Revisiting Evolutionary Game Theory

International audienceEvolutionary game theory is a relatively young mathematical theory that aims to formalize in mathematical terms evolution models in biology. In recent years this paradigm has penetrated more and more into other areas such as the linguistics, economics and engineering. The current theory of evolutionary game makes an implicit assumption that the evolution is driven by selfishness of individuals who interact with each others. In mathematical terms this can be stated as "an individual equals a player in a game model". This assumption turns out to be quite restrictive in modeling evolution in biology. It is now more and more accepted among biologist that the evolution is driven by the selfish interests of large groups of individuals; a group may correspond for example to a whole beehive or to an ants' nest. In this paper we propose an alternative paradigm for modeling evolution where a player does not necessarily represent an interacting individual but a whole class of such individuals

Behavioral Biology, the Rational Actor Model, and the New Feminist Agenda

In this paper, we will incorporate gender consciousness into critiques of the rational actor model by revisiting Carol Gilligan\u27s account of moral development. Economics itself, led by the insights that have come from game theory, is reexamining trust, altruism, reciprocity and empathy. Behavioral economics, defined as the combination of psychology and economics that investigates what happens in markets in which some of the agents display human limitations and complications, further explores the implications of a more robust conception of human motivation. We argue that the most likely source for a comprehensive theory will come from the integration of behavioral economics with behavioral biology, and that this project will in turn depend on the insights that come from evolutionary analysis, genetics and neuroscience. Considering the biological basis of human behavior, however, and, indeed, realistically considering the role of trust, altruism, reciprocity and empathy in market transactions, we argue, will require reexamination of the role of gender in the construction of human society. This paper begins by revisiting Gilligan, and arguing that her articulation of relational feminism faltered, in part, because she could not identify the source of the stereotypically feminine. Second, we will consider the ways in which the limitations of the rational actor model mean that law and economics could also not resolve the relational concerns that Gilligan raised. Third, we will discuss the rediscovery of gender that is coming out of the gendered results of game theory trials, and the new research on the biological basis of gender differences. Finally, we conclude that incorporating the insights of this new research into law and the social sciences will require a new methodology. Instead of narrow minded focus on the incentive effects in the marginal transaction, we argue that reconsideration of stereotypically masculine and feminine traits requires an emphasis on balance

The Evolution of Extortion in Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma Games

Iterated games are a fundamental component of economic and evolutionary game theory. They describe situations where two players interact repeatedly and have the possibility to use conditional strategies that depend on the outcome of previous interactions. In the context of evolution of cooperation, repeated games represent the mechanism of reciprocation. Recently a new class of strategies has been proposed, so called 'zero determinant strategies'. These strategies enforce a fixed linear relationship between one's own payoff and that of the other player. A subset of those strategies are 'extortioners' which ensure that any increase in the own payoff exceeds that of the other player by a fixed percentage. Here we analyze the evolutionary performance of this new class of strategies. We show that in reasonably large populations they can act as catalysts for the evolution of cooperation, similar to tit-for-tat, but they are not the stable outcome of natural selection. In very small populations, however, relative payoff differences between two players in a contest matter, and extortioners hold their ground. Extortion strategies do particularly well in co-evolutionary arms races between two distinct populations: significantly, they benefit the population which evolves at the slower rate - an instance of the so-called Red King effect. This may affect the evolution of interactions between host species and their endosymbionts.Comment: contains 4 figure

The modern versus extended evolutionary synthesis : sketch of an intra-genomic gene's eye view for the evolutionary-genetic underpinning of epigenetic and developmental evolution

Studying the phenotypic evolution of organisms in terms of populations of genes and genotypes, the Modern Synthesis (MS) conceptualizes biological evolution in terms of 'inter-organismal' interactions among genes sitting in the different individual organisms that constitute a population. It 'black-boxes' the complex 'intra-organismic' molecular and developmental epigenetics mediating between genotypes and phenotypes. To conceptually integrate epigenetics and evo-devo into evolutionary theory, advocates of an Extended Evolutionary Synthesis (EES) argue that the MS's reductive gene-centrism should be abandoned in favor of a more inclusive organism-centered approach. To push the debate to a new level of understanding, we introduce the evolutionary biology of 'intra-genomic conflict' (IGC) to the controversy. This strategy is based on a twofold rationale. First, the field of IGC is both ‘gene-centered’ and 'intra-organismic' and, as such, could build a bridge between the gene-centered MS and the intra-organismic fields of epigenetics and evo-devo. And second, it is increasingly revealed that IGC plays a significant causal role in epigenetic and developmental evolution and even in speciation. Hence, to deal with the ‘discrepancy’ between the ‘gene-centered’ MS and the ‘intra-organismic’ fields of epigenetics and evo-devo, we sketch a conceptual solution in terms of ‘intra-genomic conflict and compromise’ – an ‘intra-genomic gene’s eye view’ that thinks in terms of intra-genomic ‘evolutionarily stable strategies’ (ESSs) among numerous and various DNA regions and elements – to evolutionary-genetically underwrite both epigenetic and developmental evolution, as such questioning the ‘gene-de-centered’ stance put forward by EES-advocates

Mutualism and evolutionary multiplayer games: revisiting the Red King

Coevolution of two species is typically thought to favour the evolution of faster evolutionary rates helping a species keep ahead in the Red Queen race, where `it takes all the running you can do to stay where you are'. In contrast, if species are in a mutualistic relationship, it was proposed that the Red King effect may act, where it can be beneficial to evolve slower than the mutualistic species. The Red King hypothesis proposes that the species which evolves slower can gain a larger share of the benefits. However, the interactions between the two species may involve multiple individuals. To analyse such a situation, we resort to evolutionary multiplayer games. Even in situations where evolving slower is beneficial in a two-player setting, faster evolution may be favoured in a multiplayer setting. The underlying features of multiplayer games can be crucial for the distribution of benefits. They also suggest a link between the evolution of the rate of evolution and group size

The resurrection of group selection as a theory of human cooperation

Two books edited by members of the MacArthur Norms and Preferences Network (an interdisciplinary group, mainly anthropologists and economists) are reviewed here. These books in large part reflect a renewed interest in group selection that has occurred among these researchers: they promote the theory that human cooperative behavior evolved via selective processes which favored biological and/or cultural group-level adaptations as opposed to individual-level adaptations. In support of this theory, an impressive collection of cross-cultural data are presented which suggest that participants in experimental economic games often do not behave as self-interested income maximizers; this lack of self-interest is regarded as evidence of group selection. In this review, problems with these data and with the theory are discussed. On the data side, it is argued that even if a behavior seems individually-maladaptive in a game context, there is no reason to believe that it would have been that way in ancestral contexts, since the environments of experimental games do not at all resemble those in which ancestral humans would have interacted cooperatively. And on the theory side, it is argued that it is premature to invoke group selection in order to explain human cooperation, because more parsimonious individual-level theories have not yet been exhausted. In summary, these books represent ambitious interdisciplinary contributions on an important topic, and they include unique and useful data; however, they do not make a convincing case that the evolution of human cooperation required group selection

For the good of the group? Exploring group-level evolutionary adaptations using multilevel selection theory.

In this paper, we present an evolutionary framework, multilevel selection theory (MLS), that is highly amenable to existing social psychological theory and empiricism. MLS provides an interpretation of natural selection that shows how group-beneficial traits can evolve, a prevalent implication of social psychological data. We outline the theory and provide a number of example topics, focusing on prosociality, policing behavior, gossip, brainstorming, distributed cognition, and social identity. We also show that individual differences can produce important group-level outcomes depending on differential aggregation of individual types and relate this to the evolutionary dynamics underlying group traits. Drawing on existing work, we show how social psychologists can integrate this framework into their research program and suggest future directions for research

Evolutionary prisoner's dilemma game with dynamic preferential selection

We study a modified prisoner's dilemma game taking place on two-dimensional disordered square lattices. The players are pure strategists and can either cooperate or defect with their immediate neighbors. In the generations each player update its strategy by following one of the neighboring strategies with a probability dependent on the payoff difference. The neighbor selection obeys a dynamic preferential rule, i.e., the more frequently a neighbor's strategy was adopted by the focal player in the previous rounds, the larger probability it will be chosen to refer to in the subsequent rounds. It is found that cooperation is substantially promoted due to this simple selection mechanism. Corresponding analysis is provided by the investigations of the distribution of players' impact weights, persistence, and as well as correlation function.Comment: 7 pages, 5 figure