Lotus QuickPlace As A Knowledge Management Solution For MSc (IT) Program Courses

Knowledge Management is one of the hottest topics in organization nowadays. The focus of the efforts of many businesses is to meet the challenges of competition in the modern knowledge economy. It also provides a powerful way of looking at the way the organization organizes itself and uses its intellectual resources and promises a means of humanizing the approach to modern technology, putting the understanding of human intellect and motivation at the center. It is up to organizations to determine what information qualifies as intellectual and knowledge-based assets because not all information is knowledge. In general, however, intellectual and knowledge-based assets fall into one of two categories that is, explicit or tacit. Included among the former are assets such as patents, trademarks, business plans, marketing research and customer lists. As a general rule of thumb, explicit knowledge consists of anything that can be documented, archived and codified, often with the help of IT. The concept of tacit knowledge, or the know-how contained in the people's heads, is much harder to grasp. The challenge inherent with tacit knowledge is figuring out how to recognize, generate, share and manage it. In this case, Knowledge Management tools enable organization to overcome the above mention problem. Knowledge Management tools run the complete range, from standard, off-the-shelf e-mail packages to sophisticated collaboration tools designed specifically to support community building and identity. Generally, tools fall into one or more of the following categories namely e-learning applications, discussion and chat technologies, synchronous interaction tools, and search and data mining tools. This project "Lotus QuickPlace As A Knowledge Management Solution for MSc(IT) Program Courses" makes use of the technology of Knowledge Management tools to create solution in helping organization to develop a strategy that focuses on how to extract the knowledge in the organization. Lotus QuickPlace has been mainly used in implementing this project

Automating human skills : preliminary development of a human factors methodology to capture tacit cognitive skills

Despite technological advances in intelligent automation, it remains difficult for engineers to discern which manual tasks, or task components, would be most suitable for transfer to automated alternatives. This research aimed to develop an accurate methodology for the measurement of both observable and unobservable physical and cognitive activities used in manual tasks for the capture of tacit skill. Experienced operators were observed and interviewed in detail, following which, hierarchical task analysis and task decomposition methods were used to systematically explore and classify the qualitative data. Results showed that a task analysis / decomposition methodology identified different types of skill (e.g. procedural or declarative) and knowledge (explicit or tacit) indicating this methodology could be used for further human skill capture studies. The benefit of this research will be to provide a methodology to capture human skill so that complex manual tasks can be more efficiently transferred into automated processes

Values-Based Practice and Reflective Judgment

In this paper, I relate values-based practice (VBP) to clinical judgment more generally. I consider what claim, aside from the fundamental difference of facts and values, lies at the heart of VBP. Rather than, for example, construing values as subjective, I argue that it is more helpful to construe VBP as committed to the uncodifiability of value judgments. It is a form of particularism rather than principlism, but this need not deny the reality of values. Seen in this light, however, VBP is part of a broader conception of clinical judgment that can be compared with Kant’s conception of reflective judgment. This is a useful way of marking similarities between a number of issues raised in philosophy, which can inform a better understanding of clinical judgment

Tacit Representations and Artificial Intelligence: Hidden Lessons from an Embodied Perspective on Cognition

In this paper, I explore how an embodied perspective on cognition might inform research on artificial intelligence. Many embodied cognition theorists object to the central role that representations play on the traditional view of cognition. Based on these objections, it may seem that the lesson from embodied cognition is that AI should abandon representation as a central component of intelligence. However, I argue that the lesson from embodied cognition is actually that AI research should shift its focus from how to utilize explicit representations to how to create and use tacit representations. To develop this suggestion, I provide an overview of the commitments of the classical view and distinguish three critiques of the role that representations play in that view. I provide further exploration and defense of Daniel Dennett’s distinction between explicit and tacit representations. I argue that we should understand the embodied cognition approach using a framework that includes tacit representations. Given this perspective, I will explore some AI research areas that may be recommended by an embodied perspective on cognition

Personal Agents for Implicit Culture Support

We present an implementation of a multi-agent system that aims at solving the problem of tacit knowledge transfer by means of experiences sharing. In particular, we consider experiences of use of pieces of information. Each agent incorporates a system for implicit culture support (SICS) whose goal is to realize the acceptance of the suggested information. The SICS permits a transparent (implicit) sharing of the information about the use, e.g., requesting and accepting pieces of information

The Logic of Joint Ability in Two-Player Tacit Games

Logics of joint strategic ability have recently received attention, with arguably the most influential being those in a family that includes Coalition Logic (CL) and Alternating-time Temporal Logic (ATL). Notably, both CL and ATL bypass the epistemic issues that underpin Schelling-type coordination problems, by apparently relying on the meta-level assumption of (perfectly reliable) communication between cooperating rational agents. Yet such epistemic issues arise naturally in settings relevant to ATL and CL: these logics are standardly interpreted on structures where agents move simultaneously, opening the possibility that an agent cannot foresee the concurrent choices of other agents. In this paper we introduce a variant of CL we call Two-Player Strategic Coordination Logic (SCL2). The key novelty of this framework is an operator for capturing coalitional ability when the cooperating agents cannot share strategic information. We identify significant differences in the expressive power and validities of SCL2 and CL2, and present a sound and complete axiomatization for SCL2. We briefly address conceptual challenges when shifting attention to games with more than two players and stronger notions of rationality

Clinical judgement, expertise and skilled coping

Medicine involves specific practical expertise as well as more general context-independent medical knowledge. This raises the question, what is the nature of the expertise involved? Is there a model of clinical judgement or understanding that can accommodate both elements? This paper begins with a summary of a published account of the kinds of situation-specific skill found in anaesthesia. It authors claim that such skills are often neglected because of a prejudice in favour of the ‘technical rationality’ exemplified in evidence-based medicine but they do not themselves offer a general account of the relation of practical expertise and general medical knowledge. The philosopher Hubert Dreyfus provides one model of the relation of general knowledge to situation-specific skilled coping. He claims that the former logically depends on the latter and provides two arguments, which I articulate in the second section, for this. But he mars those arguments by building in the further assumption that such situation-specific responses must be understood as concept-free and thus mindless. That assumption is held in place by three arguments all of which I criticize in the next section to give a unified account of clinical judgement as both practical and conceptually structured and thus justified in the face of a prejudice in favour of ‘technical rationality’