airworthiness authorities: A streamlined assessment process

The Air and Space Interoperability Council (ASIC) has adopted the European Defence Agency (EDA) process for interregulatory military airworthiness authority recognition. However, there are gaps in the application of this process to nations outside of the European Union. This paper proposes a model that can effectively map diverse technical airworthiness regulatory frameworks. This model, referred to as the Product-Behaviour-Process (PBP) Bow-Tie model, provides the systematic structure needed to represent and compare regulatory frameworks. The PBP Bow-Tie model identifies key points of difference that need to be addressed, during inter-agency recognition between the two regulatory authorities. With the intention to adopt global use of the EDA process, the proposed PBP Bow-Tie model can be used as a basis for the successful recognition of regulatory frameworks outside of the European Union. Iris plots produced from the implementation of this model are presented, and proposed as a suitable means of illustrating the outcome of an assessment, and of supporting the comparisons of results. A comparative analysis of the Australian Defence Force and New Zealand Defence Force airworthiness regulatory frameworks is used as a case study. The case study clearly illustrates the effectiveness of the model in discerning regulatory framework differences; moreover, it has offered an opportunity to explore the limitations of the Iris plot

Analisis Risiko Ketidaktercapaianya Standar ( ET:BT ) Berthing Time Pelayanan Kapal Dengan Metode Fuzzy dan Bowtie Analysis di PT. Pelindo III Cabang Gresik

Background - PT Pelindo III is located at PT Pelindo Tanjung Perak Surabaya. Ship visits in the last three years have increased. Based on a report published on the official website of PT Pelindo III, namely an increase from 2015–2017 was 77,104,361 Gross Tonage in 2015, then 92,622,356 Gross Tonage in 2016, and 94,346,201 Gross Tonage in 2017. Objective - This study aims to determine the causes and impacts of risks that may occur due to non-achievement of performance standards (ET:BT) Berthing Time for ship services at PT Pelindo III Gresik Branch and identify the biggest risks. Design/Methodology/Approach - This research is a qualitative research using primary data and secondary data. Data collection techniques in this study are through observation, interviews and documentation. Findings - The results of this study indicate that there are four risks, namely: Dwelling Time, Idle Time and High Notes, Ship Queuing, and Trucking. The biggest risk is in Dwelling Time with a probability value of 0.96 which means that the level of risk posed is very risky. Research implications - This research contributes to employees who work at PT Pelindo III Gresik Branch who knows operational conditions both in the field and outside the field. Research limitations - This research was only conducted on the operational system of PT Pelindo III Gresik Branc

Model-Driven Development of Safety Architectures

We describe the use of model-driven development for safety assurance of a pioneering NASA flight operation involving a fleet of small unmanned aircraft systems (sUAS) flying beyond visual line of sight. The central idea is to develop a safety architecture that provides the basis for risk assessment and visualization within a safety case, the formal justification of acceptable safety required by the aviation regulatory authority. A safety architecture is composed from a collection of bow tie diagrams (BTDs), a practical approach to manage safety risk by linking the identified hazards to the appropriate mitigation measures. The safety justification for a given unmanned aircraft system (UAS) operation can have many related BTDs. In practice, however, each BTD is independently developed, which poses challenges with respect to incremental development, maintaining consistency across different safety artifacts when changes occur, and in extracting and presenting stakeholder specific information relevant for decision making. We show how a safety architecture reconciles the various BTDs of a system, and, collectively, provide an overarching picture of system safety, by considering them as views of a unified model. We also show how it enables model-driven development of BTDs, replete with validations, transformations, and a range of views. Our approach, which we have implemented in our toolset, AdvoCATE, is illustrated with a running example drawn from a real UAS safety case. The models and some of the innovations described here were instrumental in successfully obtaining regulatory flight approval

Aplicação do Método SFA (Safety Function Analisys) a um. Posto de Transformação de Energia Eléctrica da Renova

Riscos Industriais e Emergentes, 2009 pp. 827-844Este artigo descreve um estudo de segurança que aplica uma metodologia recente, desenvolvida para avaliação do risco de acidente ocupacional, chamada “Safety Function Analisys – SFA”. Este método insere-se no âmbito geral das metodologias de avaliação de risco, sendo no entanto mais específico que os métodos tradicionais. Por um lado, esta especificidade resulta do facto do SFA apenas avaliar os perigos mais críticos, previamente identificados através de outros métodos mais abrangentes. Por outro lado, tem como principal objecto de estudo a análise do “estado de segurança” de um sistema através da avaliação das Funções de Segurança (ou existentes ou em falta no sistema em causa). O SFA integra conceitos e abordagens actuais, nomeadamente os conceitos de “Safety Barrier” e “Safety Function”. O conceito “Safety Barrier” ou “Barreira de Segurança”, é usado para identificar quais os meios físicos e/ou não físicos concebidos para prevenir, controlar ou atenuar acontecimentos indesejáveis ou acidentes. De forma análoga, uma “Safety Function” ou “Função de Segurança” é, por definição, uma medida técnica, organizacional ou a combinação de ambas, que tem como função reduzir a probabilidade e/ou as consequências da ocorrência de acidentes. No presente trabalho aplica-se a metodologia SFA a um Posto de Transformação de Energia Eléctrica da Renova. Para os perigos com risco mais elevado foram avaliadas cada uma das Funções de Segurança necessárias. Dessa avaliação resultaram propostas de alteração do estado da respectiva Barreira de Segurança, ou não, consoante a sua aceitabilidade

Safety function analysis in an industrial production process

Dissertação para obtenção do Grau de Mestre em Engenharia e Gestão IndustrialAim: The purpose of this work was to identify and assess safety features on a production line of paper manufacturer called Renova. The assessment includes technical as well as organisational factors. The study was carried out through the evaluation of safety functions (SF), either present or absent in the system analyzed. Methods: The methodology applied was the SFA (Safety Function Analysis), which was developed by Harms-Ringdahl in 2001 and was updated further, in 2011 (draft version). The analytical framework was applied in two processes (raw material loading and transversal cut of log) of a production line (Line H4) of Renova. Results: In the first process analyzed (raw material loading), 47 safety functions (SF) were identified and evaluated, whereas 36 SF were assessed in the second case (transversal cut of log). The evaluation has shown that most of the SF considered are in good condition and being well monitored, therefore they do not need any improvements. In contrast, this work has also identified a number of safety functions that need essential improvements. Conclusions: As a consequence of this SFA analysis, the author proposes a number of specific recommendations to improve safety and the system’s performance in general. Since Renova is a manufacturer of paper products, fire safety is of paramount importance and one of the most relevant recommendations is perhaps the implementation of thermo graphic tests to identify possible hot spots that may originate a fire

Análise de funções de segurança num processo industrial e num posto de transformação de energia eléctrica, numa industria papeleira, aplicando a metodologia SFA

Dissertação apresentada na Faculdade de Ciências e Tecnologia da Universidade Nova de Lisboa para obtenção do grau de Mestre em Engenharia IndustrialEste trabalho descreve um estudo de segurança que aplica um método recente, desenvolvido para avaliação do risco de acidente ocupacional, chamado “Safety Function Analisys – SFA”. Este método insere-se no âmbito geral das metodologias de avaliação de risco, sendo no entanto mais específico que os métodos tradicionais. Por um lado, esta especificidade resulta do facto do SFA apenas avaliar os perigos mais críticos, previamente identificados através de outros métodos mais abrangentes. Por outro lado, tem como principal objecto de estudo a análise do “estado de segurança” de um sistema através da avaliação das Funções de Segurança (ou existentes ou em falta no sistema em causa). O SFA integra conceitos e abordagens actuais, nomeadamente os conceitos de “Safety Barrier” e “Safety Function”. O conceito “Safety Barrier” ou “Barreira de Segurança”, é usado para identificar quais os meios físicos e/ou não físicos concebidos para prevenir, controlar ou atenuar acontecimentos indesejáveis ou acidentes. De forma análoga, uma “Safety Function” ou “Função de Segurança” é, por definição, (Ringhdal, 2001), “uma função técnica, organizacional ou a combinação de ambas, que podem reduzir a probabilidade e/ou as consequências da ocorrência de acidentes ou outros eventos indesejáveis num sistema”. O presente trabalho aplica a metodologia SFA a um Posto de Transformação de Energia Eléctrica (PT) e a um Paletizador de Caixas de Cartão, ambos da Renova. Para os perigos com risco mais elevado foram avaliadas cada uma das Funções de Segurança necessárias, sendo 59 no caso do PT e 32 no caso do Paletizador. Dessa avaliação resultaram propostas de alteração do estado da respectiva Barreira de Segurança, ou não, consoante a sua aceitabilidade