Modular Formal Verification of Rust Programs with Unsafe Blocks

Rust is a modern systems programming language whose type system guarantees memory safety. For the sake of expressivity and performance it allows programmers to relax typing rules temporarily, using unsafe code blocks. However, in unsafe blocks, the burden of making sure that the code does not end up having undefined behaviour is on the programmer. Even most expert programmers make mistakes and a memory safety bug in an unsafe block renders all the type system guarantees void. To address this problem we are trying to verify soundness of Rust unsafe code applying our Modular Symbolic Execution algorithm. This text outlines our approach and the progress that has been made so far.Comment: 22 pages, 13 listings, 3 figures, Technical report, Appendix by Bart Jacob

Bringing Iris into the Verified Software Toolchain

The Verified Software Toolchain (VST) is a system for proving correctness of C programs using separation logic. By connecting to the verified compiler CompCert, it produces the strongest possible guarantees of correctness for real C code that we can compile and run. VST included concurrency from its inception, in the form of reasoning about lock invariants, but concurrent separation logic (CSL) has advanced by leaps and bounds since then. In this paper, we describe efforts to integrate advancements from Iris, a state-of-the-art mechanized CSL, into VST. Some features of Iris (ghost state and invariants) are re-implemented in VST from the ground up; others (Iris Proof Mode) are imported from the Iris development; still others (proof rules for atomic operations) are axiomatized, with the hope that they will be made foundational in future versions. The result is a system that can prove correctness of sophisticated concurrent programs implemented in C, with fine-grained locking and non-blocking atomic operations, that yields varying soundness guarantees depending on the features used.Comment: 21 pages, 4 figure

Understanding and evolving the Rust programming language

Rust is a young systems programming language that aims to fill the gap between high-level languages—which provide strong static guarantees like memory and thread safety—and low-level languages—which give the programmer fine-grained control over data layout and memory management. This dissertation presents two projects establishing the first formal foundations for Rust, enabling us to better understand and evolve this important language: RustBelt and Stacked Borrows. RustBelt is a formal model of Rust’s type system, together with a soundness proof establishing memory and thread safety. The model is designed to verify the safety of a number of intricate APIs from the Rust standard library, despite the fact that the implementations of these APIs use unsafe language features. Stacked Borrows is a proposed extension of the Rust specification, which enables the compiler to use the strong aliasing information in Rust’s types to better analyze and optimize the code it is compiling. The adequacy of this specification is evaluated not only formally, but also by running real Rust code in an instrumented version of Rust’s Miri interpreter that implements the Stacked Borrows semantics. RustBelt is built on top of Iris, a language-agnostic framework, implemented in the Coq proof assistant, for building higher-order concurrent separation logics. This dissertation begins by giving an introduction to Iris, and explaining how Iris enables the derivation of complex high-level reasoning principles from a few simple ingredients. In RustBelt, this technique is exploited crucially to introduce the lifetime logic, which provides a novel separation-logic account of borrowing, a key distinguishing feature of the Rust type system.Rust ist eine junge systemnahe Programmiersprache, die es sich zum Ziel gesetzt hat, die Lücke zu schließen zwischen Sprachen mit hohem Abstraktionsniveau, die vor Speicher- und Nebenläufigkeitsfehlern schützen, und Sprachen mit niedrigem Abstraktionsniveau, welche dem Programmierer detaillierte Kontrolle über die Repräsentation von Daten und die Verwaltung des Speichers ermöglichen. Diese Dissertation stellt zwei Projekte vor, welche die ersten formalen Grundlagen für Rust zum Zwecke des besseren Verständnisses und der weiteren Entwicklung dieser wichtigen Sprache legen: RustBelt und Stacked Borrows. RustBelt ist ein formales Modell des Typsystems von Rust einschließlich eines Korrektheitsbeweises, welcher die Sicherheit von Speicherzugriffen und Nebenläufigkeit zeigt. Das Modell ist darauf ausgerichtet, einige komplexe Komponenten der Standardbibliothek von Rust zu verifizieren, obwohl die Implementierung dieser Komponenten unsichere Sprachkonstrukte verwendet. Stacked Borrows ist eine Erweiterung der Spezifikation von Rust, die es dem Compiler ermöglicht, den Quelltext mit Hilfe der im Typsystem kodierten Alias-Informationen besser zu analysieren und zu optimieren. Die Tauglichkeit dieser Spezifikation wird nicht nur formal belegt, sondern auch an echten Programmen getestet, und zwar mit Hilfe einer um Stacked Borrows erweiterten Version des Interpreters Miri. RustBelt basiert auf Iris, welches die Konstruktion von Separationslogiken für beliebige Programmiersprachen im Beweisassistenten Coq ermöglicht. Diese Dissertation beginnt mit einer Einführung in Iris und erklärt, wie komplexe Beweismethoden mit Hilfe weniger einfacher Bausteine hergeleitet werden können. In RustBelt wird diese Technik für die Umsetzung der „Lebenszeitlogik“ verwendet, einer Erweiterung der Separationslogik mit dem Konzept von „Leihgaben“ (borrows), welche eine wichtige Rolle im Typsystem von Rust spielen.This research was supported in part by a European Research Council (ERC) Consolidator Grant for the project "RustBelt", funded under the European Union’s Horizon 2020 Framework Programme (grant agreement no. 683289)

Automated and foundational verification of low-level programs

Formal verification is a promising technique to ensure the reliability of low-level programs like operating systems and hypervisors, since it can show the absence of whole classes of bugs and prevent critical vulnerabilities. However, to realize the full potential of formal verification for real-world low-level programs one has to overcome several challenges, including: (1) dealing with the complexities of realistic models of real-world programming languages; (2) ensuring the trustworthiness of the verification, ideally by providing foundational proofs (i.e., proofs that can be checked by a general-purpose proof assistant); and (3) minimizing the manual effort required for verification by providing a high degree of automation. This dissertation presents multiple projects that advance formal verification along these three axes: RefinedC provides the first approach for verifying C code that combines foundational proofs with a high degree of automation via a novel refinement and ownership type system. Islaris shows how to scale verification of assembly code to realistic models of modern instruction set architectures-in particular, Armv8-A and RISC-V. DimSum develops a decentralized approach for reasoning about programs that consist of components written in multiple different languages (e.g., assembly and C), as is common for low-level programs. RefinedC and Islaris rest on Lithium, a novel proof engine for separation logic that combines automation with foundational proofs.Formale Verifikation ist eine vielversprechende Technik, um die Verlässlichkeit von grundlegenden Programmen wie Betriebssystemen sicherzustellen. Um das volle Potenzial formaler Verifikation zu realisieren, müssen jedoch mehrere Herausforderungen gemeistert werden: Erstens muss die Komplexität von realistischen Modellen von Programmiersprachen wie C oder Assembler gehandhabt werden. Zweitens muss die Vertrauenswürdigkeit der Verifikation sichergestellt werden, idealerweise durch maschinenüberprüfbare Beweise. Drittens muss die Verifikation automatisiert werden, um den manuellen Aufwand zu minimieren. Diese Dissertation präsentiert mehrere Projekte, die formale Verifikation entlang dieser Achsen weiterentwickeln: RefinedC ist der erste Ansatz für die Verifikation von C Code, der maschinenüberprüfbare Beweise mit einem hohen Grad an Automatisierung vereint. Islaris zeigt, wie die Verifikation von Assembler zu realistischen Modellen von modernen Befehlssatzarchitekturen wie Armv8-A oder RISC-V skaliert werden kann. DimSum entwickelt einen neuen Ansatz für die Verifizierung von Programmen, die aus Komponenten in mehreren Programmiersprachen bestehen (z.B., C und Assembler), wie es oft bei grundlegenden Programmen wie Betriebssystemen der Fall ist. RefinedC und Islaris basieren auf Lithium, eine neue Automatisierungstechnik für Separationslogik, die maschinenüberprüfbare Beweise und Automatisierung verbindet.This research was supported in part by a Google PhD Fellowship, in part by awards from Android Security's ASPIRE program and from Google Research, and in part by a European Research Council (ERC) Consolidator Grant for the project "RustBelt", funded under the European Union’s Horizon 2020 Framework Programme (grant agreement no. 683289)

A Closer Look at the Security Risks in the Rust Ecosystem

Rust is an emerging programming language designed for the development of systems software. To facilitate the reuse of Rust code, crates.io, as a central package registry of the Rust ecosystem, hosts thousands of third-party Rust packages. The openness of crates.io enables the growth of the Rust ecosystem but comes with security risks by severe security advisories. Although Rust guarantees a software program to be safe via programming language features and strict compile-time checking, the unsafe keyword in Rust allows developers to bypass compiler safety checks for certain regions of code. Prior studies empirically investigate the memory safety and concurrency bugs in the Rust ecosystem, as well as the usage of unsafe keywords in practice. Nonetheless, the literature lacks a systematic investigation of the security risks in the Rust ecosystem. In this paper, we perform a comprehensive investigation into the security risks present in the Rust ecosystem, asking ``what are the characteristics of the vulnerabilities, what are the characteristics of the vulnerable packages, and how are the vulnerabilities fixed in practice?''. To facilitate the study, we first compile a dataset of 433 vulnerabilities, 300 vulnerable code repositories, and 218 vulnerability fix commits in the Rust ecosystem, spanning over 7 years. With the dataset, we characterize the types, life spans, and evolution of the disclosed vulnerabilities. We then characterize the popularity, categorization, and vulnerability density of the vulnerable Rust packages, as well as their versions and code regions affected by the disclosed vulnerabilities. Finally, we characterize the complexity of vulnerability fixes and localities of corresponding code changes, and inspect how practitioners fix vulnerabilities in Rust packages with various localities.Comment: preprint of accepted TOSEM pape

Verus: Verifying Rust Programs using Linear Ghost Types (extended version)

The Rust programming language provides a powerful type system that checks linearity and borrowing, allowing code to safely manipulate memory without garbage collection and making Rust ideal for developing low-level, high-assurance systems. For such systems, formal verification can be useful to prove functional correctness properties beyond type safety. This paper presents Verus, an SMT-based tool for formally verifying Rust programs. With Verus, programmers express proofs and specifications using the Rust language, allowing proofs to take advantage of Rust's linear types and borrow checking. We show how this allows proofs to manipulate linearly typed permissions that let Rust code safely manipulate memory, pointers, and concurrent resources. Verus organizes proofs and specifications using a novel mode system that distinguishes specifications, which are not checked for linearity and borrowing, from executable code and proofs, which are checked for linearity and borrowing. We formalize Verus' linearity, borrowing, and modes in a small lambda calculus, for which we prove type safety and termination of specifications and proofs. We demonstrate Verus on a series of examples, including pointer-manipulating code (an xor-based doubly linked list), code with interior mutability, and concurrent code

Mechanizing Webassembly Proposals

WebAssembly is a modern low-level programming language designed to provide high performance and security. To enable these goals, the language specifies a relatively small number of low-level types, instructions, and language constructs. The language is proven to be sound with respect to its types and execution, and a separate mechanized formalization of the specification and type soundness proofs confirms this. As an emerging technology, the language is continuously being developed, with modifications being proposed and discussed in the open and on a frequent basis. In order to ensure the soundness properties exhibited by the original core language are maintained as WebAssembly evolves, these proposals should too be mechanized and verified to be sound. This work extends the existing Isabelle mechanization to include three such proposals which add additional features to the language, and shows that the language maintains its soundness properties with their inclusion