17 research outputs found
Interpretations of support among arguments
The theory of formal argumentation distinguishes and unifies various notions of attack, support and preference among arguments, and principles are used to classify the semantics of various kinds of argumentation frameworks. In this paper, we consider the case in which we know that an argument is supporting another one, but we do not know yet which kind of support it is. Most common in the literature is to classify support as deductive, necessary, or evidentiary. Alternatively, support is characterized using principles. We discuss the interpretation of support using a legal divorce action. Technical results and proofs can be found in an accompanying technical report
Change in abstract bipolar argumentation systems (SUM 2015)
International audienceAn argumentation system can undergo changes (addition or removal of arguments/interactions), particularly in multiagent systems. In this paper, we are interested in dynamics of abstract bipolar argumentation systems, i.e. argumentation systems using two kinds of interaction: attacks and supports. We propose change characterizations that use and extend previous results defined in the case of Dung abstract argumentation systems
An Axiomatic Approach to Support in Argumentation
International audienceIn the context of bipolar argumentation (argumentation with two kinds of interaction, attacks and supports), we present an axiomatic approach for taking into account a special interpretation of the support relation, the necessary support. We propose constraints that should be imposed to a bipolar argumentation system using this interpretation. Some of these constraints concern the new attack relations, others concern acceptability. We extend basic Dung’s framework in different ways in order to propose frameworks suitable for encoding these constraints. By the way, we propose a formal study of properties of necessary support
Abstract Argumentation and Answer Set Programming: Two Faces of Nelson’s Logic
In this work, we show that both logic programming and abstract argumentation frameworks can be interpreted in terms of Nelson’s constructive logic N4. We do so by formalising, in this logic, two principles that we call noncontradictory inference and strengthened closed world assumption: the first states that no belief can be held based on contradictory evidence while the latter forces both unknown and contradictory evidence to be regarded as false. Using these principles, both logic programming and abstract argumentation frameworks are translated into constructive logic in a modular way and using the object language. Logic programming implication and abstract argumentation supports become, in the translation, a new implication connective following the noncontradictory inference principle. Attacks are then represented by combining this new implication with strong negation. Under consideration in Theory and Practice of Logic Programming (TPLP)
A Labelling Framework for Probabilistic Argumentation
The combination of argumentation and probability paves the way to new
accounts of qualitative and quantitative uncertainty, thereby offering new
theoretical and applicative opportunities. Due to a variety of interests,
probabilistic argumentation is approached in the literature with different
frameworks, pertaining to structured and abstract argumentation, and with
respect to diverse types of uncertainty, in particular the uncertainty on the
credibility of the premises, the uncertainty about which arguments to consider,
and the uncertainty on the acceptance status of arguments or statements.
Towards a general framework for probabilistic argumentation, we investigate a
labelling-oriented framework encompassing a basic setting for rule-based
argumentation and its (semi-) abstract account, along with diverse types of
uncertainty. Our framework provides a systematic treatment of various kinds of
uncertainty and of their relationships and allows us to back or question
assertions from the literature
Interpretations of Support Among Arguments
The theory of formal argumentation distinguishes and unifies various notions of attack, support and preference among arguments, and principles are used to classify the semantics of various kinds of argumentation frameworks. In this paper, we consider the case in which we know that an argument is supporting another one, but we do not know yet which kind of support it is. Most common in the literature is to classify support as deductive, necessary, or evidentiary. Alternatively, support is characterized using principles. We discuss the interpretation of support using a legal divorce action. Technical results and proofs can be found in an accompanying technical report